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ABSTRACT 
 
 
 Depending on fieldwork (semi-structured interviews, participant observation, and 
archival research) in Istanbul, I explore the impact of Islamic revival on the relationship 
between the state and non-Muslim minorities in Turkey and show there are important 
reforms shifting state policies toward non-Muslim minorities after the Islamicly-oriented 
Justice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi or AK Party) government 
came to power in 2002. I analyze the impact of the nation on the state and the 
reconstruction of the nation and the state through renewed local/global structures and 
actors in historical context to explain the meaning of recent changes.  
 The Ottoman millet system produced a pre-modern form of religious pluralism 
until the rise of nationalism in the nineteenth century although non-Muslim minorities 
were second-class subjects to Muslims. After the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, the 
emergence of modern Turkey as a “nationalizing state” seeking ethnic, linguistic, and 
religious homogeneity under the rule of the secularist Kemalist elites produced an 
exclusionary polity toward non-Muslim minorities. Islamic movements constructed an 
alternative nationhood narrative based on the glorified Ottoman past as a reaction to the 
Kemalist narratives maligning the Ottomans since the early years of the Republic. Yet, it 
was also an exclusionary narrative accusing religious minorities of collaborating with 
western powers and of being responsible for the collapse the Ottoman Empire. However, 
Islamic movements have reconstructed the Ottoman past as a usable past through the 
narratives of Ottoman tolerance and identified the Turkish nation with tolerance in a 
defensive manner as a response to the globalization process that poses serious legitimacy  
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concerns over Islamic movements through the identification of Islam with religious 
fanaticism. This identity politics, which I call defensive inclusion, has resonated with the 
emergence of a better relationship between Islamic movements and religious minorities 
for a few decades and the positive shift in state policies toward religious minorities since 
2002. However, Turkish/Islamic national identity does not perceive non-Muslims as part 
of the Turkish nation, but those who live with Turks under the rule of Turkish tolerance 
even if they are full citizens de jure. This situation, which I call neo-millet system, 
reproduces the second-class status of non-Muslim minorities in a polity operating through 
modern institutions even if the state is hospitable.  
 This dissertation not only challenges mainstream theories including the 
Civilizational Approach, Modernization Theory, Assertive vs. Passive Secularism, and 
Rational Choice Theory that account for the origin of religious freedom by revealing their 
weaknesses to explain the Turkish case, but also offers an alternative approach by 
examining religious freedom or the dynamics of inclusion/exclusion of religious 
minorities as a practice of the nation. This dissertation also engages with the ongoing 
debate about the relationship between globalization and the revival of identity politics. 
Contrary to mainstream theories suggesting that the revival of identity politics based on 
the reinvention of the past under the impact of globalization triggers religious fanaticism, 
this dissertation shows that identity politics based on a constructed past paves the way of 
the emergence of religious tolerance within Turkish/Islamic circles. This dissertation also 
sheds light on the progressive role of the past/tradition in the moderation of Islamic 
movements and the construction of a legitimate Islamic identity that embraces 
multiculturalism and tolerance in the globalized world. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 Religions and religious movements have increased their impact on politics and 
society in the recent history of the world. Although religious revival is sometimes seen 
as a threat to modern liberal societies because of the identification of religious 
movements with violence, authoritarianism, and dogmatism, a large number of studies 
(e.g., Casanova 1994, Smith 1991, Stepan 2000, Wilde 2007) show that in many regions 
of the world, religious movements have integrated into the modern world and begun to 
support modern societies. Yet, it is still a dominant discourse and perception that 
Islamic movements are not only a threat to the possibility of the modernization of the 
Islamic world, but also a threat to the stability of the world. I do not claim that Islamic 
movements are in no way responsible for the emergence and prevalence of anti-Islamic 
discourse, but the crucial point that I want to emphasize here is that totalizing and 
essentializing discourses about Islam and Islamic movements have been used to 
legitimize western intervention in Muslim societies and of the international support 
toward authoritarian regimes. 
 Religious freedom and the idea of the protection of religious minorities, as Saba 
Mahmoud (2012) shows, have been favorite sites for the exercise of western power over 
the Islamic world for a few centuries. The idea of “religious freedom” and of the 
protection of religious minorities also plays an important role in manufacturing public 
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consent and support in the west for backing authoritarian regimes in the Middle East. Of 
course, the use of religious freedom and religious minorities by western powers to 
legitimize their [neo]colonial projects has led to the emergence of categorical hostility 
toward religious minorities because Muslims have perceived that non-Muslim 
minorities have been the internal collaborators of western powers in the Islamic world.  
 Religious freedom is a wide issue which includes a large number of components 
affecting religious identities and activities such as property rights, religious education, 
bringing up children in accordance with the belief of parents, public visibility of 
religious symbols, public speech, building religious institutions, missionary activities, 
and so on. Therefore, the meaning of religious freedom varies from actor to actor and 
from society to society. While religious freedom means free proselytization in some 
contexts, for some people it is to be able to wear (or not to wear) a headscarf without 
any social and political pressure. More generally, religious freedom not only covers the 
practice of religion without any coercion by any institution such as state and church, but 
also the production of a polity in which the civil, legal, or political status of those who 
identify themselves (and/or who are identified) with a religious identity are not affected 
negatively (Mahmood 2012). Therefore, religious freedom is not only a matter of piety, 
but also a matter of categorization that affects those who are identified with a religious 
identity. Even if religious freedom covers all people within a polity, religious minorities 
are its greatest beneficiaries because of its positive impact on their everyday lives.     
 In this dissertation, I examine the impact of the Islamic revival on non-Muslim 
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minorities, particularly officially recognized ones (i.e., Greeks, Armenians, and Jews)1 
and the place of non-Muslim minorities in Turkish polity in the theoretical framework 
of religious freedom. In contrast to a typical western expectation shaped under the 
impact of global media discourse about Islam, which is that Islamic revival leads to the 
increase in the repression of religious minorities, Islamic revivalism has brought about 
some important changes in favor of religious minorities in Turkey. I aim to challenge 
not only totalizing and essentializing approaches to Islamic movements, but also 
dominant theories (i.e., Civilizational Approach (Huntington 1996, Lewis 1991, Stark 
2005), Modernization Theory (Bruce 2002, Durham 1996, Norris and Inglehart 2004), 
Assertive vs. Passive Secularism (Kuru 2009), and Rational Choice Theory (Gill 2008, 
Grim and Finke 2011)) that examine the origin of religious freedom by showing that 
religious freedom cannot be understood without taking into account the practical results 
of nationhood imaginations (e.g., perceptions, thoughts, experience, discourse, and 
political action in the name of the nation) in nation-state polities.  
 The Emergence of the Post-Kemalist Turkey 
 The history of modern Turkey has been divided into two periods in the recent 
literature on Turkey in order to point out the reconfiguration of power dynamics 
because of the Islamic revival: the Kemalist Period (1920-2002) and the post-Kemalist 
period (2002-Present). Mustafa Kemal Atatürk (1881-1938) and his entourage 
established the Republic of Turkey in 1923 after the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire 
                                                
1 In this project, I refer to non-Muslim minorities in the sense of those who have a background 
coming from a non-Muslim tradition, regardless of whether they are believers/pious. 
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in the aftermath of World War I. The founding fathers of the new Republic began a 
state-led nation-building project, which is called Kemalism that aimed to produce a 
secular, modern, and homogeneous Turkish nation. Although Kemalism, the 
founding/official ideology of the Republic, consists of six pillars (republicanism, 
populism, secularism, revolution, nationalism, and statism), it has almost become 
synonymous with a rigid form of state-imposed secularism over time. Even though the 
Kemalist elites (e.g., those politicians, bureaucrats, intellectuals, and activists who are 
dedicated to the Kemalist ideals) had been highly effective in the mobilization of state 
power for the sake of Kemalist values until recent times, they have not been able to use 
state apparatus because of the increasing impact of Islamic movements2 on Turkish 
society (i.e., the Gülen movement’s impact on education, media, and finance; the 
Justice and Development Party’s (Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi or AK Party) control over 
state power and bureaucracy since 2002). Therefore, a large number of scholars suggest 
that Turkey has experienced a kind of “passive revolution” (Tugal 2009), “quiet 
revolution” (Morris 2005), or “silent revolution” (Yavuz 2009) and that a “new Turkey” 
has emerged (Aktürk 2012, Findley 2010, Fuller 2008, Keyman 2007, White 2012, 
Yavuz 2006).  
 Although this periodization can be seen as a reductionist reading of Turkish 
history, it is useful from an analytical perspective in terms of state policies. There had 
been many powerful oppositional movements (e.g., leftist movements, Kurdish 
                                                
2 In this dissertation, the term Islamic movements/groups refer to mainstream Islamic activism, in 
particular the sympathizers of the Justice and Development Party and the Gülen Movement. 
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movements, liberal intellectuals) that were against the Kemalist state throughout the 
history of modern Turkey, but they did not have enough social, economic, and political 
power to marginalize the Kemalist elites and their impact on state power. On the other 
hand, Kemalist parties and politicians (e.g., the Republican People’s Party) did not 
come to power after Turkey’s transition from the single-party regime under the rule of 
the Republican People’s Party (1923-1950) to multiparty democracy in the late 1940s, 
but the Kemalist elites, particularly the Turkish army and the judiciary, had a strong 
impact over Turkish politics and society until recent years.  
 Even if conservative political parties/politicians (or center-right politics)3 mostly 
constituted the majority of the seat in the parliament and established governments after 
Turkey’s transition to multiparty democracy, they did not bring a radical shift in state 
policies because center-right political parties did not offer an alternative discourse of 
nationhood to Kemalist nationalism. Center-right politicians, with the exception of 
Turgut Özal, by and large were the children of Kemalist nationalism even if they did not 
support rigid Kemalist secularism repressing Islamic movements because of their 
populist policies. Therefore, the role of center-right political parties/politicians in the 
emergent post-Kemalist Turkey was to tame Kemalist secularism and elites and to 
establish a friendly polity facilitating the Islamic revivalism. 
 On the other hand, even if people generally did not support Kemalist parties in 
elections in the multi-party system, the Kemalist elites maintained their hegemony over 
                                                
3 In this dissertation, the term conservative refers to those who support neither the top-down 
modernization/secularization project of the Kemalist elites nor Islamism as a political project that aims at 
establishing an Islamic regime, but those who acknowledge Islam as an important value of the Turkish 
nation and support Islam at the social and cultural level. 
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Turkish society because of the creation of a distinction between the state and the 
government (Cook 2007, Yavuz 2009). While the state remained under the control of 
the Kemalist elites (e.g., the president4, the judiciary, and the military), elected rulers 
represented the government. The role of elected governments was to rule but not to 
govern the country (Cook 2007). They could deal with facilities services such as 
infrastructure and health care, but were generally not able to restructure some basic 
institutions (e.g., the military, the judiciary, education system) reproducing the Kemalist 
hegemony.   
 Although the Kemalist project by and large remained an elite project (Mardin 
2006), it created its own loyal citizens guarding almost every field of Turkish society 
from the economy to politics, to bureaucracy, to media, to labor, to religion (Bugra 
1994). Thus, the Kemalist elites had controlled Turkish bureaucracy, military, economy, 
media, labor unions, and so on. Whenever they faced a serious challenge (i.e., rise of 
Islamic groups, rise of leftist movements,) undermining the status quo, they initially 
tried to overcome it through the guardians of the regime within civil society (e.g., state-
created media, business associations, labor unions), the judiciary, and indirect military 
interventions. When the challenges could not be overcome through civil Kemalist elites, 
the military guardians of the Kemalist regime tried to consolidate their power through 
coup d’états as we saw in 1960, 1971, 1980, and constant indirect military interventions 
(e.g., the February 28 Process in 1997) into Turkish politics and society. Then a large 
number of civil Kemalist powers, particularly media groups with long-standing ties to 
                                                
4 All presidents, with the exception of Celal Bayar (1950-1960), until 1989 were former generals. 
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the Kemalist regime, propagated military interventions as legitimate and necessary 
because they had to protect the state from the enemies of democracy and modernity 
such as Islamic groups (White 2012). Thus, the Kemalist elites maintained their 
powerful impact over Turkish politics and society until recent times even though the 
impact of the Kemalist elites on Turkish society has declined since Turkey’s transition 
from the single-party rule to the multi-party system in 1945. 
 However, the Islamic revival and the moderation of political Islam have led to 
the emergence of the post-Kemalist Turkey because of the reconfiguration of power 
dynamics and a new discourse of nationhood based on Islamic/Ottoman 
multiculturalism and tolerance. Although the Kemalist elites are still effective to some 
degree, they do not hold enough power to shape state policies and to use state power 
because of strong popular support toward the AKP, the AKP’s gradually increasing 
control over the Turkish bureaucracy, constitutional amendments restructuring Turkey’s 
court system including the supreme court, the increasing impact of high-tech police as a 
“Big Brother” keeping the Kemalist elites, particularly the military and judiciary, under 
surveillance, and the detention of a large number of generals because of ongoing 
investigations for military coup attempts. Of course, the emergence of the post-Kemalist 
Turkey is a long and gradual story, but it is the breakpoint that the AKP took the control 
of state power in 2002. 
 As a result of the emergence of the post-Kemalist Turkey, there has been a 
radical shift in state policies toward some major issues that Turkey has been discussing 
for long years. For example, the Kemalist state did not recognize the presence of Kurds, 
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Kurdish identity, or Kurdish language. While it was a crime to say that “Kurds exist” in 
the past, state-owned public broadcaster, TRT, launched a new TV channel broadcasting 
only in Kurdish in 2004. Another example can be the headscarf issue. Although the 
headscarf ban on campuses was a well-known issue in Turkey, it was wider than 
campuses and covered many public and civil services; therefore, those who had 
professional occupations (e.g., lawyers, doctors) and worked on state premises were not 
able to wear the headscarf. For instance, a newly elected deputy member of the Islamic 
Virtue Party, Merve Kavakci, was not allowed to take her oath in the Turkish 
Parliament in 1999 under the impact of the February 28 Process, which is a soft military 
coup overthrowing Turkey’s first Islamic-led coalition government in 1997. While she 
lost her seat in the Parliament and then Turkish citizenship, the Constitutional Court 
closed down her political party, the Virtue Party. However, in the post-Kemalist period, 
the headscarf ban was lifted not only on campuses, but also in public/state facilities. As 
a result, deputy members, university presidents, doctors, and lawyers are able to wear 
the headscarf for the first time.   
 As far as non-Muslim minorities are concerned, there are also important reforms 
(e.g., property rights, religious and institutional freedom, abolishing committees 
keeping minorities under surveillance, and language rights) showing the shift in state 
policies toward non-Muslim minorities. The AKP government is the most reformist 
government in responding the needs of religious minorities since the beginning of the 
Republic even though the concerns of religious minorities rank extremely low in the 
agenda of the country. In this dissertation, I will examine recent changes in state 
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policies toward religious minorities and the mechanism of the change.  
 The Local, the Global, and the Politics of the Past 
 A large number of studies explain recent positive developments in terms of 
minority rights through Turkey’s integration process into the European Union (EU) 
(Kaya 2009, Kizilkan-Kisacik 2010, Kurban 2007, Tasch 2010, Toktas 2006, Toktas 
and Aras 2009-2010). Turkey applied for full membership in the EU in 1987 and 
became a candidate country for full membership in 1999. For these studies, the AKP 
increased the level of democracy in Turkey because of the impact of the EU process 
that requires respect for civil rights and liberties. Turkey, hence, has experienced many 
constitutional amendments and legal changes strengthening democracy, the rule of law, 
and human and minority rights under the impact of the Turkey’s integration process to 
the EU. As a result of recent legal changes, for these studies, the EU process is the 
fundamental factor for recent developments, but the AKP is a secondary factor.  
 However, constitutional and legal reforms are meaningless if a political 
authority does not want to put them into practice. Although ethnic and religious 
minorities were already equal citizens de jure, there was open discrimination against 
ethno-religious minorities in the Kemalist period. One also needs to take into 
consideration that democratic reforms cannot be carried out without political 
responsibility and commitment. Thus, the EU process is an important factor bringing 
minority problems to the political agenda, but not sufficient to explain the positive 
relationship between Islamic movements and non-Muslim minorities. I suggest that 
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while the Islamic revival or the AKP is the main actor shaping recent democratic 
developments in Turkey, the EU process is a secondary factor facilitating democratic 
reforms.  
 When we look at some EU countries such as Greece, Bulgaria, Poland, and 
France, although the EU has led to the emergence of positive developments to some 
degree, the EU regulations are not so effective in the transformation of minority regimes 
(Grigoriadis 2008, Sasse 2008, Tahir 2012). For example, although Greece has been a 
member of the EU since 1981, EU reports have frequently criticized Greece’s minority 
regime because of the violation of some basic rights of minority groups (Huseyinoglu 
2012, Kyriakou 2009, Triandafyllidou 2001). A well-known example of the violation of 
basic minority rights is that Greek authorities had not allowed Muslim minorities to 
establish a mosque in the capital, Athens, because of a strong nationalist resistance to 
the construction of a mosque since Greece gained its independence from the Ottoman 
Empire in 1832. As a result, those studies that explain recent developments through the 
EU process do not take into account the long-term relationship between different ethno-
religious categories within the same geographical arena and the impact of identity 
politics on that relationship.  
 In contrast to the studies that attempt to explain recent changes through a top-
down approach by focusing on the impact of the EU on Turkey, I mostly focus on the 
process from the view of the local while examining recent changes because the 
relationship between Turks, Greeks, Armenians, and Jews cannot be understood 
comprehensively without paying attention to the impact of identity politics. Although 
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identities are under the impact of some global factors (i.e., the globalization process) 
and actors (i.e., the EU), they are always constructed in a specific sociohistorical 
context, which is the local. Identity politics thus cannot be understood successfully 
without focusing on the local. In particular, in this project, I examine the impact of the 
nationhood imaginations of the Kemalist and Islamic elites, which are two dominant 
and rival nationhood imaginations, on non-Muslim minorities depending on Roger 
Brubaker’ s analysis of nationhood and the practice of the category of the nation 
(Brubaker 1996b, Brubaker 2004a, Brubaker et al. 2006). As a result of my theoretical 
approach, I am not interested in what the nation is, but its practices (e.g., perceptions, 
thoughts, experience, discourse, and political action in the name of the nation) in the 
social and political life. 
 Depending on my theoretical approach, I treat Turkishness, Greekness, 
Armenianness, and Jewsness as a category. Treating them as a category not only allows 
me take into account inflexibility, changeability, and heterogeneity within nationalist 
claims, but also enable me to discern competing organizations, desires, and interactions 
in the name of the same category of the nation. Although ethnicity is a dominant 
categorical approach to minorities in academia because the studies on minorities are 
generally constructed based on the western experience of shifting attention from 
religion to nationalism and ethnicity (Apostolov 2001), I am going to take Greeks, 
Armenians, and Jews as a category of non-Muslim minorities. On the other hand, 
ethnicity frequently operates with different categories such as religion (ethno-religious), 
language (ethno-linguistic), and culture (ethno-cultural). Therefore, the term ethno-
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religious categories can be more appropriate, but I will emphasize the aspect of 
religious identification because religion is a key distinctive factor in the construction of 
categorization of non-Muslim minorities in Turkey. The categories Greekness, 
Armenianness, and Jewishness are firstly and predominantly perceived as non-Muslims 
at the social, cultural, and political level; then they are identified with their ethnic 
origins because of that the legacy of the Ottoman millet system is still highly effective 
in the former territories of the Ottoman Empire in the construction of a relationship 
between different categories.  
 On the other hand, national imaginations produce strong connections between 
the past, present, and future; therefore, the relationship between different ethno-
religious categories entails the examination of the impact of the past, present, and future 
imaginations affecting the practical results of nationhood imaginations. One cannot 
discover the practice of nationhood imaginations without past narratives invented in the 
present for the present. In particular, the relationship between Turks and non-Muslim 
minorities, particularly Armenians, Greeks, and Jews, cannot be understood only with 
reference to the impact of the EU. Therefore, this project primarily focuses on past 
narratives shaping the present and nation (or We) imaginations affecting the place of 
non-Muslim minorities in Turkish society. 
 Argument of the Dissertation 
 My argument is that the Kemalist nation-building project which aimed to 
establish a homogenous nation produced a hostile polity toward non-Muslim minorities 
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whereas the nationhood imagination of Islamic movements (the Gülen Movement and 
the AK Party) allows them to attempt to establish an inclusive, tolerant, and friendly 
environment, but not an egalitarian polity. Islamic movements have brought forth 
alternative notions of self, morality, and nationhood based on narratives of Ottoman 
multiculturalism, tolerance, and pluralism in a defensive manner as a response to 
Kemalist nationalism narrating the Ottoman Empire as the uncivilized remnant of the 
Medieval Ages and the globalization process that poses serious legitimacy concerns 
over Islamic movements. I conceptualize this situation as defensive inclusion. That is, 
while Islamic movements bring chosen glories of the Ottoman Empire, particularly the 
Ottoman legacy of pluralism and toleration, back into the present in a defensive way as 
a response to both Turkey’s Kemalist/secularist elites and the global discourse depicting 
Islam as an intolerant religion in order to construct a legitimate identity in the 
globalized world, this identity politics based on tradition or reinvention of the past leads 
to the shift in state policies and the emergence of an inclusive polity toward religious 
minorities. However, Islamic understanding of nationhood hinders the emergence of an 
egalitarian polity even if it is inclusive in terms of state policies. While Islamic 
movements construct/perceive themselves as tolerant movements, they imagine Turkey 
as a Muslim country tolerating (or permitting) non-Muslim minorities to live in Turkey 
in accordance with their own beliefs. Thus, the Islamic nationhood imagination 
reproduces the millet system of the Ottoman Empire de facto and the status of 
inequalities, even if the post-Kemalist Turkey under the impact of Islamic movements is 
more inclusive than the Kemalist Turkey that was ruled by the secularist elites.  
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What we see is the reproduction of a traditional configuration in the form of 
modern institutions because recent developments have derived from the articulation of 
Islamic groups’ nationhood imagination shaped under the impact of nostalgia for the 
Ottomans with the secular discourse of democratization and multiculturalism of the 
Turkish polity as a response the Kemalist nationhood imagination and the globalization 
process in a defensive manner. I conceptualize this situation as the emergence of “neo-
millet system.” What I mean by “neo-millet system” is the emergence of a polity 
operating in the form/discourse of modern institutions (i.e., democracy and citizenship) 
in spite of continuing second-class status of non-Muslim minorities de facto. It is 
important to bear in mind that this result, the emergence of “neo-millet system,” is not a 
result of a conscious/rational choice, but the corollary of the Islamic way of being, 
seeing, thinking, acting, and imagining that is shaped by the Turkish-Islamic nationhood 
imagination. 
On the other hand, even though there are some positive developments in favor of 
religious minorities and the Islamic elites (those Islamic politicians, intellectuals, 
activists, or businessman who struggle for Islamic revival) eagerly try to help them in 
the post-Kemalist period, the state under the rule of the AKP still continues to violate 
the basic rights of minorities. In addition to the Turkish-Islamic nationhood imagination 
reconstructing minorities as “neo-millets,” Kemalist nationalism is still an important 
factor hampering the development of an egalitarian polity in the post-Kemalist period 
because of the impact of a hybrid form of nationhood imagination on ruling Islamic 
elites. While the Islamic elites have constructed an alternative form of nationhood 
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imagination based on narratives of Ottomanism to Kemalist nationalism, they have also 
been under the impact of Kemalist nationalism indoctrinated by the state for long years 
because Kemalist nationalism has become national “habitus” to be practiced by not only 
Kemalist/nationalist elites, but also ordinary men and women who have been formed by 
the republican schools disseminating the idea that “the Turk has no friend, but the Turk” 
under the strict monopoly over the educational system (Gole 2010b). For example, as a 
result of fearful and imaginary conspiracy infused in Turkish society and education 
system, in today’s Turkey, a large number of people still believe that Greeks aim to 
regenerate a Greek Pontus state (Karaosmanoglu 2010:198), which existed in the 6th 
century in northeastern Turkey close to the border of Georgia (not close to Greece), 
although Greek people were exiled to Greece as a result of the population exchange 
between Turkey and Greece in the mid-1920s. Thus, Kemalist nationalism has 
performed as “habitus” in the sense of a set of excluding practices and discourses that 
are learned and internalized.  
Although an aggressive and relentless anti-minority discourse that has been 
routinized and dominated Turkish politics and society for long years is still highly 
visible, it has lost its capacity to mobilize people against minorities. On the other hand, 
a new discourse based on tolerance and multiculturalism has increased its impact on 
Turkish society and resonated with a positive shift in the relationship between Islamic 
movements and non-Muslim minorities as well as in state policies toward non-Muslim 
minorities. Thus, my aim is not to show how Turks are (not) tolerant, but to understand 
the dynamics of recent changes in minority politics in Turkey. 
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 Religious minorities have been numerically insignificant (Table 1) and 
politically powerless in Turkey since the early years of the Republic. However, they 
cause such a stir and a source of conflict and suspicion throughout the history of 
modern Turkey. In spite of relatively their insignificant numbers (2.5 percent in 1927; 
0.2 percent in 2005),5 the state and state elites had strong motives for restricting their 
activities until recent years because of the legacy of the past. Although the Islamic elites 
had the same views and motivations as the Kemalist elites in the past, they have tried to 
develop a better relationship with religious minorities since the mid-1990s. One can 
wonder why such a small number of people gain the attention of social and political 
actors and why Turkey’s Islamic elites try to produce a hospitable polity for a small 
number of people than Turkey’s secular elites in contrast to a typical expectation. I will 
examine this question throughout this dissertation, but briefly it is because religious 
minorities, particularly Greeks and Armenians, are a constitutive element of Kemalist 
nationhood imagination as “the Other.” Therefore, they were perceived as a threat to 
national unity and cohesion by the Kemalist elites. However, they have become the 
realm of the practice of glorified Ottomanist/Islamic understanding of tolerance and 
justice in the globalized world that poses serious legitimacy concerns over Islamic 
                                                
5 In this context, I need to highlight that the major factor in the construction of minority politics is 
not the relative size of minority population in a polity, but the impact of the dialectic of we/they (or 
otherization) on minorities. It can be seen in many cases that small numbers of minorities are identified as 
a major challenge to social cohesion (see, Appadurai 2006) For instance, France banned the veil in public 
schools in 2004 although there were fewer than 1,500 Muslim students wearing the veil in public schools 
in 2004 (Kuru 2009:104). There are thousands articles and hundreds books about this issue. Many of 
them have made important contributions to ongoing theoretical debates such as minorities, national 
identity, and the relationship between the state and religion. 
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movements in order to show how Islamic politicians are more tolerant than Turkey’s 
secularists for the Islamic elites. In this context, I need to underline one more time that 
this is not a result of a rational calculation, but the emergence of an impulsive outcome 
of the Islamic nationhood imagination. 
 Table 1: Muslim and Non-Muslim Population in Turkey (in thousands) 
 
Year 1914 1927 1945 1965 1990 2005 
Muslims 12941 13290 18511 31139 56860 71997 
Greeks 1549 110 104 76 8 3 
Armenians 1204 77 60 64 67 50 
Jews 128 82 77 38 29 27 
Others 176 71 38 74 50 45 
Total 15997 13630 18790 31391 57005 72120 
% of non-Muslims 19.1 2.5 1.5 0.8 0.3 0.2 
Source: (Icduygu, Toktas and Soner 2008) 
 
 In addition to officially recognized minorities (i.e., Greeks, Armenians, and 
Jews), there are also unrecognized non-Muslim minorities (e.g., Assyrians, Protestants, 
Catholics, Baha’is, and Yazidis) in Turkey. Although recognized minorities have been a 
major focus of Turkish politics and a central reference point to Turkish national 
identity, unrecognized ones have never been centred on Turkish politics. Therefore, in 
this dissertation, I mostly focus on recognized minorities. Regarding unrecognized 
minorities, I can briefly claim that state policies toward unrecognized minorities are tied 
to the relationship between the state and recognized ones. That is, while the state was by 
and large antagonistic to unrecognized minorities in the Kemalist period, it has become 
responsive to their needs in the post-Kemalist period. For example, the AKP 
government recently allocated Assyrians an area in the district of Yesilkoy, one of 
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wealthiest suburbs of Istanbul, to build a new church (Hurriyet Daily News 2015). 
There were existing churches that were restored and reopened to the public, but the state 
had not authorized any new church until the AKP government; therefore, the Assyrian 
church in Yesilkoy is going to be the first church built in the history of modern Turkey.  
 Alevis, a heterodox Muslim category, are also outside of the scope of this 
dissertation because different dynamics and factors are active in the construction of the 
relationship between the state, Kemalism, Islamic movements, and Alevis. In particular, 
the analysis of Alevis in Turkey requires focusing on the dichotomy between Sunnis 
and Alevis whereas this dissertation is built upon the dichotomy between Muslims and 
non-Muslims. 
 This study mostly is not an implicit comparison between state policies as it 
exists and theoretical ideals derived from modern political conceptualizations (e.g., 
democracy, human rights, the rule of law), but an explicit comparison between state 
policies in the Kemalist and post-Kemalist periods. I also need to emphasize that my 
aim is not to say that while the Kemalist period was “bad,” the post-Kemalist period is 
“good,” but to understand the dynamics of exclusion and inclusion in the context of 
historical landscape and the reconstruction of the state and nation through renewed 
local/global structures, political actors, self-definitions, social practices, and political 
reactions by drawing a comparison between the Kemalist and post-Kemalist periods in 
state policies toward religious minorities from the late period of the Ottoman Empire to 
the present.  
 All in all, this dissertation shows that religious freedom cannot be understood 
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without taking into account competing nationhood imaginations, claims on national 
“ownership,” and the role of religious minorities in the construction of different 
nationhood imaginations. Also, this dissertation contributes to the debate on the 
relationship between globalization and the revival of identity politics. The literature 
(e.g., Appadurai 2006, Castells 1997, Giddens 2011, Hall 1991a) is by and large locked 
around the revival of identity politics seeking utopias in the past rather than in the future 
because of the increase of self-awareness under the impact of interconnectedness and 
suggests that the enemy of this process is multiculturalism, diversity, and cosmopolitan 
values. However, this dissertation shows that the reinvention of the Ottoman past as a 
response to the globalization process paves the way of the embrace of multiculturalism, 
pluralism, and diversity within Turkish/Islamic circles. In addition to these two major 
contributions, this dissertation sheds light on how religious movements produce a more 
inclusive polity when they come to power by focusing on a seemingly paradoxical 
situation, which is the transformative and progressive role of tradition, which is 
anything transmitted or handed down from the past (Shills 1981), in the reconstruction 
of religious identities and the legitimization of new developments in the globalized 
world. 
 Research Questions, Methodology, and Data Collection 
 This project poses two primary questions: (1) How was the exercise of state 
power over religious minorities in the Kemalist period and what has changed in the 
post-Kemalist period in terms of the exercise of state power over religious minorities? 
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(2) What kind of relationship has been there between the Islamic movements and 
religious minorities at the social level?  
 First, this project will show how nationalism came to dominate political life 
since the late nineteenth century and examine how the category of the nation has been 
proposed, propagated, institutionalized, and embedded in the form of the exercise of 
state power in the Kemalist and post-Kemalist Turkey and the impact of the practice of 
competing nationhood imaginations on religious minorities. My aim is not to show the 
legal regime in these two periods, but to examine the exercise of state power over 
minorities from the perspectives of religious minorities by presenting some popular and 
symbolic issues shaping the collective memories and identities of non-Muslim 
minorities as a guide for understanding the impact of two nationhood imaginations on 
minorities. In particular, by examining the activities of the Kemalist and Islamic elites 
as well as the reaction of religious minorities to these elite projects, I will address the 
following major questions: How was the state’s behavior toward religious minorities in 
the Kemalist Turkey? How did the state behavior change toward religious minorities 
over time? What has changed in the post-Kemalist Turkey? And what has not changed 
and why? 
 Second, I believe that it is necessary to examine the relationship between 
religious minorities and Islamic movements in order to understand the shift in state 
policies toward religious minorities and the place of religious minorities in the post-
Kemalist period. I would like to address some key questions: What is the relationship 
between Islamic movements and non-Muslim religious minorities from the perspective 
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of both non-Muslim minorities and Islamic movements (the Gülen Movement and the 
AK Party)? Is there any social interaction? If so, what is the form of social interaction? 
How often do they come together? What kind of activities do they perform? What kind 
of individual relationship is there between the prominent members of religious 
minorities and of Islamic movements? Can the prominent members of religious 
minorities easily access Islamic politicians and local authorities? If so, what is the 
attitude of politicians toward them? 
 I address these issues through a constructivist approach. In other words, my aim 
is not to decide what reality is, but to understand what meanings people give to the 
social world and realities. Thus, while examining the questions above, my approach will 
be to understand how social agents, particularly religious minorities, understand and 
interpret recent developments in Turkey. 
 The analytical question of this project is not to examine competing nationhood 
imaginations in Turkey, but to focus on the impact of two competing nationhood 
imaginations on state policies toward religious minorities. Therefore, I also use existing 
studies to understand the Kemalist and Islamic nationhood imaginations even if I bring 
new knowledge about them by examining the discourse and statements of both Islamic 
and Kemalist elites. In order to answer the analytical question of this project, which is 
the exercise of state power over religious minorities, I collected my major data through 
fieldwork in Istanbul, a metropolis in which non-Muslims mostly concentrated, to grasp 
the meaning of recent changes from the perspectives of religious minorities. Although I 
actively used the three dimensions of fieldwork (participant observation, interviews, and 
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archival research), semi-structured interviews are the key method of data collection in 
this project. 
 I conducted intensive interviews with the members of non-Muslim communities, 
Muslim and non-Muslim religious leaders, Islamic and Kemalist politicians, and 
relevant journalists and academics. Particularly, I conducted long interviews with 
almost 30 prominent members (e.g., religious leaders, school principals, journalists, and 
secular intellectuals) of non-Muslims in Istanbul. They provided me with valuable 
knowledge about the exercise of state power over minorities. We talked about a large 
array of topics including their past experiences, life histories, everyday problems, 
difficulties that they face, the recent political developments in the country, the 
relationship with Islamic movements, the attitudes of municipal authorities toward their 
institutions, their future expectations, the changes over time, how they adjust to these 
changes, how they manage repressions, and so on. These interviews allowed me to gain 
useful information about issues of social and political restrictions on non-Muslim 
minorities, the mindset and attitudes of both Kemalist and Islamist elites toward non-
Muslim minorities, and changes over time from the point of views of non-Muslims. The 
interviews were not recorded in order to allow the participants to talk without any 
hesitation. Of course, I also conducted conservations with ordinary non-Muslims, and 
they were helpful for me to grasp their everyday life experiences. However, I gave 
priority to the interviews with which I conducted the leading members of non-Muslim 
minorities because they can comprehensively identify state policies toward religious 
minorities.  
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 In addition to interviews, I participated in their meetings and cultural activities 
and visited their churches/synagogues and schools. They allowed me to see the 
dynamics of exclusion and inclusion in the real world. For example, religious minorities 
faced serious difficulties in the renovation of their churches and schools in the past; 
therefore, a large number of the buildings of minority institutions were old. Participant 
observation allows me to see whether they can renovate their buildings under the rule of 
Islamicly-oriented government and municipalities.  
 I also collected data through archival and documentary research and examined 
governmental documents, national and international reports, policy papers, the archives 
of minority newspapers and journals. These sources provided me with valuable 
information about my research and allowed me to test, support, and enhance my 
empirical findings in the field. 
 Dissertation Chapters 
 The dissertation is to be composed of six chapters including the introduction and 
conclusion. In the second chapter, I will present a critical review of dominant theories 
including the civilizational approach, modernization theory, passive secularism, and 
rational choice theory to explain the origin of religious freedom by critically discussing 
the application of these theories to my case. As an alternative to existing theoretical 
approaches, depending on Roger Brubaker’s analytical approach to the nation, I will 
examine religious freedom as the practice of the nation in a theoretical way and show 
the dynamics of the exclusion/inclusion of religious minorities in Turkish polity.  Based 
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on Brubaker’s analysis of nation-building process in Eastern Europe through the 
concepts of “nationalizing states,” “national minorities,” and “external national 
homelands,” I will examine the construction of Turkish nationalism in the context of 
Eastern Europe. Then I will take a close look at the Islamic elite’s endeavor to construct 
as a Muslim and tolerant nation based on the reinvention of the Ottoman past in order to 
construct a stable and legitimate Muslim identity in the globalized world in a defensive 
manner as a reaction to both Kemalist narratives insulting the Ottoman history and the 
global discourse depicting Islam as an intolerant and illiberal religion. In this chapter, I 
will intensely examine the concept of defensive inclusion based on the mythification of 
the Ottoman history, justice, and tolerance by bringing well-chosen elements of the 
Ottoman history into the present as an endeavor to construct an inclusive nationhood 
imagination. I believe that this chapter will give a reader a snapshot of the whole 
project.   
 In the third chapter, I will zoom in on the place of religious minorities in the 
Kemalist period and examine the impact of heavy-handed Kemalist nationalism on non-
Muslim minorities. Here I focus on the exercise of state power on religious minorities in 
a nested series of historical moments. This aim of this chapter is to provide a historical 
background in order to understand the meaning of recent changes in the post-kemalist 
period. 
 In the fourth chapter, I will examine the changing dynamics of the social 
relationship and interaction between Islamic movements and religious minorities and 
analyze the exercise of Islamic understanding of tolerance at the social level. I will 
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show that Turkish Islamic movements (the Gülen Movement and the AK Party) 
perceive Turkey as a Muslim country permitting its religious minorities to live in 
Turkey in accordance with their own beliefs. They want to produce a hospitable polity 
for religious minorities in a defensive manner as a response to the globalization process 
that poses serious legitimacy concerns over Islamic movements. 
 In the fifth chapter, I will examine the increasing impact of the Islamic 
movements on state power, the transformation of the exercise of state power under the 
rule of the AKP, and its practical results for religious minorities. This chapter will not 
only examine recent developments in favor of religious minorities, but also analyze the 
limit and mechanism of inclusion operating in a defensive and permissive manner. 
Therefore, even if the AKP government has produced a large number of reforms in 
favor of religious minorities, the AKP’s understanding of tolerance and nationhood 
produced serious obstacles to a progression toward an egalitarian polity.  
 Finally, I will summarize key findings in the conclusion and discuss their 
contributions to relevant sociological inquiries including the debates on religious 
freedom and identity politics in the globalized world. 
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CHAPTER 2 
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM AS A PRACTICE OF THE NATION 
 
 
 Religious freedom has become a prevalent topic in social sciences because of 
the increasing impact of religion on sociopolitical matters and conflicts in the globalized 
world. A large number of studies try to explain the origin of religious freedom through 
some theoretical approaches. Before examining religious freedom as a practice of the 
nation, I examine mainstream theoretical approaches to the origin of religious freedom 
including the civilizational approach, modernization theory, assertive vs. passive 
secularism, and rational choice theory, and show their weaknesses to explain the origin 
of religious freedom. With the exception of rational choice theory, other theories 
explain the origin of religious freedom through secularism although their approaches to 
the origin of secularism are different from each other. In the secularism-based theories, 
civilizational approach and modernization theory have been criticized sharply by many 
scholars and can be seen as dead theories; however, some recent studies have renovated 
these approaches. Therefore, I also deal with them briefly along with the others.  
 Major Theoretical Approaches to Religious Freedom 
The Civilizational Approach 
 The Civilizational approach explains religious freedom through the 
characteristics of civilizations or some key texts shaping cultures. Samuel Huntington’s 
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and Bernard Lewis’s studies are commonly accepted as well-known examples of this 
approach. In addition to these scholars, Rodney Stark’s recent studies can also be seen 
as good examples of civilizational approach to religious freedom although he is a 
prominent member of rational choice theory’s application to religion.  
 According to the civilizationalist theorists, the nature of religion is more 
important than the role of agency and structure. The separation of religion and the state, 
which is a necessary condition for religious freedom, secularism, and democracy in a 
wider context, is one of the distinctive characteristics of Western civilization and 
Christianity. These theorists usually refer to a well-known bible verse in order to show 
the distinction of western civilization from others: “Render therefore unto Caesar the 
things which be Caesar's, and unto God the things which be God's” (Luke 20:25). 
Bernard Lewis believes that secularism is part of Christian civilization because “the 
distinction between church and state, so deeply rooted in Christendom, did not exist in 
Islam” (Lewis 1991:2-3). Similar to Lewis, Huntington believes that “In Islam, God is 
Caesar; in China and Japan, Caesar is God; in Orthodoxy, God is Caesar's junior 
partner. The separation and recurring clashes between church and state that typify 
Western civilization have existed in no other civilization” (Huntington 1996:70). As a 
result, for this approach, only Christian societies can produce secularism as the 
separation of religion and state, which is a necessary act that guarantees religious 
freedom for everyone.   
 On the other hand, Rodney Stark’s recent studies (2001, 2003, 2005) merge 
rational choice theory into the civilizational approach. Although I will examine rational 
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choice theory in detail in the following pages, I do wish to note that in his earlier 
studies, as a rational choice theorist, Stark suggests that a “pluralistic equilibrium” in a 
society is a necessary condition for religious freedom because in a pluralistic market all 
religions need religious freedom due to the competition between different religious 
groups in order to persuade other people. Therefore, while religions are more tolerant 
toward other beliefs in pluralistic societies, conflict is more visible within a dominant 
religious market (Stark and Finke 2000). However, in his recent studies (e.g., Stark 
2001, Stark 2003), Stark argues that people’s understanding of God is highly important 
for historical developments because beliefs shape how people think and behave. 
Therefore, all religions, including monotheist religions, are not the same in terms of 
their impact on society. Stark suggests that the imagination of God within a society 
shapes societies and social realities. Thus, different theologies have different social 
impacts. He suggests that the source of the Protestant reformation, the rise of science, 
capitalism, the end of slavery, democracy, individualism, and the separation of church 
and state in the west is Christianity because of its dedication to rationality and progress. 
While “Christianity alone embraced reason and logic as the primary guide to religious 
truth” (Stark 2005: X), other religions focused on mystery and religious institutions. 
Whereas there was no theology as a rational discipline in polytheistic religions, scholars 
in Judaism and Islam concentrated on religious law. Thus, for Stark, only Christianity 
developed a fully rational theology as a discipline. Christianity’s faith in rationality, 
reason, and commitment to progress were infused in economic, political, and scientific 
realm in the western world. Stark believes, therefore, that “western civilization was 
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really God-given” (Stark 2003) and Christian beliefs are central in the construction of 
Western history although anti-religious and anti-Catholic bias in academia belittles 
religion and its impact. Stark believes that Christianity is a primary element in the 
development of western democratic theory, the separation of church and state, liberty, 
and individualism because Christian theology provided the intellectual basis for all 
these developments. The basic factor behind the increase of religious freedom in Europe 
is the “victory of reason” resulting from Christianity’s dedication to rationalism. 
Christian theologians theorized the nature of equality and individual rights before 
secular political theorist (e.g., John Locke), and then enlightenment thinkers developed 
their egalitarian works based on the studies of church scholars.   
 To sum up, the civilizational approach tries to explain religious freedom by 
focusing on text and theological differences between religions, which are seen as a core 
institution shaping civilizations. Secularism as the separation of religion and state is a 
“Christian remedy” due to some characteristics of Christianity; therefore, western 
societies produce the separation of church and state as a necessary condition for 
religious freedom. This theoretical approach has been criticized sharply by a large 
number of scholars (Bayat 2007, Grim and Finke 2011, Said 2001, Sen 1999, Stepan 
2000). I am not going to deal with all of them, but, briefly, a serious weakness with this 
approach is that it ignores the struggle for power between the church and state in the 
history of western societies. In contrast to this theory, the separation of religion and 
church were established in many Christian societies (i.e., France, Spain) in spite of the 
harsh resistance of the Catholic Church to Enlightenment liberalism and secular elites 
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(Monsma and Soper 2008). Therefore, there were strong anti-Catholic and anti-clerical 
movements in many Christian societies such as France, Spain, Germany, and Mexico.   
 Perhaps the most serious weakness of this approach is that it ignores the 
‘multivocal’ structure of religions. Not only Islam and Orthodox Christianity, but also 
Catholism, Calvinism, and Lutheranism have some elements that have been interpreted 
as obstacles to the separation of state and church (Bayat 2007, Stepan 2000). In this 
context, the real question is not whether religious texts hinder the separation between 
state and church, but how they are interpreted by actors as part of political struggles 
(Bayat 2007).  
 The civilizational approach also cannot explain different levels of religious 
freedom in Christian societies. Some Christian societies such as Denmark, Sweden, and 
the Netherlands have more religious freedom for all religious groups than others such as 
France and Germany (Grim and Finke 2011). That this theory cannot explain the 
decrease and increase of religious freedom over time in Christian societies is another 
problem. For example, although England is one of those which have very high religious 
freedom for all religious groups in today’s world, Catholics were persecuted, 
imprisoned, even executed due to their beliefs from sixteenth century to nineteenth 
century England (Mann 2009). Besides, this theory cannot account for why some non-
Christian societies (i.e. Japan, Albania, Senegal, South Korea, Haiti) have more 
religious freedom than some Christian societies (i.e. France, Germany, Italy, Spain, the 
UK) (Grim and Finke 2011).  
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Modernization Theory 
 There are different versions of modernization theory and its application to 
religious freedom within social theory, but it, at least, works at two levels as ideational 
and structural approaches. The structural approach briefly says that the relationship 
between religion, politics, and society can be explained through the modernization of 
societies. For this approach, religious freedom is not a product of choice, but the natural 
consequence of the modernization process (Anderson 2003, Casanova 1994, Gill 2008, 
Norris and Inglehart 2004) because the process of economic and human development 
leads to the erosion of religious beliefs and practices and the dominance of secularism 
that in turn would produce more religious freedom. While the impact of religion on the 
state and society declined because of the modernization process (industrialization, 
urbanization, increase of education, population growth, and so on), the rise of modern 
and secular institutions and the separation of church and state developed a decisive step 
toward the emergence of religious freedom within modern societies (Bruce 2002). 
 The ideational approach to religious freedom in the modernization theory 
explains the origin of religious freedom through the impact of the enlightenment ideas 
over modern societies. This approach basically suggests that the modernization process 
leads to the rise of the idea of enlightenment, particularly liberalism and the ideas of 
John Locke. According to this approach, Locke’s ideas convinced people about the 
necessity of religious freedom, changed traditional patterns, and led to the increase of 
religious freedom within western countries. McConnell (1990), Durham (1996), and 
recently Miller (2012) have this kind of approach to the origin of religious freedom. 
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They basically argue that Locke’s ideas, particularly their materialization in the US, and 
the globalization of the Lockean insight are the main factor producing religious 
freedom.  
 Although the modernization of societies is an important factor facilitating the 
development of religious freedom, the modernization process does not provide a 
sufficient condition explaining the origin of religious freedom. First, as many major 
studies (e.g., Asad 2003, Casanova 1994, Gill 2008, Kuru 2009, Stark and Finke 2000) 
about religion in the modern world argue, there is a limited correlation between 
modernization, secularization, and religious freedom. A large number of equally high-
developed and modern countries have different state-religion relations regulating 
religious freedom. Even if this theory takes into account the separation of religion and 
state as the necessity step toward religious freedom, the modernization process played 
an important role in the production of many kinds of relationships between religion and 
state. Some countries which do not have official religion (France and Germany) have 
less religious freedom than those with official religion such as Denmark and Finland 
(Grim and Finke 2011). On the other hand, while some forms of secularism (i.e., the 
US, the UK, and the Netherlands) are inclusive toward religion and allow the presence 
and visibility of religion in the public sphere, others (i.e., France, Turkey until recent 
times, Mexico between 1917-1992) tend to restrict the visibility of religion in public. 
Hence, this theory cannot explain the differences between the US and France as modern 
and ‘enlightened’ countries and the similarities between France and (the Kemalist) 
Turkey in terms of the practice of secularism (Kuru 2009). Furthermore, the level of 
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religious freedom is higher in some less-developed countries than more developed 
countries. For example Argentina, Columba, and Mexico have less religious freedom 
than Ecuador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua (Gill 2008). 
 Finally, if there is a necessary relationship between religious freedom and the 
modernization process, this approach cannot explain the ebb and flow in the level of 
religious freedom over time because religious freedom is not unilineral and there is a 
large amount of fluctuations in modern societies since sixteenth century (e.g., the 
fluctuation of religious freedom for Catholics and other groups in Spain, the rise and 
decline of intolerance for new religious movements in some western societies such as 
Germany, and the flux and reflux of anti-Semitism and Islamophobia in the West). 
Assertive Secularism vs. Passive Secularism 
 Although the civilizational approach and the modernization theory try to explain 
the origin of religious freedom through secularism in terms of the separation of religion 
and state, they cannot explain different approaches to religion in the modern world 
because, as Talal Asad (2003) argues, secularism as the separation of religion and state 
does not necessarily provide a guarantee for religious freedom for all religious groups, 
in particular for religious minorities. In contrast, even if secularism as the separation of 
religion and state is an important step toward the protection of religious freedom, 
including non-believers, it can be a means to restrict the activities of religious groups at 
the hand of rigid secularist groups and politicians as we see Turkey, Spain, France, and 
Mexico. 
 Ahmet Kuru aims to understand differences in the practice of secularism in his 
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study of Secularism and State Policies toward Religion (2009). He tries to understand 
why American state policies are inclusionary toward religion while France and Turkey 
have largely exclusionary policies by focusing on veiling issue. In particular, he asks 
why the US allows students to wear religious symbols in educational institutions while 
France and Turkey impose restrictions on religious symbols in educational institutions. 
 Kuru argues that religious freedom is the result of founding fathers’ ideology 
shaping state policies toward religion or the practice of secularism. The important point 
is state building process creating “path dependence” toward state-religion relations. The 
“path dependence” of the state is the result of the struggle of purposeful political 
ideologies. For Kuru, there are two kinds of ideological approaches to religion: 
“assertive secularism” and “passive secularism.” While assertive secularism tends to 
exclude religion from the public sphere and sees it as a private matter, passive 
secularism is neutral toward religion and allows believers to perform their religion in 
the public sphere. Exclusionary or inclusionary policies toward religion in the public 
sphere are shaped in accordance with these two approaches; and, ideological struggles 
between assertive and passive secularism shape state policies toward religion. Thus, 
Kuru suggests that religious freedom depends on these two kinds of secularism. The 
winners of this political struggle in a nation lock state policies into a path, but this 
process does not lead to historical determinism because dominant ideology can move 
back and forth between assertive and passive secularism like a swinging pendulum 
depending on the struggle between ideological groups. Thus, ideological and 
institutional change is possible, but it requires a critical juncture to change the path once 
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it is constructed. The degree of assertive or passive secularism produces different 
dynamics and leads to the emergence of different levels of religious freedom.  
 In Turkey and France, the presence of an “ancient regime” based on the close 
relationship between monarchy and religion led to the development of strong anti-
clerical Republican movements. When the republican elites in these countries 
established new nation-states, they did not want the hegemonic role of religion over the 
state and society. Therefore, the victory of secular republican elites led to the 
development of assertive secularism. On the other hand, in the US, the lack of ancient 
regime and the consensus of secular and religious elites on the separation of the church 
and state led to the development of passive secularism. However, opposing ideologies 
challenges dominant ideologies and leads to the emergence of some exceptions, 
contradictions, and changes in state policies toward religion based on the balance of 
power between struggling ideological groups. State policies toward religion can change 
in a radical way, but a critical juncture is necessary in the formation of a new path. 
According to Kuru, Turkey has experienced a critical juncture when the AKP came to 
power, and state policies toward religion have changed. He argues that the AKP 
politicians are proponents of passive secularism and they allow the public visibility of 
religion in Turkey.   
 Although Kuru examines political changes affecting state behavior towards 
religion, social restrictions on religion in a nation remain unanswered in his theory. 
Religious freedom is not only a political issue; there are also social and cultural 
restrictions on religious freedom. For example, even if the US is a passive secular 
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country with high religious freedom and religious symbols are allowed at educational 
institutions, there are some Muslim women who choose not to wear headscarf because 
of social gaze and fear although they would prefer to wear it (Khalid 2011).   
 Kuru’s approach has also some problems in explaining state policies toward 
religion. I have reservations about the neutrality of the state towards all religious groups 
in practice. For example, in Kuru’s study, the U.S. is seen as a good example of neutral 
policies toward. However, while a large number of religious groups such as Mormons, 
Catholics, new religious movements (i.e., Jehovah Witnesses), and recently Islam were 
discriminated against in the US history (Corrigan 2010), some religious groups such as 
Evangelicals, have enormous impact on the construction of American national identity 
(Emerson and Smith 2000, Huntington 2004, Smith 2000) and American socio-political 
life throughout American history (Lindsay 2007) despite the strict separation of religion 
and state de jure. As Bellah (1970) argues, while American civil religion embraces 
Protestantism, Catholicism, and Judaism, other religions (i.e., Islam, Orthodox 
Christianity, Buddhism) are not seen as slices of American civil religion. Thus, Kuru’s 
theory cannot explain discrimination against some religions and hierarchical approaches 
to religious groups in a passive secular country.  
  Another problem with Kuru’s theory is that it provides politicians with too 
much agency. Politicians, including founding fathers, do not and cannot behave in 
accordance with their own ideological stance in all conditions. Kuru argues that 
founding fathers lock the state into a path in the period of state formation in terms of the 
relationship between religion and state. However, each state formation is a distinct and 
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unique process, and founding fathers also depend on social structures. As Bryan S. 
Turner (1990) points out, the state formation process in France and the US was 
materialized from below.  While the emergence of French nation-state was the result of 
a long historical struggle from below against the church authority and the king, in 
America, the state was established based on the protection of individual freedom and 
the rejection of centralized state power. And founding fathers in Turkey established a 
new Republic in Ankara in the 1920s from above after the independence war in 1920 as 
an alternative to the Ottoman Empire. This kind of state formation allowed them to 
establish a new Republic in accordance with their ideological stance.  
 While Kuru’s theory may explain the construction of state behavior toward 
religion ‘from above’ (i.e., Turkey), it is historically and comparatively not sufficient to 
explain the emergence of exclusionary approaches to religion in France and of inclusive 
approaches to religion in the US because founding fathers’ ideology in ‘from below’ 
cases (i.e., France and the US) has a limited impact on the construction of state behavior 
toward religion. In the US, founding fathers’ ideology could be influential in the 
development of the separation of church and state during the period of the state 
formation, but founding fathers’ impact on the development of inclusive policies toward 
religion in public was limited because of the development of American national values 
that favored the protection of individual freedom and the rejection of central state power 
from below. 
 On the other hand, Kuru explains recent changes in Turkey through the 
domination of passive secularism over assertive secularism as represented by the AKP 
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leadership’s ideology (Kuru 2006, Kuru 2009). As a result, we need to expect a neutral 
state toward all religious groups in a passive secular country. But, even if religious 
restrictions imposed on minority religions have been abolished, the AKP leadership has 
in fact promoted Islam as an unofficial state religion. 
 Finally, Kuru’s concentration on the ideology of politicians cannot explain 
recent developments in Turkey due to the transformation of national identity “from 
below.” Because of the emergence of the new Islamic middle class after the 1980s and 
its impact on the diffusion of democratic values within Islamic public sphere, the 
advocacy for the increase of social, cultural, and political rights has developed from 
below. The formation of the AKP is also a response to the development of the new 
Islamic middle class (Atasoy 2005, Gumuscu 2008, Jang 2005, Taniyici 2003, Yavuz 
2006, Yavuz 2009). The AKP leadership has been influenced by the demands coming 
from the new Islamic middle class for the increase of social, cultural, and political rights 
for everyone. For example, Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan called for restrictions on 
abortion in early 2012, but he had to back down due to strong resistance not only from 
secular opponents, but also from Islamic circles. 
Rational Choice Theory 
 Rational choice theory is a very popular theoretical approach to religion in the 
academia of the US. According to this theory (Stark and Bainbridge 1985, Stark and 
Finke 2000), the first theoretical axiom is that people act rationally based on 
cost/benefit calculation. Religious behavior is also part of cost/benefit calculation; 
therefore, it is a rational behavior similar to other human behaviors. Another basic 
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axiom is that people aim to gain rewards and to avoid costs; but rewards are limited in 
supply. Therefore, humans aim to reach the rewards in the future and hereafter. They 
also have some otherworldly rewards that cannot be verifiable in this world. The 
supernatural helps them to gain these otherworldly rewards. 
 Rational choice theory not only covers individual choices, but it also includes 
religious groups. While religions and religious groups are a kind of firm aiming to 
enhance their costumer portfolio, customers make rational choices among available 
products. In this theory, “a religious economy consists of all of the religious activity 
going on in any society: a market of current and potential adherents, a set of one of 
more organizations seeking to attract or maintain adherents, and the religious culture 
offered by the organizations” (Stark and Finke 2000:193). When people are faced with a 
choice, “within the limits of their information and understanding, restricted by available 
options, guided by their references and tastes, humans attempt to make rational choices” 
(Stark and Finke 2000:38). But, the religious market is mutually exclusive; customers 
cannot choose two religions at the same time. 
 For this approach, an unregulated religious market tends to be pluralistic unless 
an external factor (e.g., the state) supports a single religious group/firm. An unregulated 
religious economy also produces a vigorous competition between religious 
groups/firms. While religious pluralism and competition lead to the development of 
high religious participation, the lack of competition in a society leads to a low level of 
religious participation. While the religiosity in the US is an outcome of religious 
pluralism and competition, low religious participation in Europe is the result of the lack 
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of energetic and attractive religious groups.  
 Rational choice theory also argues that “religious change is largely the product 
of supply-side transformations” (Stark and Finke 2000:193). Demanding religions 
increase their impact on society and win the market place because they supply religious 
rewards; however, those who are incapable of motivating and sustaining religious 
organizations and activities get weaker. Thus, new religious movements increase their 
impact when conventional churches become lazy and weak. 
 Anthony Gill’s study of The Political Origins of Religious Liberty (2008) and 
Brian J. Grim and Roger Finke’s study of The Price of Freedom Denied (2011) are 
well-known examples of this theory’s application to religious freedom. Anthony Gill 
believes that religious freedom has been increasing in many parts of the world although 
there are significant differences among nations in terms of religious freedom. The 
question is how to explain these differences and the increase of religious freedom all 
over the world. In particular, his aim is to explain why some countries have more liberal 
regulations toward religion while others restrict religious freedom.  
 Gill provides a general theory explaining the origin and development of 
religious freedom through the role of human agency based on rational choice theory. He 
believes that “religious liberty is a matter of governmental regulation” (Gill 2008:47). It 
is politicians or lawmakers who are going to decide the limit of religious freedom. Thus, 
political interest, in particular the self interested and utility maximizing politicians, 
shapes regulations toward religion through legislation. This requires understanding the 
motives and incentives of political leaders in order to understand religious liberty. As 
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rational actors, politicians aim to be elected one more time and stay in power. They 
therefore want to solve social, economic, and political problems. They tend to increase 
religious freedom for their own interest and political survival if they do not perceive any 
threat from religion and religious actors. 
 In this context, the degree of religious pluralism or the presence of a dominant 
religion in a society are important factors shaping the decisions of political leaders. For 
Gill, pluralistic religious market produces religious liberty in society because any 
religion cannot dominate religious market; and each religion tends to increase religious 
freedom for all religions because restrictions can decrease their own freedom. However, 
if there is a dominant religion within a society and political leaders perceive the 
dominant religion as a potential threat to their political presence, this leads to the 
decrease of religious freedom. 
 The dominant religion generally tends to restrict the freedom of religious 
minorities in a society while religious minorities aim to increase religious freedom. If 
politicians do not perceive dominant religions as a political threat, they generally tend to 
decrease freedom for religious minorities due to the pressure from the dominant religion 
because for politicians “winning the ‘hearts and minds’ of the citizenry - that is, gaining 
ideological legitimacy - is most likely the cheapest route to ensuring political survival in 
office” (Gill 2008:49). Thus, for Gill, although religious market is an important factor 
influencing the limit of religious freedom in a society, politicians are the key actors 
defining the legal parameters. 
 Grim and Finke in their study of The Price of Freedom Denied (2011) aim to 
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examine the factors leading to the restriction of religious freedom and the results of the 
denial of religious freedom based on the data produced from International Religious 
Freedom Reports by the State Department’s Office of International Religious Freedom. 
They aim to challenge Huntington’s clash of civilizations thesis, which argues that 
multiculturalism or cultural and religious diversity within a society leads to the increase 
of social conflict. In contrast to the clash of civilizations thesis, Grim and Finke argue 
that religious homogeneity and the denial of religious freedom lead to the rise in social 
conflict and violent religious persecution, and that religious pluralism produces 
religious freedom and social peace. 
 Even though Grim and Finke’s study has many similarities with Gill’s study, 
they try to account for social restrictions on religious freedom in addition to political 
restrictions. For them, it is necessary to examine not only governmental restrictions, but 
also social restrictions on religious freedom because religious and social groups can be 
the source of restrictions on religious freedom even if the state is neutral and less 
antagonistic toward religion. For them, there are two important factors leading to 
restrictions on religious freedom: (I) a dominant religion aiming to limit the activities of 
minority religions beyond the state and (II) the state producing legal restrictions on 
religious activities.  If the state perceives religion as a threat to the social order and 
security or political stability, it restricts religious freedom. On the other hand, dominant 
and established religions believe that all other religions are heretical and a threat to the 
established religion; therefore, religious groups and social movements supporting the 
dominant religion can restrict religious freedom for minority religions. Also, a dominant 
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religion sometimes can force politicians to restrict the activities of minority religions. 
For Grim and Finke, the worst case for religious freedom is the close alliances between 
politicians and an established religious group. This produces serious conflicts and 
restrictions on religious freedom for minority groups.  
 Grim and Finke categorize countries into six groups in accordance with the level 
of religious freedom: (I) Sociopolitical Monopoly (Iraq, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, 
Egypt, Pakistan); (II) Religion as a Political Threat (Communist governments and states 
such as China, North Korea, and Vietnam); (III) Monopolistic Social Pressure (India, 
Indonesia, Russia, Turkey, Israel, Greece); (IV) Power is Partitioned between Religion 
and State (France, Nigeria, Mexico, Germany); (V) Freedom with Some Tensions 
(Italy, Spain, the UK, Argentina, Brazil, South Africa, the Philippines); (VI) High 
Levels of Religious Freedom (Japan, Australia, South Korea, Taiwan, Canada, Chile, 
Denmark Sweden, New Zealand, Haiti, Albania, Mali, Senegal). 
 After examining these categories, Grim and Finke reach the conclusion that (I) 
religious pluralism leads to a decrease in social conflict because if a religion becomes 
dominant and controls political power, it restricts other religions because they are seen 
as heretical. (II) There is also a close relationship between state interference and violent 
religious persecution. If the government interferes with religion and believers, the level 
of religious persecution increases. The rate of religious persecution is higher in those 
countries where the state is in favor of the dominant religion than those states that are 
neutral toward religion. Their research supports the neutrality of the state toward 
religions because favorism leads to the development of religious persecution. 
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 Although rational choice theory is a prevalent approach explaining religious 
freedom, it has a number of limitations. Rational choice theory argues that if politicians 
perceive religion as a threat to them and the state, they restrict religious activities. 
However, as Jose Casanova (1994) shows, religion within modern democratic civil 
societies integrated into the modern world and created its own sphere. Although 
dominant religion can demand some privileges in the modern world, they are not a 
threat to secular politicians and the separation of state and church. Even the Catholic 
Church has no problem with the separation of state and church in today’s world (Wilde 
2007). 
 When we look at restrictions imposed on religion by the state in many cases, 
particularly in some European countries, we see that these restrictions (i.e. the cross, 
kippah, hijab, minaret) are generally religious symbols. If these symbols are threats to 
politicians in France and Switzerland, why do British and Dutch politicians not perceive 
these symbols as threats for their political survival? Although these are not threats to 
politicians, some European countries restrict some religious symbols with public 
support because they suggest that these religious symbols are not compatible with 
European values or their own national identities. Thus, rational choice theory cannot 
explain restrictions imposed on religious symbols, which are not threats to the survival 
of the state and politicians. 
 Rational choice theory also provides politicians with too much agency. Even if 
politicians want to ban or release some religious activities, they are not always able to 
do it. For example, in Turkey, the headscarf issue has produced social unrest and extra 
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costs for politicians and Turkish society for long years, but a large number of politicians 
could not solve this problem in the Kemalist period even if many of them wanted to 
solve it because there are also other factors shaping religious freedom such as pressure 
groups, supreme and constitutional courts, civil and military bureaucracy, and the mass 
media. On the other hand, it is not easy to restrict religious activities in a society with 
high religious freedom for politicians without powerful social, intellectual, bureaucratic 
(particularly military and judicial bureaucracy), and economic support for their acts 
aiming to restrict religious activities because religion is generally a very powerful 
institution mobilizing people easily and producing strong resistance.  
 Rational choice theorists do not take into account the differences between 
religion and religious fundamentalism. For these theorists, all religious groups are 
inherently fundamentalist because all religious groups aim to restrict other religions’ 
activities due to their belief that other religions are heretical. However, all kinds of 
religion may believe that other religions are heretical, but this does not necessarily mean 
that they aim to restrict the freedom of other religious groups. This understanding is 
generally a remnant of the medieval ages and the religious wars in Europe. In today’s 
modern democratic civil societies, dominant religion can also demand more religious 
freedom for religious minorities. For example, the French Catholic Church does not 
support the burqa and veiling bans and it urges to respect the rights of all believers 
(Daily Mail 2010). In Britain, the religious leader of the Anglican Church, Dr. Rowan 
Williams as the Archbishop of Canterbury, advocates the adaptation of certain aspects 
of Sharia law for Muslims in the UK (BBC 2008). 
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 As a result of some basic premises rational choice theory, rational choice 
theorists misinterpret some cases. I believe that Turkey is a good example how some 
basic premises of rational choice theory lead to misreading and misunderstanding. Grim 
and Finke categorize Turkey into ‘Monopolistic Social Pressures’ and describe this 
group as follows: 
The government attempts to hold a neutral or at least less antagonistic view 
toward religion… This attempt at neutrality, however, is often challenged by 
religious or social groups calling for more restrictions on select groups… Russia 
and Turkey also fall into this group… Governments are facing strong pressures 
to increase restrictions on selected groups. Not surprisingly, the level of violent 
religious persecution is nearly as high for this group as it is for the sociopolitical 
monopoly.” (Grim and Finke 2011:85) 
 
 Although Turkey is officially a secular state, the government is not neutral 
toward all religious groups because while the state provides religious services for 
Muslims through the Directorate of Religious Affairs in order to control religious 
activities, it ignores minority religions. In the Kemalist Period (1920-2002), the state 
was antagonistic toward religious groups including Islamic groups and restricted 
religious activities for all religious groups (Ahmad 1993, Berkes and Ahmad 1964, 
Findley 2010, Gole 1996, Mardin 2006, Yavuz 2003). As Alfred C. Stepan said that: “in 
Turkey (as in Pakistan and probably Indonesia as well) the greatest obstacle to 
democracy is posed not by Islam but by military and intelligence organizations 
unaccountable to democratic authority” (Stepan 2000:52). On the other hand, in the 
post-Kemalist Period (2002-Present), we see the decline of political restrictions 
imposed on religious freedom for not only Muslims, but also religious minorities 
including non-Muslim minorities at the hand of religiously-oriented politicians in close 
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alliance with dominant religion. Although the worst case for the emergence of religious 
freedom is the close alliance between religious groups and the government for rational 
choice theories, the close alliance between dominant religion and the government has 
led to the increase in religious freedom for minority groups in Turkey. When we look at 
social and political restrictions on minority religions in Turkey, a deep examination 
and/or ‘thick description’ show that the source of the restrictions on minority religions 
is not religious groups, but nationalist and secularist groups. Thus, although rational 
choice theory seems reasonable, it cannot explain the Turkish case because Turkey is a 
Muslim dominant society, and there is a close alliance between dominant religion and 
religiously-oriented politicians who increased religious freedom for minority religions. 
For rational choice theorists, these are very complicated and unexplainable situations. 
 Religious Freedom as a Practice of the Nation 
The Nation as a Practical Category 
 What is a nation? According to Brubaker (1996b, 2004a, 2004b, 2006), this 
question supports substantialist approaches that perceive nations as real entities and 
enduring communities. For him, as part of his constructivist approach, one needs to take 
nation into consideration as a category of practice, not as a category of analysis. He says 
“we should not ask ‘what is a nation?’ but rather: how is nationhood as a political and 
cultural form institutionalized within and among states?” and “how does nation work as 
practical category, as classificatory scheme, as cognitive frame?” (Brubaker 1996b:16). 
The practical uses of the category of nation require focusing on nation-oriented 
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perceptions, discourses, action, struggles, and claims. 
 Even if the nation is not a real entity, people have a feeling of belonging to 
nations and a sense of affinity with nations because of political claims based on 
collectivities and the narratives producing a sense of shared attributes and history. As 
part of the practice of the category of the nation, people not only identify themselves 
with certain categories (e.g., Frenchness, Turkishness, Greekness, whiteness, and 
blackness) but also identify others with certain categories. But these identifications 
should not be treated as real entities. In contrast, they are imaginary, contextual, and 
situational. Although self-identification, external identification, and categorization have 
a dialectical relationship, they do not have to converge and to represent realities; 
however, this process has vital implications for those who are involved in.  
 More importantly, powerful and authoritative institutions, particularly the state, 
categorize people. The state is highly influential in the formation of assumption, 
perception, and categorization that shape the exercise of collective behavior. It is one of 
the most influential and active agents of identification and categorization of people in 
relation to gender, religion, occupation, ethnicity, criminality, and race. It determines 
what is what and who is who.  As Bourdieu shows, the state not only has the legitimate 
use of physical force, but also “symbolic power” shaping “categories of perception and 
appreciation” (Bourdieu 1994). Bourdieu depicts the role of the state in the formation of 
national identity is as follows: 
Through classificational systems (especially according to sex and age) inscribed 
in law, through bureaucratic procedures, educational structures and social rituals 
(particularly salient in the case of Japan and England), the state molds mental 
  49 
structures and imposes common principles of vision and division…. And it 
thereby contributes to the construction of what is commonly designated as 
national identity (or, in a more traditional language, national character).” 
(Bourdieu 1994:7-8) 
 
 A nation is not a real entity, but it is reified by the state because nation-states 
produce their own national heroes, mythologies, symbols, national anthems, 
commemoration, and enemies through state power (e.g., schooling and militarization). 
The practical uses of the category of the nation permeate into many aspects of society 
(i.e., movies, theaters, music, art newspapers, sport activities, bumper stickers, and so 
on) (Billig 1995, Edensor 2002) to produce social cohesion based on a sense of a shared 
set of beliefs, memories, traditions, and practices. Then political actors and 
organizations mobilize national values and justify collective action in the name of the 
imagined collectivities. Therefore, the practical use of the idea of the nation generates 
loyalty and trust, and becomes an effective source of legitimacy and mobilization. 
 Although the state can be a highly effective actor in the promotion of the idea of 
the nation, it cannot monopolize the practical uses of the nation (Brubaker 2004a). 
Nationhood is a diverse place where different imaginations compete, conflict, or 
negotiate; therefore, even if the state tries to produce national commonalities, it is not 
able to produce the internal sameness. Ideological and political struggle between 
different visions suffuse in many debates and discursive fields (i.e., national symbols, 
language, education, past narratives, sport, and religion) and leads to the change of 
some basic imagined premises and perceptions of nationhood over time. 
  50 
National Narratives, the Sense of a Shared Past, and Mythscapes 
 Ernest Renan, in his famous 1882 lecture, claimed that the nation is constituted 
by two things: the sense of a shared past and the will to live together (Renan [1882] 
1990[1882]). Here, my aim is not to examine what constitutes the nation, but to 
emphasize that the sense of a shared past is commonly used as a practice of the nation 
by nationalist claims (Anderson 2006). The sense of a shared past based on select past 
narratives in the construction of a nation provides a sense of continuity and same 
destiny (Cinar 2005), justifies power relations (Abizadeh 2004), and maintains 
collective identities by producing the sense of sameness. The sense of a shared past not 
only produces the sense of sameness, but also plays an important role in the delineation 
of the self from others. Therefore, nation-states pass the sense of a shared past to new 
generations by establishing national museums, narrating national mythologies and 
epics, and teaching national histories. As a result, the memories of the past play a key 
role in the construction of “we” and “the others,” and resonate with the exercise of 
exclusion and inclusion in a society.  
 The nation itself is an ongoing construction; therefore, national history is 
continually reinterpreted in the light of the constructs of nationalisms; thus, the past is 
rediscovered, reinvented, and reshaped as part of the construction of identity processes 
by bringing chosen elements of the past (e.g., shared memories, historical narratives, 
heroic stories, myths, traumas, and golden ages) into the present (Friedman 1994). As 
Stuart Hall points out, “the past is not waiting for us back there to recoup our identities 
against. It is always retold, rediscovered, reinvented. It has to be narrativized. We go to 
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our own pasts through history, through memory, through desire, not as a literal fact” 
(Hall 1991b:57). 
 Perhaps all modern societies depend on past narratives; and all these narratives 
are mythical to a certain extent. While the construction of identity reshapes the past, the 
past constructed by the self, in turn, affects the present because the past is reproduced in 
the present for the present (Bell 2003). The reconstruction of the past can be imaginary 
or real because a large number of sources (e.g., historical movies, documentaries, TV 
series, novels, comic books, collective stories) are mobilized in the reconstruction of the 
past for the present as part of power struggle. In this context, the important point is not 
whether it is real, but its impact on the present.  
 Nationhood is a diverse place where the dominant and the dominated 
nationhood imaginations compete, conflict, or negotiate. Ideological and political 
struggle between different visions suffuse in many debates and discursive fields (e.g., 
historical narratives, national symbols, language, education, and religion). The presence 
of competing nationhood imaginations can bring about the emergence of different past 
narratives shaping the present and producing different outcomes in the exercise of 
inclusion and exclusion in a society. In this context, it is useful to take into account 
Bell’s notion of ‘mythscapes’ in order to understand the impact of competing national 
identity imaginations on past narratives (Bell 2003). The term “mythscapes” points out 
ideological spaces where “governing myths” and “subaltern myths” compete with each 
other to shape national identity because of their different historical reference points and 
past imaginations affecting the present. In his words:   
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Organic forms of collective remembrance can actually run against the grain of 
the dominant narrative (or 'governing mythology') of the nation... Memory can 
thus function as a counter-hegemonic site of resistance, a space of political 
opposition... I consequently introduce the notion of a mythscape, the temporally 
and spatially extended discursive realm wherein the struggle for control of 
people's memories and the formation of nationalist myths is debated, contested 
and subverted incessantly. The mythscape is the page upon which the multiple 
and often conflicting nationalist narratives are (re)written; it is the perpetually 
mutating repository for the representation of the past for the purposes of the 
present.” (Bell 2003:66) 
The Nation-Building Process in Turkey in the Context of Eastern Europe 
 Nation building is a long and complex process varying in different experiences. 
Almost all major theorists (e.g., Anderson (2006), Gellner (2006), and Hobsbawm 
(1992) explain nation-building based on western experience. According to them, nations 
were invented bit by bit under the impact of modernization and industrialization 
processes because of the development of print culture, mass-education, the interest of 
elites, and so on. These processes led to the invention of nations or “state-seeking 
nations” (Brubaker 2009), so that people established their own nation-states. However, 
in many cases, particularly in Central and Eastern Europe, the nation-building process 
was very different from “state-seeking nations.” Recent studies (e.g., Brubaker 1995, 
Brubaker 1996a) show that the states or “nationalizing states” by and large created their 
own nations from above in many cases; thus, the state was not the corollary of invented 
nations, but an active agent creating its own nation.  
 There is a triadic relationship between “nationalizing states,” “national 
minorities,” and “external national homelands” in the nation-building processes in 
Central and Eastern Europe after the disintegration of the multinational empires (i.e., 
Ottomans, Habsburg, and Romanov) in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and the 
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rebirth of nation-states and the idea of the nation in the 1990s because of the collapse of 
the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia. While the nation-state refers to an 
achieved or completed condition, “nationalizing states” refer to unrealized and 
uncompleted nation-states or as states destined to be nation-states of and for particular 
nations. “Nationalizing states” depend on a “core nation” or nationality defined by 
ethnocultural characteristics, which sees itself as the legitimate and real owner of the 
state. However, the core nation has a weak position to shape cultural, economic, and 
demographic policies; therefore, the state is the active power promoting the interest of 
the “core nation” in the name of the “core nation.” “Nationalizing states” are inherently 
more effective than state-seeking nationalisms in terms of the promotion of the 
language, cultural revival, demographic predominance, economic welfare, or political 
hegemony of the core nation in almost every formal and informal setting: in legislature, 
the media, universities, the streets, and so on. Thus, nationalism shapes both formal 
policies and informal practices in these polities.  
 The collapse of the multinational empires and nationalization of political space 
in the region has left tens of millions of people outside their own national territory and 
created “national minorities.” The term “national minorities” refers to a large number of 
people who belong to one state through formal citizenship, but have ethnonational 
affinity to another.  
 Homeland for these national minorities does not refer to the state in which they 
live, but another state with which they have ethnonational affinity. Therefore, another 
state can be an “external national homeland” for its ethnic diaspora. As a result, these 
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states see themselves as responsible for protecting not only their own citizens but also 
ethnic co-nationals who have citizenship in other countries. The homeland state 
monitors its own ethnonational kin in other countries, tries to protect their interest, and 
takes action in their name.  
 Although Brubaker’s theoretical approaches to “nationalizing states” in Central 
and Eastern Europe are very useful in order to understand the situation of ethno-
religious minorities in Turkey, there are some significant issues one needs to take into 
account with respect to “national minorities” in Turkey. First, religion played a highly 
effective role in the construction of otherness between Turks and minorities. Minorities 
in Turkey after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire were firstly non-Muslims, then they 
were Greeks, Armenians, Bulgarians, or Jews. Second, a large number of new 
“nationalizing states” gained their independence from the Ottoman Empire; therefore, a 
sense of victimization emerged from defeats and the sense of betrayals was very 
powerful in the construction of Turkish nationalism. 
Competing Nationhood Imaginations and Their Impact on Religious Minorities in 
Turkey 
 Although the millet system was also seen in Islamic Empires before the Ottoman 
Empire, it became institutionalized under the rule of the Ottoman Empire, particularly 
after the conquest of Constantinople (1453), the capital of the Byzantium Empire and 
the center of Orthodox Christianity, by Ottoman Sultan Mehmed II (1444-46/1451-
1481). In the millet system, people were categorized in accordance with their own 
religion until the mid-nineteenth century and each religion was considered one nation 
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(millet in Turkish), which is called the millet system. While all Muslims were also 
considered one nation in the millet system, the term Turk referred to all Muslims even 
though there were many different ethnic Muslim categories.  
  After the conquest, Mehmed II endeavored to make Istanbul (Constantinople) a 
center of three religions, which were Islam, Christianity, and Judaism. He declared 
himself “Kayseri-Rum” (Caesar of Rome) and identified himself as the leader of 
Christians in the East. Mehmed II encouraged Christians to remain in the city after the 
conquest; therefore, he guaranteed religious freedom and provided them with some tax 
exemptions. He gave new privileges to the head of the Orthodox Patriarchate and 
Patriarchs became the second highest religious authority after the Seyhulislam in the 
Ottoman Empire. In the millet system, Patriarchs became community leaders who were 
in charge of Orthodox Christians too; therefore, the Orthodox Patriarchate became an 
Ottoman institution that had a huge bureaucracy in order to fulfill its responsibilities 
over Orthodox Christians. The territorial expansion of the Ottoman Empire over time 
led to the expansion of the authority of the Patriarch of Constantinople over Orthodox 
Christians. The Orthodox Patriarchate expanded its administrative jurisdiction from the 
Mediterranean to Baltic Sea and from Central Europe to the Volga. It also increased its 
authority over other eastern Christians and Patriarchies. Thus, for the first time, under 
the Ottoman Empire, almost all Orthodox Christians were collected under a single 
authority (Alexandris 1992:23).  
 During the course of the Byzantium Empire, the Armenian Apostolic Church 
was banned from any kind of activities in Constantinople because the Orthodox 
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Patriarchate of Constantinople and the Armenian Apostolic Church had considered each 
other as heretic since the Council of Chalcedon (AD 451). After the conquest of 
Istanbul by the Ottoman Empire, Mehmed II brought the Armenian Metropolitan of 
Bursa to Istanbul and established the first Armenian Patriarchate of Istanbul in 1461. 
Armenian Patriarchs in the Ottoman Empire, similar to Orthodox Patriarchs, were not 
only religious leaders, but also the heads of Armenian Christians. 
 Mehmed II also brought Romanioate Jews, those who lived in Anatolia and the 
Balkans, to Istanbul to make the city as an important center of Islam, Christianity, and 
Jewry. A small number of Ashkenazi Jews also migrated to Istanbul after its conquest 
by the Ottomans because for Jews, it was better to live under the rule of Muslims 
instead of Christians in the medieval ages (Lewis 1984). However, the major Jewish 
population of the Empire consisted of Sephardi Jews. After the conquest of the Iberian 
Peninsula by the Spain Kingdom, Jews and Muslims were forced either to convert to 
Christianity or to expel from the Peninsula as a result of the edict of “The Alhambra 
Decree” (the Edict of Expulsion) of 1492. Sultan Bayazid II (1481-1512) sent the 
Ottoman navy to Spain to bring Sephardi Jews to the Ottoman lands (Levy 2003). They 
then were settled in many major Ottoman cities such as Istanbul, Izmir, Bursa, Edirne, 
and Salonika. 
 The millet system by and large produced a form of pre-modern religious 
pluralism and allowed many different religions, particularly three Abrahamic religious 
traditions, to live together without any major conflict and persecution until the rise of 
nationalism in the nineteenth century (Barkey 2012, Campos 2010). Although Turks or 
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Muslims as a dominant nation had many privileges, religious minorities participated in 
Ottoman society and became very active in commercial and bureaucratic realms (Levy 
2003). The Millet system consisted of the self-governing units of religious groups that 
had a large degree of freedom within their own internal and communal affairs. These 
millets established their own institutions, drew up their own moral and legal codes, and 
imposed them on their community members. Although the Ottoman millet system 
produced a polity allowing different religions to live together under the rule of the 
Ottoman sultans, the tolerance in this system was not based on individual freedom, but 
communal freedom because the Ottoman rulers were not interested in communal 
restrictions over individuals within these communities. Therefore, Will Kymlicka 
suggests that the millet system was a kind of “federation of theocracies” (Kymlicka 
1995:157). He also points out that the millet system was an effective institutional 
accommodation to cultural diversity and the most developed model producing tolerance 
before the invention and expansion of the idea of liberal democracy although the millet 
system was very different from liberal democracy because of its structure based on 
communal autonomy, not individual liberty. 
 The traumatic experiences of the late period of the Ottoman Empire, particularly 
the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, shaped the relationship with minorities in 
modern Turkey, particularly in the single-party period between 1923-1945, and led to 
the development of Kemalist fear and phobia toward minorities. For the Kemalist elites, 
Turkey’s multiethnic structure was a potential threat to the unity and future of the new 
Republic because European powers could use non-Muslim minorities to interfere with 
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the internal affairs of the new Republic, and the non-Muslim minorities could 
collaborate with western powers against the new Republic again. Therefore, the 
allegiances and loyalties of non-Muslims to the new nation-state were a matter of 
considerable concern for the Kemalist elites. The founding fathers of the new Republic, 
therefore, believed the remains of the multiethnic structure of the Empire within 
national borders were a threat to the core nation, Turks. The state elites aimed to get rid 
of them by producing distrustful and hostile attitudes. Although minorities had specific 
rights and entitlements, they faced serious difficulties, restrictions, and the violations of 
their basic rights (e.g., extra taxes, the abolishment of property rights, restrictions 
imposed on education rights, language restrictions, religious restrictions, and so on). 
The Kemalist nationalism not only shaped state behavior, but also infused Turkish 
society through education, the media, judicial decisions, and so on. Therefore, religious 
minorities were targeted by Turkish nationalists through retaliation, humiliation, and 
hate campaigns. As a result, they did not feel secure and at home. 
 However, in the post-Kemalist Turkey, Turkey has experienced important 
improvements in terms of minority rights. The government has increased the social, 
cultural, religious, and economic rights of non-Muslim minorities and developed a 
positive and considerable relationship with non-Muslim minorities although there are 
still a large number of problems remained to be solved. 
 A large number of studies (e.g., Barkey 2012, Brink-Danan 2011, Cinar 2005, 
Colak 2006, Grigoriadis 2007, Kösebalaban 2011, Özyürek 2007, Somun 2011, Tugal 
2012, Yavuz 1998, Yavuz 1999) pay attention to the rise of nostalgia for the Ottomans 
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in Turkey as part of the increasing impact of Islamic movements on Turkish society. 
However, a large number of these studies focus on the role of nostalgia for the 
Ottomans or neo-Ottomanism in the construction of Turkish foreign policy as Turkey’s 
imperial desire to shape former Ottoman territories. But, it is much deeper because 
nostalgia for the Ottomans is not only an important factor affecting Turkey’s foreign 
policy, but also a predominant narrative shaping the nationhood imagination of Turkish 
Islamic movements. 
 Islamic intellectuals and groups have always been very critical toward the 
Kemalist narratives maligning the Ottoman past and picturing the Ottomans as the 
darkness of the medieval ages. As a reaction to the Kemalist historiography, Islamic 
thinkers and groups began to establish an alternative past narrative, which glorifies the 
Ottomans as part of their counter-hegemonic struggle, in the early years of the new 
Republic. The glorification of the Ottomans at the hand of Islamic groups and 
intellectuals has increasingly continued in the ongoing construction of identity over 
time. 
 On the other hand, the literature on the rise of nostalgia for the Ottomans by and 
large ignores the impact of the globalization process and Turkey’s relationship with the 
EU. However, one needs to take into account that Turkey’s integration into the 
globalization and EU processes have also facilitated the rise of identity politics based on 
nostalgia for the Ottomans because of the increasing impact of interaction leading to the 
development of defensive politics of differentiation since the 1980s. The rise of 
totalizing discourse that depicts Islam as illiberal and intolerant in the globalized world 
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and the increasing impact of cultural conditions (Turkey’s Islamic identity) on Turkey’s 
integration process on the EU play an important role in the development of nostalgia for 
the Ottomans. While Westerners/Europeans by and large portray the west/Europe as the 
land of individual liberties, tolerance, human rights, it is common to perceive the 
Islamic world/Turkey as a threat to western/European values. While Christian and 
nationalist Europeans who perceive the EU as a “Christian club” resist Turkey’s 
integration because of Turkey’s religious identity, secular and liberal Europeans 
perceive Turkey as a threat to European secular/liberal tolerance because of the revival 
of Islam in Turkey and perceptions of Islam’s resistance to European secular values 
(Casanova 2006).  
 As a response to the West/Europe, Islamic public figures in Turkey not only try 
to bring out impressions of western hypocrisy by showing the discrepancy between 
western discourse on tolerance, multiculturalism, and minority rights and western 
practice toward the Islamic world (e.g. support for authoritarian regimes in the Middle 
East, Islamophobic discourse, and the approval of Turkey’s headscarf ban on campuses 
as a necessity of secularism by the European Court of Human Rights), but also bring the 
past back by comparing tolerance in the Ottomans and Europe in the form of nostalgia 
for the Ottomans as an endeavor trying to prove that Muslims were (and are) more 
tolerant than Europeans. 
 Islamic academics and public intellectuals curiously excavate the tolerance in 
the Ottomans to understand how the Ottomans ruled hundreds of different ethnic and 
religious groups in a peaceful situation without any serious violence from the fourteenth 
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century to the nineteenth century. Therefore, they organize symposiums and talks that 
examine diversity and tolerance in the Ottoman Empire. However, an explicit 
articulation of nostalgia for Ottomans can be seen in an extensive body of writings 
about the Ottomans in Turkey. These writings are generally produced by Islamic public 
intellectuals (e.g., Yavuz Bahadiroglu, Mustafa Armagan, Kadir Misiroglu). Many 
people eagerly purchase and peruse books about the Ottomans. Many of these books are 
bestsellers among non-fiction books and their authors are on Forbes Turkey’s list of top 
earning authors (Haberturk 2012).  
 These books are not scholarly books and their intellectual merit can be 
disputable. However, they play an important role in the construction of Islamic 
nationhood imagination in Turkey. They are written in a defensive way based on well-
chosen glories as a reaction to Kemalist and western historiography shaped under the 
impact of Orientalist discourse. These books try to prove how Ottomans were tolerant, 
how they were magnificent, how they were just, and so on. Some of them try to prove 
how the Ottoman Empire is the best example of some modern ideas such as human 
rights, rule of law, and equality. Thus, they render modern institutions/values vernacular 
by showing that they were already part of the Islamic civilization, in particular Ottoman 
society.  
 In the cultural field, nostalgia for the Ottomans became a big market in today’s 
Turkey and can be witnessed in many aspects of daily life such as publishing, 
architecture, media, fashion, furniture, and exhibition. For example, there are many 
expensive restaurants designed with Ottoman furniture and serving Ottoman food; many 
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students take Ottoman language lessons to learn to read Ottoman script; almost all 
major television channels, including secular ones, have very popular television series 
about the Ottomans (e.g., “the Magnificent Century,” “Once Upon a Time in the 
Ottomans,” “Harem,” etc.). Additionally, movies about the Ottomans attract millions of 
people. Recently, a movie, Fetih 1453 (Conquest 1453), about the capture of Istanbul 
was released in February 2012, watched by millions within a few days, and became a 
record-breaking movie in Turkey. It not only shows how the Ottoman Empire was 
powerful but also how the Ottomans were tolerant by emphasizing that Mehmet II 
allowed the people of Constantinople (Istanbul) to practice their own religion after the 
conquest.  
 Islamic movements actively organize commemorative practices producing a 
sense of connectedness to the Ottoman past. Particularly, the commemoration of the 
conquest of Istanbul is celebrated every year on May 29 and produces a sense of 
glorification through bringing the glorified Ottoman past back into the present. 
According to Tanil Bora, a prominent leftist thinker, the commemoration of the 
conquest of Istanbul has two symbolic meanings:  “First, it is the symbol of Ottoman 
(that is Islamic) hegemony. Secondly, it is the symbol of the justice and the multiplicity 
of Islam… Within this discourse, Istanbul is the proud example of Muslim-Turkish 
justice which offers protection to foreigner-non-Muslim members” (quoted in Colak 
2006:596). 
 In the political field, Islamic and conservative politicians have increasingly used 
the discourse of Ottoman tolerance and diversity to solve internal tensions since the 
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1980s. Whenever they talk about ethnic and religious minorities, they habitually make a 
reference to the multicultural and tolerant nature of the Ottoman Empire. Particularly, 
Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan constantly gives examples from the Ottomans. 
He also ordered the Directorate of State Archives to prepare an archival book depicting 
the tolerance of the Ottomans toward non-Muslim minorities to give this book as a gift 
to the leaders of other countries visiting Turkey. Even this example in itself shows how 
Islamic politicians want to show how they are so tolerant in the form of nostalgia for the 
Ottomans by bringing some chosen elements of the Ottomans back into the present in a 
defensive manner in the globalized world. 
The Emergence of Defensive Inclusion and Neo-Millet System  
 Although the relationship between the local and the global varies from context 
to context, the literature examining the impact of the globalization process on culture 
and politics by and large focuses on two mainstream approaches: the homogenizing 
impact of the globalization process and the resurgence of identity politics that triggers 
fanaticism and fundamentalism. The homogenization thesis (e.g., Fukuyama 2006) 
points out that the globalization process leads to the universalization of western liberal 
democracy under the impact of the hegemony of the west, in particular the US. The 
proponents of the latter approach (e.g., Appadurai 2006, Castells 1997, Friedman 1994, 
Giddens 2011, Hall 1991a, Hall 1991b) argue that national/local identities try to protect 
their own identities as a response to an increasing interaction in the globalized world; 
therefore, they rediscover their cultural and historical roots. However, this is not only a 
general loss of faith in progress and a new form of the rejection of modernity, but also 
  64 
the emergence of a new form of tribalism and traditionalism. Alain Minc suggests this 
process as the emergence of “a new middle age” (Friedman 1994:vii). For social 
scientists, this process leads to the rise of new cultural movements and religious 
fundamentalism. Stuart Hall’s approach to the globalization process and identity politics 
can be considered a good way of illustration of these ideas. He argues that cultural 
identities rediscover their own roots that spark the rise of “defensive exclusivism” (Hall 
1991a:25) when they are threatened by the global.  He points out: “when the 
movements of the margins are so profoundly threatened by the global forces of 
postmodernity, they can themselves retreat into their own exclusivist and defensive 
enclaves… We have seen that happen: the refusal of modernity which takes the form of 
a return, a rediscovery of identity which constitutes a form of fundamentalism” (Hall 
1991a:36).  
 In Turkish case, Islamic circles have reinvented the Ottomans as “a usable past” 
(Roskies 1999) in order to construct a stable identity by juxtaposing the idea of the 
tolerant and magnificent Ottomans with the global discourse of tolerance and 
multiculturalism in a defensive manner. Thus, there is an articulation of tradition with 
cosmopolitan values because the rise of identity politics based on tradition does not 
conflict with multiculturalism and diversity. What we see in Turkey is not the 
production of “defensive exclusivism” or a form of religious fundamentalism/fanaticsm, 
but defensive inclusion based on tradition. It is a simultaneous articulation of different 
cultural (e.g., Islamic revivalism and the reinvention of the Ottoman past), political 
(e.g., Turkey’s integration process into the EU and global politics), and economic (e.g., 
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the integration of Turkish/Islamic capital into neoliberal globalization) projects, and the 
reinvention and reconstruction of historical roots as an endeavor for the production of a 
legitimate Islamic identity in the globalized world. The reinvention of historical roots 
based on the glorification of select elements of the past not only legitimizes the 
economic and political requirements of, and dependence on, the globalized world, but 
also gives rise to an inclusive national narrative that embraces global discourse of 
multiculturalism, pluralism, tolerance and prevents the rise of religious fundamentalism 
and fanaticism.  
 On the other hand, Islamic understanding of nationhood is a serious obstacle to 
the emergence of a democratic/egalitarian polity because of an understanding of 
tolerance operating in the form of permission and reproducing inequalities even if it 
leads to the emergence of a better polity compared to previous times. According to 
Rainer Forst (2007), there are two kinds of conception of tolerance: the permission 
conception and the respect conception. In the permission conception, an authority gives 
permission to the members of a minority group to live in accordance with their own 
beliefs. In this concept, minority groups accept the dominant position of the authority 
and its privileges. Thus, this kind of permission inherently reproduces status inequalities 
and social stratification. On the other hand, the respect conception of tolerance 
perceives tolerating and tolerated parties as political and moral equals although they 
recognize each other’s differences. Based on this distinction, Turkey’s inclusive and 
tolerant Muslim identity perceives Turkey as a Muslim dominant country, permits non-
Muslim minority groups to live Turkey in accordance with their own beliefs, and tries 
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to protect minority groups. I conceptualize this situation in Turkey as the emergence of 
“neo-millet system.” What I mean by the “neo-millet system” is the emergence of a 
polity where political structure operates in the form of modern institutions such as 
democracy, equal citizenship, and individual freedom de jure while it reproduces non-
Muslims as second-class citizens to Muslims de facto.  
 Indeed, non-Muslim intellectuals are aware of the meaning of recent changes. 
Although they are by and large glad to recent changes under the rule of the AKP 
government, they are not satisfied with the new situation emerged because of the 
Islamic revival. Rober Koptas, the editor in chief of Agos, bilingual Istanbul-based 
Armenian newspaper, gives us a perfect synopsis of recent changes affecting religious 
minorities in the post-Kemalist Turkey:  
In Turkish ‘public discourse’ up to now, Armenians and Christians were 
considered enemies, but that discourse is changing… The issue of the minorities 
is still being addressed in terms of ‘tolerance,’ it’s true. For me, tolerance is not 
the ideal point of arrival. Until now, however, the nationalists saw Greeks, 
Armenians, Jews as a danger to the nation, tolerance is a good thing in 
comparison. (Biondi 2011:31) 
 
 For non-Muslim minorities, the ideal point of arrival is to be treated as equal 
citizens in all realms. They want to feel that they are part of Turkish society as “normal” 
and “equal.” Let me bring Koptas here one more time: “Conditions in Turkey constantly 
remind me that I am an Armenian. This is a painful fact that I cannot escape from. I’d 
like to feel that I belong to this land, and I want to get lost in the crowds” (Today's 
Zaman 2012) However, there is no sign to show that an egalitarian approach to religious 
minorities will surface in the near future. 
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 Concluding Remarks 
 This chapter has shown that major theoretical approaches cannot explain the 
origin of religious freedom successfully by examining their weaknesses. As an 
alternative, I argue that religious freedom cannot be understood without taking into 
account the practical uses of the nation by focusing on the impact of two competing 
nationhood imaginations on religious minorities in Turkey. The sense of a shared past is 
highly effective in the construction of nationhood imaginations; however, hegemonic 
and counter-hegemonic projects have different historical reference points and past 
narratives.  In Turkey, Kemalist and Islamic nationhood imaginations have different 
historical reference points and past narratives affecting the present, in particular the 
place and status of religious minorities. During the Kemalist period, Kemalism as a 
hegemonic national imagination produced a repressive environment for religious 
minorities because of the construction of Turkishness based on the impact of traumatic 
experiences (e.g., the separation of new nation states, the loss of a large number of 
territories, ethno-religious cleansing, the invasion of Anatolia as homeland) in the 
declining period of the Ottoman Empire. The Kemalist elites justified their ideologies 
and attitudes through traumatic experiences in the late period of the Ottoman Empire by 
producing fear and paranoia based on former experiences for the sake of Turks as “core 
nation.” On the other hand, the Islamic imagination as a counter-hegemonic project has 
increased its impact on Turkish society since the 1980s and established a different 
nationhood imagination as a Muslim nation tolerating religious minorities. Nostalgia for 
the heyday of the Ottoman Empire and the mythification of the Ottoman tolerance 
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without a critical approach are highly influential in the construction of this kind of 
imagination. The Islamic discourse focuses on the chosen glories and tolerant structure 
of the Ottoman Empire producing an inclusive polity for religious minorities as a 
response to both Kemalist repression and the globalization process in a defensive 
manner. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE STATE AND RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN THE KEMALIST 
PERIOD 
 
 
Modern Turkey, as a “nationalizing state,” became the successor to the Ottoman 
Empire after the abolishment of the Sultanate (November 1, 1922) and its recognition 
by western powers with the Lausanne Peace Treaty (July 24, 1923). The traumatic 
experiences of the late period of the Ottoman Empire was one of the most influential 
factor shaping the construction of a new nation-state and a new nationhood. After the 
establishment of a new state, the founding fathers of the new Republic began to build a 
homogeneous nationhood through the mobilization of religion, ethnicity, and language. 
The state making and nation building in Turkey intertwined with each other. While the 
founding fathers established a new nation-state, they used the state in order to build a 
new nation.  As Charles Tilly (1985) suggests, state making cannot be fulfilled without 
war, violence, and exclusion within a given territory and outside of it because it is 
almost impossible to produce a legitimate monopoly over violence without violence. 
Therefore, Tilly proposes state making process as “organized crime.” Similarly, the 
state making of the Republic of Turkey was also a result of wars, violence, and 
exclusion of many segments of Ottoman society.  
This chapter focuses on the exclusion of religious minorities in the process of 
state making and nation building in Turkey. In particular, I will examine the 
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construction of Turkish nationalism and the Kemalist nation-building project, and its 
impact on religious minorities. I will depict the construction of Turkish nationalism 
from the perspective of Turkish nationalism in order to understand the repressive 
policies toward religious minorities. Then I will deal with some key historical 
developments shaping the collective memories of religious minorities in the Kemalist 
period. 
 From Millets to Minorities: Historical Perspectives on the Shift from Empire to 
Nation-State and its impact on Non-Muslims 
In the Millet system of the Ottoman Empire, each millet/religious group was 
provided with great autonomy and freedom. They were by and large allowed to govern 
themselves in their cultural, civil, religious, and financial affairs and to practice their 
own religion. However, the modernization process, the rise of nationalism, and the 
impact of western colonial powers on the Ottoman Empire were not only threats to the 
unity and future of the Empire, but also led to the breakdown of its traditional structure 
in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. The idea of nation as a new way of 
conceptualization of identity and community diffused in many regions of the Ottoman 
Empire, in particular Eastern Europe, and affected not only a small number of elites, but 
also broader populations (Brubaker 1996b, Brubaker et al. 2006). Nationalist 
movements tried to establish their own nation-sized political structures by gaining 
independence from the Ottoman Empire. The decline of the Empire and its weakness to 
western powers and Russia also encouraged nationalist movements to gain 
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independence from the Ottomans. In addition to nationalist ideals and the decline of the 
Ottomans, western powers and Russia promoted nationalist ideas and collaborated with 
nationalist movements in order to use them in accordance with their own interest while 
western powers and Russia competed each other in order to maximize their advantage 
in the decline of the Ottoman Empire. Nationalist movements in turn generally tended 
to develop good relations with western powers and Russia in the way of independence 
as a reaction to the repressive threat coming from the Ottoman Empire.  
The concept of religious liberty and the idea of the protection of religious 
minorities, primarily on behalf of the protection of Eastern Christians and Christian 
missionaries, were actively used for the legitimization of imperial and colonial projects 
in order to intervene in the internal affairs the Ottoman Empire (Mahmood 2012). For 
example, Russia gained a right to protect Orthodox Christians in the Ottoman Empire 
with the treaty of Kucuk Kaynarca in 1774. Russia exaggerated the conditions of the 
treaty and claimed that it was the representative of Orthodox Christians in the Empire. It 
abused the right to protect Christians and encouraged Orthodox Christians to rebel 
against the Ottoman Empire in order to take the control of the Balkans and Slavic 
population (Alexandris 1992, Mahmood 2012, Mastny and Nation 2008). 
The Ottoman elites tried to overcome independence struggles and western 
interference through some reforms (i.e., granting equal treatment through the edict of 
Gulhane (Tanzimat Fermani) in 1839, granting equal citizenship and the abolishment of 
the millet system by the Imperial Reform Edict (Hatti Humayun/Islahat Fermani) in 
1856, the declare of parliamentary system and constitutional monarchy (Mesrutiyet) in 
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1876, and so on). The Ottoman rulers also promoted the ideology of “pan-Ottomanism,” 
promoting the unity all of different groups of people who live in the Ottoman Empire. 
However, despite the endeavors of the Ottoman rulers, many ethno-nationalist 
movements pursued to gain their independence from the Ottoman Empire and 
established their own nation-states [e.g., Greece (1832), Bulgaria (1878), Serbia (1878), 
Romania (1878), Bosnia (1878), and Albania (1912)] in the nineteenth and 20th 
centuries.   
After the lost of a large amount of its territories in the Balkans as a result of the 
dramatic defeat of the Ottomans in the Russia-Ottoman war of 1877-1878, Sultan 
Abdulhamit II (1876-1909) abolished the constitutional monarchy in 1878 and began to 
promote the idea of pan-Islamism in order to unify Muslims living in the Ottoman 
territory at least in the late decades of the nineteenth century; however, it was also 
ineffective because of the impact of colonial powers, particularly Britain and France, on 
the Arab world and the rise of nationalism among Arabs too (Kayali 1997). 
The Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) took the control over the Ottoman 
Empire after the Young Turk revolution in 1908, and promulgated the Second 
Constitutional Era. The CUP was established as a reform movement seeking to 
reconstitute a constitutional monarchy with the collaboration of many segments of 
Ottoman society (Turks, Arabs, Greeks, Armenians, Jews, Liberals, Nationalists, 
Islamists) as a reaction to Sultan Abdulhamid II’s authoritarian administration 
(Hanioglu 1995, Zurcher 2010). The CUP hence was a kind of pan-Ottomanist 
organization embracing all elements of the Ottoman Empire to find a common purpose 
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to live together.  Although it was a diverse organization, those who were under the 
impact of French positivism and secularism were dominant in the Committee. Under the 
impact of French ideals, the leading cadre of the CUP aimed at promoting liberty, 
equality, and fraternity in the Ottoman Empire. According the CUP elites, constitutional 
monarchy and parliamentary system were going to satisfy all segments of Ottoman 
society and they were going to renounce their nationalist desires. However, the CUP 
elites disappointed in a short time because of revolts in Albania and Yemen, Armenian 
unrest in eastern Anatolia, Italian invasion of Tripoli, and the outbreak of the Balkan 
Wars in the early 1910s. 
The new Balkan states that gained independence from the Ottoman Empire 
aimed at enlarging their territories at the expense of the Ottoman Empire. The Italian 
invasion of Tripoli in 1911 encouraged them (Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia, Montenegro) to 
form a coalition against the Ottoman Empire. The allied Balkan states declared war on 
the Ottoman Empire in 1912. After being defeated by the Balkan coalition, the Ottoman 
army had to retreat at Istanbul suburbs. The Ottoman Empire then made an agreement 
with the Balkan states and lost its almost all territories remained in the Balkans, 
including the city of Edirne, which was the capital city of the Ottoman Empire before 
Istanbul. Albania also gained its independence with this agreement. However, after the 
Balkan war, other Balkan states declared war against Bulgaria because of the 
disagreement about the allocation of the territories that were gained from the Ottoman 
Empire. The Ottoman Empire used this opportunity and retook the city of Edirne.  
The Balkan wars were a disaster for the Ottoman Empire. It showed that there 
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was no future for the Ottoman Empire because even new and small states could defeat 
the Ottoman army.  All segments of Ottoman society, Balkan states, and western 
powers realized that it was necessary to take actions by taking into account this 
expectation. Greece aimed at fulfilling the Megali Idea (the Great Idea), which was the 
goal of establishing Greater Greece or reviving the Byzantium Empire by subjugating 
Istanbul and other Ottoman territories where Greek population inhabited. A large 
amount of Ottoman Greeks, including the Orthodox Patriarchate, also began to support 
the Megali Idea after the Balkan wars. Although they had strong emotional and cultural 
ties to Greece (Ahmed 1977), many of them were reluctant to support the Megali Idea 
before the Balkan wars. Armenian nationalists in Eastern Anatolia increased their 
struggle for establishing their own nation-states, developed close relations with Russia 
against the Ottoman Empire, and organized revolts in many Anatolian cities. Western 
powers and Russia began to negotiate how to allocate Ottoman territories. 
The shift in the political attitudes of the Orthodox Patriarchate can be a good 
example of the impact of the Balkan wars on the behaviors of political actors. The 
increasing impact of nationalism, the rise of separationist movements, and the 
emergence of Russia as a powerful political actor were not only a threat to the Ottoman 
Empire, but also a threat to the authority and influence of the Orthodox Patriarchate 
over the Orthodox Christian World in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. When 
separatist movements gained their independence from the Ottoman Empire, they also 
established their own national churches. Thus, the local Orthodox churches turned into 
national churches (e.g., Greek Orthodox Church, Bulgarian Orthodox Church, Serbian 
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Orthodox Church, Romanian Orthodox Church) by seceding from the Orthodox 
Patriarchate throughout the independence struggles of the Balkan States from the 
Ottoman Empire. The Russian Orthodox Church also began to develop as a new center 
of Orthodox Christianity. These developments decreased the historical importance and 
role of the Orthodox Patriarchate. As a reaction to the nationalist movements and the 
increasing impact of the Russian Orthodox Church, the Orhodox Patriarchate was 
ecumenist (or pan-Ottomanist) and struggled against nationalist ideals until the last 
years of the Ottoman Empire, particularly the Balkan wars (Barker 2008, Vovchenko 
and History 2008). However, it began to behave as an independent institution from the 
Ottoman Empire and to support the Greek Megali Idea after the Balkan wars. 
Another crucial change after the Balkan wars was the development of Turkish 
nationalism as a dominant political position in the Ottoman Empire. The ruling elites of 
the CUP began to promote Turkish nationalism in order to protect Turks at least as the 
“core nation” through attempting to induce solidarity among Turks/Muslims. Therefore, 
it may be conceded that modern Turkey as a nation-state was born under the rule of the 
CUP in the aftermath of the Balkan wars as a reaction to/part of the Balkan nationalism 
in Eastern Europe. 
 The economic policies of the CUP can be a good illustration of the transition 
from an Empire to a nation-state in terms of the mentality of the state. Non-Muslim 
population of the Empire was prevalent in the share of the Ottoman economy (i.e., 
financial institutions, commercial activities, and professional jobs) in the last period of 
the Ottoman Empire (Ahmed 1977, Alexandris 1992). They adapted themselves to 
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modern economic institutions, cooperated with western businessman and financiers, and 
worked as the representatives of them in the Ottoman Empire. For example, well-known 
Galata bankers were by and large Greeks, Armenians, and Jews. Indeed, Ottoman 
sultans mostly had good and positive relations with these bankers and consulted them 
about the financial affairs of the Empire.  They in turn funded the financial needs of the 
Ottoman Empire, in particular war expenses. However, the CUP perceived the 
domination of the Ottoman economy by non-Muslims as a threat to the future of the 
Ottoman Empire because the CUP believed that non-Muslim merchants became 
“comprador bourgeoisie” due to their strong ties with European powers. The CUP 
leaders also suggested that non-Muslims, particularly Greeks and Armenians, did not 
regard the Ottoman Empire as their own state (Ahmed 1977). Therefore, the CUP 
wanted to create a Muslim-Turk bourgeoisie class and encouraged/forced some Turks 
who were craftsmen, notables, or bureaucrats to engage in economic activities and 
began to implement etatist policies in order to turkify the Ottoman economy.  
Another highly crucial factor in the construction of Turkish nationalism was the 
persecution of Muslim/Turkish population in the former Ottoman territories. While the 
Ottoman Empire lost its territories in the Balkans and Caucasians, Muslim population of 
these regions had to move toward Anatolia. Historical studies report (e.g., Karpat 1985, 
McCarthy 1995, McCarthy 2010) that almost 6 million Ottoman Muslims were perished 
in the Balkans between 1821-1922 in a century because of ethno-religious cleansing. 
Turks and other Muslims in the Balkans had to flee to Anatolia because of persecution, 
massacre, and exile. On the other hand, while more than 2 million Muslims, particularly 
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Circassions, were killed in the Caucasians, more than 1 million Caucasian Muslims 
migrated to Anatolia (Chatty 2010). As a result of the territorial loss and migration, the 
Muslim population of the Ottoman Empire increased and the Empire began to turn into 
a Muslim state. While the Muslim population of the Empire was 60 percent in 1820, it 
became 76 percent in the 1890s (Akarli 1972).  On the other hand, many of the ruling 
elites of the Ottoman Empire and the new Republic were among those who moved to 
Anatolia because of the territorial loss of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans. They 
were the witnesses to/victims of the ethno-religious cleansing of Turks/Muslims in the 
region. Therefore, they felt that Turkish nationalism aiming at establishing a secure and 
homogenous homeland was the only way to survive.  
In the wake of the outbreak of the First World War, the Ottoman Empire took 
part in the war on the side of Central Powers of Germany and Austria-Hungary and put 
up a fight against Britain, France, and Russia on many fronts. Although the withdrawal 
of Russia from the war because of the Russian Revolution of 1917 gave some hope to 
win the war, the defeat of the Central powers brought about the end of the Ottoman 
Empire.  
One of the most tragic events of World War I was the deportation of Armenians 
from eastern Anatolia to southern provinces of the Empire (e.g., Syria and Lebanon) 
and the death/massacre of a great deal of Armenians. Similar to Balkan nationalism, 
Armenian nationalism began to develop in the nineteenth century too. While Russia 
provoked Armenians to establish their own nation-states, Armenian nationalists began 
to establish their own organizations and to support the expansion of the Russian Army 
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at the expense of the Ottoman Empire in the Caucasians since the war of 1821. 
Particularly, the establishment of para-military forces among eastern Armenians 
brought about an upsurge of Armenian revolts and gang activities in the late period of 
the nineteenth century (Dundar 2011, Lewy 2005). The first Armenian revolts took 
place in Zeytun and Erzurum in 1862/1863. Then, these revolts continued in other 
Ottoman cities such as Kayseri, Corum, Yozgat, Merzifon, Adana, and Van. Armenian 
nationalists also attempted to assassinate Sultan Abdulhamit II in 1905. During World 
War I, thousands of Armenians joined the Russian Army to fight against the Ottoman 
Empire. On the other hand, in the view of Turkish nationalist historiography, while the 
Ottoman army was fighting against the allies on many fronts, Armenian gangs attacked 
defenseless Muslim villages and killed innocent people. All these events led the CUP 
leaders to take some measures against Armenian nationalists in eastern Anatolia. As a 
first step, the CUP elites abrogated Armenian organizations and arrested 2,345 
Armenian nationalists on April 24, 1915. As a result of the ongoing activities of 
Armenian nationalists, the CUP leaders took a very severe measure and decided to 
relocate all Armenians in the region, including elderly people, women, and children, 
from eastern Anatolia to the southern part of the Empire (particularly Lebanon and 
Syria). During the relocation process, the number of deaths are not clear, but it ranges 
from 250.000 to 1.2 million.  
After the end of World War I, Istanbul remained under the occupation of the 
Allied Powers from November 12, 1918 to September 23, 1923. The Allied Powers 
came together to allocate Ottoman territories at Paris Peace Conference in 1919, and 
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negotiations continued at the London and San Remo conferences. As a result of these 
conferences, the Ottoman Empire and the Allied Powers signed the Treaty of Sèvres on 
August 10, 1920. The terms of the Treaty of Sèvres were highly severe. According to 
this treaty, Turks were given a small portion of Anatolia. The southern part of Anatolia 
and Arab-dominant areas (Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Palestinian, Hejaz) were allocated by 
Britain, France, and Italia. Greeks, Armenians, and Kurds also claimed territorial rights 
at the expense of the Ottoman Empire. However, Greeks were the most advantageous 
one among these groups because (1) they had their own state, which was a member of 
the Allied Powers; (2) their population in the Ottoman Empire was the highest after 
Muslims, and (3) they had the Orthodox Patriarchate, which was a highly influential 
institution in the Christian world. Greek Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos was also 
invited to the Paris Peace Conference to discuss and negotiate the territorial claim of 
Greece at the expense the Ottoman Empire. At the Conference, the Allied Powers 
decided to give Northern Epirus, the Aegean islands, Izmir and its hinterland, and the 
whole of Thrace to Greece. Istanbul and the zones of the strait were going to be an 
international zone that was in the charge of the Allied Powers. Indeed, Prime Minister 
Venizelos was not so resistant to this decision because he believed that Istanbul was 
going to be conquered from within because of a huge Greek population and their 
dominance over the Istanbul economy (Alexandris 1992). Armenians were given 
eastern Anatolia. Kurds were going to go to a referendum about whether they want to 
establish an independent state because of the lack a general agreement. In addition to 
these, The Ottoman finance was going to be under the control of the Allied Powers, the 
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Ottoman army was to be a limited number of soldiers and banned from obtaining some 
military equipment.  
Although the delegates of the Ottoman Empire signed the Treaty of Sèvres, it 
was not put into practice because of the emergence of the Turkish National Movement 
rejecting the Treaty under the leadership of Mustafa Kemal in Anatolia.  Mustafa Kemal 
established the Turkish Grand National Assembly and a new government in Ankara as 
an alternative to Istanbul in 1920 and mobilized Turkish people against the Allied 
Powers to save Turkish dominant territories. It was necessary to enforce the Turkish 
National Movement or the Ankara government to accept the conditions of the Treaty. 
Therefore, Greece in western Anatolia and the First Republic of Armenia in eastern 
Anatolia fulfilled this duty with the support of the Allied Powers because they had some 
concerns that the Treaty of Sèvres could change at the expense of Greece and Armenia. 
After the defeat of Armenian army by the Turkish National Movement at the Battle of 
Kars in 1920 and then the invasion of Armenia by Soviet Russia, the Turkish National 
Movement shaped the eastern border of modern Turkey. The Turkish National 
Movement also defeated the Greek Army in a series of war, which is called the Greco-
Turkish war of 1919-1922, and drove the Greek army from Anatolia. 
During the invasion years of Anatolia and Istanbul, Ottoman Greeks developed 
close relations with the Allied Powers and supported Greece’s invasion of Anatolia, in 
particular the Megali Idea. Istanbul Greeks established “Constantinopolitan National 
Defense League” in 1920. In the first meeting of the league, they declared that their 
“fidelity to the person of Venizelos, to the Allies and to the cause of Hellenism” 
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(Alexandris 1992:69). The Orthodox Patriarchate was also actively engaged in political 
issues not only in the Ottoman Empire, but also in Athens. The Orthodox Patriarchate 
openly supported Greek Prime Minister Venizelos and his desire for the establishment 
of Greater Greece and the Megali Idea. The Orthodox Patriarchate also sent its 
representatives to almost all meetings and conferences in the Paris peace conference. 
Particularly, the election of Meletius as a new Patriarch in 1921 brought about a radical 
break in the political attitudes of the Orthodox Patriarchate toward Turkey (Fortna et al. 
2012). He felt that he had to fulfill his role in the new era. Immediately after the 
election, he established a new committee within the Orthodox Patriarchate to support 
Greek invasion of Anatolia and provided the leadership of Ottoman Greeks.  He visited 
Orthodox parishes, encouraged people to join the Greek Army against the Turkish 
National Movement, and demanded financial support from them for the Greek Army. 
He established the bureaus of the recruitment for the Greek army at Orthodox Churches.  
He also visited European capitals (e.g., London and Paris), discussed political matters 
such as the future of Istanbul, the Orthodox Patriarchate and Turks, with European 
political leaders. He also sent letters to world leaders and religious leaders and wanted 
them to help to purge Turks from Anatolia, in particular from Istanbul.  
However, the Treaty of Sèvres was annulled after a series of successful battles 
of the Turkish National Movement against Greece. The Turkish National Movement as 
the successor of the Ottoman Empire and the allies signed the Treaty of Lausanne in 
1923. This treaty recognized the demise of the Ottoman Empire, the birth of the 
Republic of Turkey as a nation-state, and the borders of the new Republic in 1923. 
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After this treaty, Turkey recovered Istanbul, Eastern Thrace, a few Aegean islands, and 
Anatolia. Under the term of the Treat, the allies began to evacuate Istanbul and Anatolia 
on August 23, 1923.  
The Lausanne treaty had been the major international document shaping the 
relationship between the new Republic and religious minorities until Turkey’s EU 
integration process. Although the Lausanne Treaty, use the term “non moslem 
minorities” without reference to any specific community, the Turkish state recognized 
only three Ottoman millets (Armenians, Greeks, and Jews) as minorities. According to 
the Treaty, recognized minorities were citizens and had the same rights as Turks. But, 
there were also some rights that were afforded by this treaty: freedom of movement and 
emigration, equal treatment before the law, equal rights to establish and manage their 
own institutions such as place of workshop, education, charitable organizations, the use 
of their own language without pressure, and “equitable share” in public funding for 
educational, religious and charitable institutions. However, Turkey did not recognize 
other non-Muslims (e.g., Assyrians, Baha’is, Protestants, Catholics, and Yezidis) as 
minorities. Therefore, they were not allowed to utilize the minority rights that were 
provided by the Lausanne Treaty. For example, Catholics and Protestants were not 
allowed to open their institutions (i.e., schools and associations), and their churches 
were not considered a place of worship de jure until the AKP government. 
 Building a Homogenous Nation: Religion, Ethnicity, and Language 
For the founding fathers of modern Turkey, the multiethnic Ottoman experience 
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and the western interference in minority issues led to the development of a paranoid fear 
of internal and external enemies based on past experiences (Cooper and Akcam 2005, 
Keyman 2007, Özyürek, Steinmetz and Adams 2006, Özyürek 2007, Üngör 2012, 
Zurcher 2010). Turkey’s multiethnic structure was perceived as a potential threat to the 
unity and future of the new Republic because European powers could use non-Muslim 
minorities to interfere with the internal affairs of the new Republic, and non-Muslim 
minorities could collaborate with western powers against the new Republic again. 
Therefore, the allegiances and loyalties of non-Muslims to the new nation-state were a 
matter of considerable concern for the Kemalist elites, and the remains of the 
multiethnic structure of the Empire within national borders could be a threat to Turks, 
which was the “core nation” of the new Republic, one more time. As a result of the 
legacy of the past, the founding fathers immediately began to create a modern, secular, 
and homogenous Turkish nation. While the aim was to create “one language, one state, 
and one nation,” the motto was that “how happy is the one who says I am a Turk,” one 
of Atatürk statements. 
In this context, the meaning of Turkishness was a vital issue because while 
Turks were considered loyal citizens, others were always suspect and unwanted citizens 
on the way of the creation of a homogenous nation. Although the meaning of 
Turkishness varied over time, the Kemalist elites mobilized religion, ethnicity, and 
language in the construction of Turkish nationalism depending on social, political, 
cultural, and economic conjuncture in order to create a homogeneous Turkish society. 
While they primarily used religion in the 1920s, ethnicity and language became 
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dominant makers of the construction of Turkish nationalism in the 1930s. The shift 
from religion to language and ethnicity led to the production of different practical and 
discursive outcomes for minorities.  While religion hindered the inclusion of non-
Muslim minorities in the Turkish nation, ethnic and linguistic focus in the 1930s opened 
a little room for the inclusion of non-Muslim minorities through assimilation. However, 
this shift did no go beyond an inclusive discourse for a while because the state behavior 
toward minorities had been highly repressive until recent years.  
Although there were some different perceptions/discourses about the role of 
Islam in the construction of Turkishness, the dominant approach among the Kemalist 
elites was to see Islam as one of the key characteristics of Turks in the 1920s. However, 
their approaches to Islam by and large were very pragmatic. For them, Islam was seen 
as an important element producing inclusion and exclusion in creating a homogenous 
society in the 1920s because Islam was one of the most important elements shared by 
the majority of the population, shaping individual identities, establishing a collective 
culture, and uniting Turks. Although the Kemalist elites used Islam in order to create a 
homogenous society, their attitudes toward Islam were not cordial because many of 
them, whose worldviews were shaped based on French positivism and materialism 
(Göle 1997), believed that the reason for the backwardness was social and cultural 
structure shaped by Islam or religion. 
The Kemalist elites focused on social and cultural development based on rigid 
“westernization” in the early years of the new Republic as part of the idea of 
“developmentalism.” In developmentalism, the aim of non-Western societies before the 
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1980s was to reach the standards of the Western world through state-led 
industrialization (McMichael 1996). However, “developmentalism” was shaped not 
only based on economic development, but also social and cultural westernization in 
Turkey (Ahiska 2010, Bozdogan and Kasaba 1997, Brockett 2011, Findley 2010, Gole 
1996, Kieser 2006, Mardin 2006, Zurcher 2004). Therefore, the state was the main actor 
of the development process shaped in accordance with modernization and secularization 
in order to reach the standards of “contemporary civilizations” (Berkes and Ahmad 
1964). The Kemalist elites used state secularism as a means in order to repress 
traditional Islamic understanding and activities and to regulate Islam through the laws 
and repression in accordance with the needs of the new Republic on behalf of “the 
requirements of contemporary civilization” (Brockett 2011, Cakiroglu and Rubin 2005, 
Davison 1998, Gole 1996, Ince 2012, Kuru 2009, Toprak 1981, Yavuz 2003). Thus, 
Turkey’s nation-state building process developed not only based on the perceptions 
stemming from the multiethnic structure of the Empire, but also as a reaction to the 
Islamic characteristics of “the ancien régime” or the Ottoman Empire such as being the 
caliph and guard of Muslims.  
The top-down modernization and secularization project of heavy-handed 
Kemalist elites aimed to produce a radical break from the legacy of the past by molding 
minds and bodies into the design of the Kemalist elites. One of the most important and 
innovative reforms aiming to erase the legacy of the past and to seek a new beginning 
was to change the Turkish alphabet from the Arabic script to the Latin script in 1928. 
This step broke the ties of new generations with the written culture in the past because 
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new generations were not able to read or understand any text written before the alphabet 
reform. This step also allowed the Kemalist elites to establish a new written culture 
based on their national imagination and to control almost everything written and 
published in the single-party period (1923-1945). With the exception of a limited 
number of families, which had the capacity and opportunity that allowed them not to 
raise their children in accordance with the official ideology, new generations by and 
large were open to being shaped in accordance with the official ideology. After the 
unification of National Education in 1924, the state monopoly over education provided 
state elites with a centralized control of the curriculum and the teaching staff. This 
allowed them to design the curriculum in accordance with their own nationhood 
imagination and to promote national consciousness. 
 However, national identities cannot be constructed just based on “forgetting” 
“shameful episodes” in the past, but, it is necessary to invent and commemorate “our 
own” history in accordance with “We” imagination (Anderson 2006; Hobsbawm 1992) 
because nations cannot be invented without the sense of past and historical continuity 
across time.  Therefore, the Kemalist elites concentrated on the origin of Turks and 
Turkish language in the 1930s while they continued to eliminate the legacy of the 
Islamic past. Ethnicity and language began to play foremost makers of Turkish 
nationalism. State elites invented the Turkish History Thesis (Altinay 2004, Cagaptay 
2013, Dösemeci 2013, Ince 2012, Kirisci and Winrow 2013). This thesis had some 
several axiomatic beliefs: Turks are ancient, homogenous, and distinctive; have 
mythical and celebrated roots; and have perfect phonotypical characteristics. Turks 
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established an excellent civilization in Central Asia, but they had to leave their home 
because of climatic changes and moved to a westward direction to civilize the rest of 
the world. Turks were the ancestors of ancient civilizations such as the Sumerians, the 
Egyptians, and the Hittites. Thus, all ancient civilizations (e.g., the Sumerians and the 
Hittites) were also originally Turkish.  In order to support these ideas, some new State 
institutions were named after these civilizations (e.g., the SumerBank named after the 
Sumerians, the Etibank named after the Hitities). Also, as a corollary of this thesis, 
almost all important events changing the history of the world (e.g., the wheel and 
writing) were discovered by Turks.  
 State elites also discovered the Sun Language Theory, which argued that the 
Turkish language was the mother of all languages (Altinay 2004, Dösemeci 2013, Kaya 
2004, Kirisci and Winrow 2013). Mustafa Kemal Atatürk established the Turkish 
Language Association in 1932 in order to support and to promote Turkish language. 
Mustafa Kemal invited Agop Martayan, a linguist with an Armenian descent, to Turkey 
to be the head of the Turkish Language Association, while he was in Bulgaria. In 1934, 
as part of the law of surname, Martayan replaced his last name with “Dilacar” 
(tongue/language opener) as a suggestion of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. He continued his 
studies on Turkish language at the Turkish Language Association and Ankara 
University until his death in 1979. In the early years, the Turkish Language Association 
focused on purification of Turkish language from Arabic and Persian words by 
replacing new pure Turkish ones. The aim was not only to purify the language as an 
endeavor of nationalism, but also to secularize the daily language by eliminating 
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Islamic/Arabic words and to cut off the ties of new generations with the past by 
establishing a new secular language.  
In the 1930s, speaking Turkish became a significant sign showing loyalty to the 
ideals of the Republic because one of the most distinguished characteristics of a Turk 
was to speak Turkish (Kizilkan-Kisacik 2010, Kurban 2007, Toktas 2005). The 
Kemalist elites restricted the usage of different languages (particularly Kurdish) in 
schools, media, publishing, courts, and so on. They changed all non-Turkish street, 
village, and town names, and replaced them with Turkish names. They also changed the 
language of azan (calling for prayers) from Arabic to Turkish, and tried to change the 
language of worship in mosques. Those who resisted were repressed brutally. 
As a result of the Turkish History Thesis, and the Sun Language Theory, the 
Kemalist elites suggested that all Anatolian groups were originally Turkic, but they lost 
their original identities over time. When they adapted Turkish language, they could 
become Turks. However, it was necessary to assimilate them into Turkishness. 
Therefore, all different ethnic groups were subject to assimilation and purification 
policies. For example, the presence of Kurds (20-25 million people) in Turkey had not 
been recognized by the state until recent times. For the Kemalist elites, Kurds were 
either “mountain Turks” or “prospective Turks”(Aktürk 2012, Kizilkan-Kisacik 2010).  
The Turkish History Thesis and the Sun Language Theory also affected the 
place of non-Muslim minorities in the 1930s. The Kemalist elites began to discuss 
whether they were Turks. They tended to include Armenians and Jews in Turkish 
nation. Some Kemalists (e.g., Dr. Resit Galip, Nadir Nadi, Rusen Esref) argued that 
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Armenians and Jews had the same ethnic origin as Turks. For example, Dr. Resit Galip, 
Minister of Education, stated in a meeting that “anthropological comparisons and 
ancient historical data leave no room to doubt that the Armenians have the same 
ethnical origins as the Turks…In expressing my conviction on this point I believe I have 
sufficiently indicated the logical line of conduct which the Armenians in Turkey should 
follow with regard to the performance of their duties as Turkish citizens” (quoted in 
Cagaptay 2004:89). Another example, Rusen Esref Unaydin, Atatürk’s executive 
secretary, told in the Turkish Parliamentary Speech on June 7, 1934, that “as if it was 
not enough that they [the Jews] did not speak Turkish, they have, also, adopted a 
language that did not belong to them.” They “will one day learn that they are Turks, and 
when they join to the Turkish nation, to us, they will understand that they are happy and 
that they will not be able to find that pride in their previous self”(quoted in Cagaptay 
2004:94). 
In this context, it is necessary to mention that Jews had a better relationship with 
the Kemalist elites than other non-Muslim minorities. The attitude of Jews in the recent 
years of the Ottoman Empire was very different from Greeks and Armenians. While 
they did not struggle to establish their own state, they also helped the Turkish National 
Movement in the Greco-Turkish wars because many of them suffered under the rule of 
Greeks in Thrace (Cagaptay 2013:24). On the other hand, Jews also supported the aim 
of the Turkish National Movement to establish a new Republic. Chief Rabbi Haim 
Nahum participated in the negotiations between Turkey and the Allied Powers as a 
Turkish delegate in Lausanne. After the establishment of the new Republic, they were 
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so hopeful about the future because a new Republic based on enlightenment ideals was 
established. In the early years of the new Republic, they eagerly became active in the 
Republican People’s Party and dedicated to republican ideals. Although they believed 
that a new era for Jews began, it did not take a long time to understand that they were 
also unwelcomed citizens of the new Republic because of heavy handed 
homogenization policies based on religion, ethnicity, and language.  
Although the Turkish History Thesis produced a kind of a discursive shift 
toward religious minorities for a while in the 1930s it did not bring about a real shift in 
state attitudes toward religious minorities. Religious minorities were described as  
“domestic foreigners,” “Turkish citizens with foreign nationality”, “citizens who are not 
from Turkish race”, “citizen who do not have Turkish origin” in court records and 
official papers throughout the history of modern Turkey. More importantly, the state did 
not give up the aim of the purification of Anatolia from non-Muslim population until 
recent years. In the Kemalist period, particularly in the single-party period (1923-1945), 
almost all religious and minority groups were openly subject to exclusion, 
marginalization, isolation, assimilation, and turkification because of heavy-handed 
homogenization policies. This homogenization process led to the emergence of a 
hierarchical stratification in Turkish society. While a secularized and Kemalist Turk 
was an ideal citizen and superior to other identities because of the equation with 
secularism and the “civilized” person (Cagaptay 2013, Gole 2010a), non-secular ethnic 
Turks were ordinary citizens. On the other hand, ethnically non-Turkish Muslims (e.g., 
Kurds) were second-class citizens as long as they open to assimilation whereas non-
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Muslim minorities were the unwanted citizens of the Republic (Bali 2012, Donmez et 
al. 2011, Keyman and Icduygu 2005). Even if non-Muslims were citizens, they did not 
feel at home and considered themselves “local foreigners with Turkish citizenship” 
(Ter-Matevosyan 2010).  
 State Policies toward Religious Minorities in the Kemalist Period 
Although recognized minorities had specific rights and entitlements de jure, 
they faced serious difficulties and restrictions because of the distrustful and hostile 
attitudes of the state. They were openly discriminated against on many occasions (e.g., 
extra taxes, the abolishment of property rights, restrictions imposed on education rights, 
language restrictions, religious restrictions, and so on) by the state. However, Kemalist 
mentality not only shaped state behavior, but also infused Turkish society through 
education, the media, judicial decisions, and so on. Therefore, Turkish nationalists kept 
targeting non-Muslim minorities through retaliation, humiliation, and hate campaigns.  
Population Exchange between Turkey and Greece 
One of the most important consequences of the Treaty of Lausanne was the 
population exchange between Greece and Turkey. In the aftermath of World War I, one 
of the major aims of the Ankara government was to purify Anatolia from non-Muslim 
population because for the ruling elites, non-Muslims, particularly Greeks and 
Armenians, were disloyal to the country. It was not possible to live with them together 
because of not only the rise of enmity among these nations, but also a strong sense of a 
threat to the future of the new Republic. Although Armenian population in Anatolia was 
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cleansed after the events of 1915, there was a large amount of Greek population 
remained in Anatolia after World War I. Therefore, the Ankara government aimed at 
removing Greeks and the Orthodox Patriarchate from Turkey to secure the future of the 
nation in the peace negotiations of the Lausanne Treaty. Turkey and Greece decided to 
exchange their own minorities for the sake of homogenization of their own societies 
during the peace negotiations. As a result of the agreement, while 1.2 million Greeks 
were expelled to Greece, half a million Muslim Turks were expelled from Greece to 
Turkey. Those who were expelled did have any right to return to their former places 
without getting permission from the respective state.  
However, only those Greeks who lived in Istanbul and those Turks who lived in 
Western Thrace were exempted from the population exchange. Indeed, the Allied 
Powers and Greece did not want the expulsion of Istanbul Greeks because it was a huge 
damage to the commercial interest of western powers and Greece (Alexandris 1992:86).  
Western companies used to work with Greek merchants and professionals. Managerial 
and administrative positions of international companies also belonged to Greeks. 
Greece also did not want because Greeks controlled the economy of Istanbul and they 
strong commercial ties with Greece. On the other hand, the expulsion of Greeks from 
Istanbul meant the end of the Megali Idea. Although Turkey accepted to not exile 
Istanbul Greeks, Turkish delegates persuaded the Allied Powers to impose some 
limitations on those who remain in Istanbul in order to get rid of Greeks as much as 
they could do. Thus, all Istanbul Greeks who were not Turkish subjects (i.e., the citizens 
of other countries, particularly Greece) and all Istanbul Greeks who were Turkish 
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subjects but not natives of Istanbul were also subject to population exchange. Because 
of these restrictions on Istanbul, Greek population in Istanbul decreased from 300.000 
in 1922 to about 100.000 in 1927 (Icduygu, Toktas and Soner 2008).  
After the population exchange with Greece, non-Muslim population decreased 
from 20 percent to 2.5 percent in Anatolia. Thus, the homogenization of Turkish society 
as a project was nearly completed. But this does not mean that the project of the 
purification of Anatolia from non-Muslims was renounced even if they established only 
2.5 percent of population. As a result of the hostile attitudes of the state toward 
minorities and socio-political environment, many of them did not feel secure and left 
the country over time. 
 The role of religion in the construction of a homogenous nationhood in the early 
years of the new Republic can be seen in the population exchange policies one more 
time. For the Kemalist elites, Islam was one of essential elements of Turkish nation in 
the 1920s. Therefore, although the Karamanlides were an ethnically Turkic group 
speaking Turkish, they were expelled to Greece as part of the population exchange 
between Greece and Turkey in 1923 by the Kemalist elites because of their religious 
identity as Greek Orthodox (Clark 2006). 
Religious Institutions 
 In the new Republic, the state aimed to weaken the tie between minority 
organizations and religious leaders because, in contrast to the ancient regime, it did not 
recognize religious institutions as the representatives of their own communities. For 
example, the Turkish government did not allow priests to visit other minority 
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institutions such as minority schools. On the other hand, similar to Muslims, the social 
lives of non-Muslim minorities were also under the impact of the strict secularization 
policies of the state. Religious institutions were not able to apply religious laws 
regulating social life (e.g., marriage regulations) and all non-Muslims, as citizens, 
became subjects to secularized Turkish laws like Muslims. 
Although all religious leaders and institutions  (e.g., the Armenian Patriarchate, 
the Chief Rabbinate) were under repression, the Orthodox Patriarchate faced serious 
difficulties in the new Republic because its anti-Turkish activities during the Greek 
invasion of Anatolia led to the rise of enmity among Turkish nationalists. For example, 
Mustafa Kemal stated that the Orthodox Patriarchate was “a center of perfidy” in one of 
his statements (Macar 2003). On the other hand, while the Armenian Patriarchate and 
the Chief Rabbinate were national institutions, the Orthodox Patriarchate was 
ecumenical. Therefore, the Kemalist elites perceived the Orthodox Patriarchate as a 
threat to national sovereignly. 
The hostile activities of the Orthodox Patriarchate brought about the idea of the 
necessity of the removal of the Orthodox Patriarchate from Turkey. During the peace 
negotiations, the Turkish delegates aimed at the removal of the Orthodox Patriarchate 
from the territories of Turkey and argued that it was not possible for the Orthodox 
Patriarchate to stay in Istanbul because of its hostile activities toward Turkey. A large 
number of Greeks were to leave Turkey because of the population exchange. Then it 
was not a necessary institution in Turkey. They also argued that the Orthodox 
Patriarchate was not only a religious institution, but also a political institution; the 
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presence of the Orthodox Patriarchate, which had juridical authority over orthodox 
Christians, was also not acceptable in a secular country. Turkey was about to abolish the 
Caliphate in order to establish a secular and modern country; therefore, they argued that 
the Turkish government would not explain the presence of the Orthodox Patriarchate in 
Istanbul to its Muslim population after abolishing the caliphate (Macar 2012). As a 
result of these factors, for the Turkish side, the removal of the Orthodox Patriarchate 
from Turkey was not a matter of negotiation, but a necessary act.  
 However, the Greek government rejected the idea of the removal of the 
Orthodox Patriarchate from Istanbul. For the Greek government and Venizelos, the 
removal of from Istanbul was the end of the ideals of the Megali idea (Alexandris 
1992:89). On the other hand, the Greek government did not want any powerful 
institutions whose authority exceeded over the sovereignty of the nation-state (Macar 
2003, Macar 2012). As a result, Greek delegates were also very persistent in its demand. 
Indeed, the Greek government threatened to declare war on Turkey because of the 
removal of the Orthodox Patriarchate from Istanbul (Alexandris 1992). 
 The delegates of the Allied Powers also supported the presence of the Orthodox 
Patriarchate in Istanbul and argued that the Orthodox Patriarchate was one of the most 
important religious centers of the Christian world and symbol of Orthodox Christianity. 
The removal of the Orthodox Patriarchate from Istanbul was a humiliation to the 
Christian world; therefore, it should have remained in Istanbul (Alexandris 1992). Thus, 
Turkey had to accept the presence of the Orthodox Patriarchate in Istanbul. However, 
the Orthodox Patriarchate was renounced its all non-religious privileges bestowed upon 
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it by the Ottoman sultans (e.g., the leadership of the Orthodox Christians in Turkey, 
juridical authority over Orthodox Christians, and the political impact and power over 
the Orthodox world) in order to satisfy the Turkish government. It remained in Istanbul 
as a pure religious institution. One of the major concerns of Turkey was the activities of 
Patriarch Meletius IV and his presence in the throne of the Orthodox Patriarchate. The 
Allied Powers and Greek Prime Minister Venizelos also assured that Meletius IV was 
replaced by another Patriarch. 
 During the peace negotiations, Patriarch Meletius IV struggled for the removal 
of the Orthodox Patriarchate from Istanbul to Thessaloniki or Mount Athos because he 
suggested that it was not possible to fulfill its ecclesiastical responsibilities under the 
rule of the new Republic. However, he could not find enough support from the Greek 
government and the Holy Synod of the Orthodox Patriarchate. After Turks took the 
control of Istanbul, he had to leave the country because of anti-Meletius activities, 
campaigns, and demonstrations in Istanbul. Particularly, anti-Meletius segments among 
Istanbul Greeks had intensified their resistance to him, started campaigns for the 
resignation from the patriarchate, and his removal from Istanbul because his presence 
was perceived as a threat to Greeks in Istanbul. The activities of Damianos Damianidis, 
a trustee of the Galata district and the general-secretary of the church of Panagia 
Kaphatiani were noteworthy.  He occupied the Patriarchate with 100 protestors during a 
Pan-Orthodox conference and manhandled Patriarch Meletius (Alexandris 1992). As a 
result of the pressure, Patriarch Meletius had to leave the country under the protection 
of the Allied Powers. 
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 However, Patriarch Meletius did not want to leave Istanbul and to resign from 
the Patriarchate. Before his departure, he made an interview with a Turkish newspaper 
and said that he was not an enemy of Turks (Alexandris 1992). He also expressed that if 
the Turkish government allowed him to stay, he wanted to continue his patriarchate.  
Actually after he left the city, he wanted to continue his patriarchic responsibilities, but 
it was almost impossible to fulfill his responsibilities without settling in Istanbul. 
Therefore, Patriarch Meletius continued to placate Turkish side with his some positive 
discourse while he was in Greece. For example, in an interview with the Journal 
d'Orient and Stamboul, he pleaded with Turkish side “to forgive and forget” with 
reference to “magnanimity shown to his predecessors in office by the Caliph Omar and 
Sultan Mohammed the Conqueror” (quoted in Alexandris 1992:144).  The Allied 
Powers and Venizelos were persistent to the abdication of Patriarch Meletius from the 
throne of the Orthodox Patriarchate because his presence was not only a threat to the 
future of the Orthodox Patriarchate in Istanbul, but also the development of a positive 
dialogue between Turkish authorities and the Orthodox Patriarchate. As a result, he had 
to resign from the throne of the Patriarchate. After the resignation of Meletius, the Holy 
Synod elected Gregorios. He was a moderate person and did not involved in anti-
Turkish sentiment during the war times. Immediately, after the election, he declared his 
“sincere loyalty” to Turkey. 
 The establishment of modern Turkey was a beginning of a new era for the 
Orthodox Patriarchate because there were some radical changes: A small number of 
Greek Orthodoxies remained in Turkey because of the population exchange; the 
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Orthodox Patriarchate also had limited authority over Christian orthodoxies; more 
importantly, the Orthodox Patriarchate needed to get accustomed to living under the 
rule of a hostile polity. The hostility toward the Orthodox Patriarchate within Turkish 
society led to the emergence of phobic approaches to the Orthodox Patriarchate and the 
persecution of the Orthodox Patriarchate throughout modern Turkish history. Although 
the Turkish state admitted the presence of the Orthodox Patriarchate in Istanbul, the 
Turkish governments kept intervening in the Orthodox Patriarchate and its activities 
because it was always perceived as a Greek “trojan horse” operating in Turkey. The 
Patriarchs and the members of the Holy Synod were therefore under strict surveillance 
in the early years of the Republic. Almost all trips of Patriarchs and bishops were 
strictly controlled and checked whether they were part of any activity against Turkey.  
 Another important development affecting the relationship between the Orthodox 
Patriarchate and the Turkish government was the establishment of the Turkish Orthodox 
Church by Papa Efthim during Greco-Turkish war with the support of the Turkish 
National Movement in the early 1920s as a means to jeopardize the position of the 
Orthodox Patriarchate (Macar 2003). Papa Efthim was originally a Karamanlis 
Orthodox priest working for the Orthodox Patriarchate as the archbishop of Angora. 
During the invasion of Anatolia, he supported the Turkish National Movement and 
developed close and positive relations with the Ankara government. Although 
Karamanlis Turks were subject to the population exchange, Papa Efthim was exempted 
from the exchange because of his pro-Turkish activities during the Anatolian war. After 
the Turkish National Movement took the control of Istanbul, he moved to Istanbul and 
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institutionalized the Turkish Orthodox Church.  He also changed his name and replaced 
it with Zeki Erenerol. Eftim wanted to take the advantage of uncertain conditions and 
seized some churches belonged to the Orthodox Patriarchate in Istanbul with the 
support of Turkish nationalists. He occupied the Orthodox Patriarchate a few times and 
showed his intention to be elected as a patriarch during the process of the abdication of 
Meletius and the election of Gregorios. He argued that Patriarch should be a turcophone 
for the benefit of the Orthodox Patriarchate.  But the Holy Synod severed Papa Efttim’s 
relations with the Patriarchate. He also appointed himself as the representative of the 
patriarchate in Ankara. The Ankara government however rejected his representation of 
the Patriarchate in Ankara. Although the Ankara government used him as a trump card 
in the early years, it did not support him and his ambitions about the future of the 
Patriarchate in the following years. However, the Turkish Orthodox Church became a 
center of the resistance of non-Muslim minorities, in particular the Orthodox 
Patriarchate, since then. This church still exists without any members with the exception 
of the Erenerol family. However, it is still highly active against minorities in the 
present. 
 Each election of a new Patriarch was a big concern for the Turkish state; 
therefore, the state intervened in the election process and banned the election of those 
who had some anti-Turkish activities and discourses in the early years of the Republic. 
After the sudden death of Gregory VII in 1925, Constantinos VI was elected as a new 
Patriarch. He was not a native Istanbul Greek, but came to Istanbul in 1921. Therefore, 
the Turkish government did not recognize him as a Patriarch because according to the 
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Turkish government, he was not a Turkish citizen because he was subject to the 
population exchange. He thus could not be a Patriarch. For the state elites, the Orthodox 
Patriarchate aimed to enforce the Turkish government to admit that the members of the 
Holy Synod exempted from the exchange because of their positions by choosing a 
patriarch who was subject to the population exchange. The mixed commission of the 
population exchange gathered to solve this problem, but the negotiations were endless. 
Then, on January 30, 1925, the Turkish government detained Constantinos VI at 6 a.m. 
in the morning and deported him.  Before the election of the next Patriarch, the 
governor of Istanbul warned the members of the Holy Synod to choose the new 
Patriarch in accordance with the expectation of the Turkish government. He also 
suggested the Holy Synod to not choose the archbishop of Chalcedon, Joachim, which 
was one of the most important figures in the Orthodox Patriarchate, because the Ankara 
government would not be happy with him. In accordance with this warning, the Holy 
Synod chose Basil III as the new Patriarch. 
 One of the most crucial discussions about the Orthodox Patriarchate was 
whether it was an Orthodox Patriarchate or a national church. Although the Orthodox 
Patriarchate is a highly important/influential institution in the Christian world, 
particularly for Orthodox Christians, the Turkish state refused its ecumenical role and 
prohibited the use of the title “Ecumenical.” The Turkish state recognized the Orthodox 
Patriarchate as a local/national institution that regulates the religious affairs of Greek 
Orthodox Christians in Turkey. It was officially called  “the Greek Orthodox 
Patriarchate of Phanar (Fener Rum Orthodox Patrikhanesi) with an emphasis on 
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Phanar, which is the neighborhood where the Orthodox Patriarchate has existed since 
the sixteenth century.  As a result of this approach, the Turkish government by and large 
tried to prevent the Orthodox Patriarchate from fulfilling its ecumenical responsibilities. 
For example, in 1925, the Patriarchate initiated a Pan-Orthodox Convention, but the 
Turkish government did not allow the Orthodox Patriarchate to organize it. In 1926, EP 
Basil III, and all members of the Holy Synod was initiated criminal proceedings 
because they convened a Pan-Orthodox meeting at the Halki seminary. 
 After 1927, Turkey and Greece began to develop good relations with each other. 
This situation also led to the emergence of a favorable environment for the Orthodox 
Patriarchate. The Turkish government allowed Greek Prime Minister Venizelos to visit 
the Orthodox Patriarchate in 1930 in order to show its goodwill. This was a spectacular 
event in the history of the Orthodox Patriarchate because for the first time a Greek 
prime minster was allowed to visit the Orthodox Patriarchate. He also visited the 
Orthodox Patriarchate in 1931. While Patriarchs began to visit other countries, 
European political leaders also visited the Orthodox Patriarchate. The Turkish 
government did not try to prevent the Orthodox Patriarchate from carrying out its 
ecumenical responsibilities. The Orthodox Patriarchate organized Pan-Orthodox 
conferences in the 1930s. Particularly, during the reign of the Patriarch Athenagoras 
(1948-1972), the Orthodox Patriarchate of Istanbul began to play very active 
international roles and developed close relations with other Orthodox national churches 
and the Rome Catholic Church. The representatives of the Orthodox Patriarchate and 
the Rome Catholic Church came together and began to develop a dialogue in 1958 for 
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the first time since 1547. The Orthodox Patriarchate also sent its representatives to 
Vatican II. Patriarch Athenagoras met with Pope Paul VI in Jerusalem in 1964 and they 
rescinded the east–west schism of 1054, which is called the Great schism. However, the 
Orthodox Patriarchate has serious difficulties in fulfilling its ecumenical responsibilities 
after the Cyprus conflict between Turkey and Greece in the 1970s. 
Education and Language 
According to the Lausanne Treaty, minorities could establish their own 
educational and clergy-training institutions and teach their own language and religion in 
their schools. Therefore, Armenians, Greeks, and Jews were allowed to open their own 
schools and to teach their own languages in their schools. However, they faced many 
restrictions on and violations of their rights and were under stifling surveillance. They 
had difficulties in the approval of their teaching materials, the appointments of their 
own staff and teachers, and getting permission to renovate and repair their school 
buildings. The Ministry of National Education also appointed a Turkish deputy head, 
whose salary came from the Turkish state, whose authority was more effective than the 
principal of the minority school. The busts and pictures of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and 
depictions of his famous sayings were seen in every corner of minority schools; the 
language of education was Turkish with the exception of language and religious classes. 
As a result of these kinds of discriminatory policies and the decline of minority 
population, the number of non-Muslim minority schools decreased over time. While 
there were 6,437 minority schools with extensive autonomy in the Ottoman Empire in 
1894, there were 117 minority schools in 1931, and only 46 schools remained in 1996 
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(Kaya 2009:8-9).  Although the Lausanne Treaty was clear about education rights 
including clergy training, the clergy training institution of the Armenian Patriarchate 
and The Halki Greek Orthodox seminary, which was the main theology school of the 
Orthodox Patriarchate, were both closed in 1971 as a result of the closure of all private 
colleges under the impact of the 1971 military coup. 
 Until the early years of the new Republic, minorities were able speak their own 
languages without any repression. Many languages (e.g., Turkish, Greek, Armenian, 
Ladino, Arabic, French) were part of daily life in the cosmopolitan cities of the Empire 
and there were many people who could speak many languages fluently as a result of 
social interactions. As a result of social and political pressure in the new Republic, 
minorities had to feel that they needed to speak only Turkish in public.  For the 
Kemalist elites, the unity in language was not only a crucial way of homogenization of 
Turkish society, but also an important a symbol showing loyalty to the ideals of the new 
Republic.  
 A group of university students and professors at Istanbul University with the 
support of the state elites initiated “Citizen, Speak Turkish!” campaigns in the late 
1920s in order to hinder minorities from speaking their own languages in public (Aslan 
2007, Bali 2012, Cagaptay 2013). University students distributed posters and fliers 
encouraging speaking Turkish on Istanbul streets, campuses, busses, ships, and trains. 
This campaign gained media attention and public support in a short time and spread all 
over the country. In the mid-1930s, it reached its peak point. The state also supported 
this campaign. For example, Prime Minister Inonu at the Fourth Congress of the ruling 
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Republican People’s Party said: “From now on, we will not keep quiet. All citizens, 
who live with us, will speak Turkish” (quoted in Cagaptay 2013:96). Then, those who 
did not speak Turkish in public were menaced and harassed. In some cities such as 
Edirne and Tekirdag, those who do not speak Turkish in public were fined for speaking 
a different language from Turkish in public. As a result of this campaign, minorities felt 
that they had to speak Turkish in the streets because it was dangerous to speak their 
native languages. This campaign was highly influential until the early 40s. Although the 
campaign was renounced in the mid-1940s, minorities continued to refrain from 
speaking their own languages in public. While they spoke their own languages at home, 
they began to speak Turkish in the street.  
 Although there were a small number of Greeks and Armenians who support this 
campaign, a large number of Jews had to feel that they needed to support it. Jews felt 
that they needed to be open to the assimilation policies of the new Republic because 
there was not any country to go at that time. Anti-Semitism was also increasing its 
impact all over Europe in the 1930s. Jewish intellectuals, community leaders, and 
religious leaders encouraged Jews who could not speak Turkish to learn it. They 
established new language institutions such as the Union for the Turkish Language and 
the Jewish Commission for the Dissemination of the Turkish Language, the Turkish 
Culture Association, the Association for Balat Turkish Culture and Aid, to teach 
Turkish to Jewish people. Of course, there were some reactions to Jewish leaders 
among Jews; however, many Jews began to learn Turkish, changed their surnames, and 
began to use Turkish names.  
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 Additionally, although the native language of Turkish Jews was Ladino, the 
Turkish government enforced them to use either Turkish or Hebrew in their educational 
institutions because, for the state elites, they were Jews and their native language was 
Hebrew, not Ladino. Then Jews community leaders chose to use Turkish as an 
education language in their community schools. As a result of this change and socio-
political pressure, while the ladino language was to die in Turkey, Turkish became the 
native language for the new generations in the 1960s. 
The Relationship with Other “Nationalizing States” and Its Impact on Religious 
Minorities 
Whenever other “nationalizing states” repressed Turkish minorities, Turkey as a 
“nationalizing state” and as “the external national homeland” of the Turkish minority, 
suppressed the other countries’ diaspora in its boundaries as an endeavor to protect its 
own diaspora. When other “nationalizing states” (e.g., Greece) and Turkey had some 
political conflicts and tensions, the state elites used this conflict as an opportunity to use 
against minorities. The 6-7 September events can be a good example the relationship 
between nationalizing state, the external homeland, and minorities.  Turkey had a 
political conflict with Greece because of the persecution of Turkish minorities in the 
island of Cyprus by Greek nationalists, in particular the nationalist EOKA organization, 
in the mid-1950s.  Turkish nationalists organized a series of demonstrations and protests 
against Greece and Cyprus Greeks in Istanbul. On August 25, 1955, pro-Turkish 
nationalist newspapers, in a calculated affront to Turkish nationalist sensibilities, 
reported that Cyprus Greeks massacred Turks. This news produced strong aggression 
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and anti-Greek sentiments in Istanbul. Prime Minister Menderes immediately 
proclaimed: “if the Greeks dare touch our brethren, there are plenty of Greeks in 
Istanbul to retaliate upon” (quoted in Alexandris 1992:256). Turkish Prime Minister 
thus gave Turkish nationalists a direction and threatened Greeks in Istanbul. In the 
heady days of peaceful mass demonstrations, on September 6, 1955, a Turkish 
nationalist newspaper that was delivered afternoon reported that Greeks bombed the 
house that Atatürk was born in Thessalonica.  It also published its photo in a serious 
damage. After this news, the peaceful demonstrations against the EOKA turned into 
destructive riots and people were mobilized against minorities, particularly Greeks, on 
September 6-7, 1955. Greek stores, churches, and residents were mobbed and looted. 
During these events, people were shouting  “Cyprus is Turkish, will remain Turkish” 
and “Turkey belongs to Turks.” Throughout these events, according to official numbers, 
three people were murdered, many women were raped, and hundreds were injured. 
According to many testimonies, police and security forces did not intervene in the 
events. Indeed, they sometimes attacked non-Muslims and supported the mob too. After 
two days later, martial laws were carried out and the military forces controlled Istanbul 
streets. In the following years, it was understood that the bomb claim was a lie and that 
some people in the security forces of Turkey organized these plans and mobilized 
people by using mass media and psychological war techniques (Bruinessen 2009, 
Jenkins 2004, Karaosmanoglu 2010).  
The political conflict between Greece and Turkey about the island of Cyprus 
continued to affect Istanbul Greeks until the 1970s.  For example, in the mid-1960s, 
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Turkey expelled all Greeks who did not have Turkish citizenship (12,592 people) from 
the country (Karaosmanoglu 2010). They were generally wealthy people doing 
business. According to the state elites, they supported “Greek terrorists in Cyprus by 
sending money to them” (Alexandris 1992:283). In addition to this, during the conflict 
years, the Orthodox Patriarchate was also under strong state pressure: Orthodox 
churches were not allowed to restore; the relations of the Orthodox Patriarchate with 
other countries were cut off; European diplomats were not allowed to visit the Orthodox 
Patriarchate; and more importantly the Halki Greek Orthodox seminary were closed 
down.  
The Nationalization of the Turkish Economy and Its Impact on Minorities 
 There was continuity on the economic policies of the CUP and the new Republic 
in terms of the nationalization of the Turkish economy. The founders of modern Turkey 
also wanted to create a national economic structure. The desire for a national economy 
led to the development of a strong partnership between the state and the Turkish 
entrepreneurs. In the early years of modern Turkey, a close relationship with the ruling 
party or membership in the party was an important way to do business or to get capital 
from the state (Bugra 1994, Keyder 1987). State elites also encouraged some 
bureaucrats and politicians to involve in business; therefore, it was very difficult to 
differentiate high-level bureaucrats from businessmen. The ruling elites provided them 
with free factory sites, duty-free imports of machinery and raw materials, and 
guaranteed government purchases. 
 Similar to the CUP elites, the Kemalist elites felt the necessity of the 
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nationalization of the Turkish economy because of the sense of the domination of the 
Turkish economy by non-Muslim minorities. Therefore, the nationalization policies of 
the ruling elites by and large targeted non-Muslims and their economic activities. In the 
image of Turkish nationalists, non-Muslims took the control of the Ottoman economy 
because of some commercial advantages provided by Ottoman sultans such as low 
taxes. They also collaborated with western powers and companies and gained excessive 
legal and financial immunities under the protection of foreign consuls from the mid-
1700s to World War I. They also increased their wealth in unfair way because of war 
profiting during war times, particularly World War I and the Greco-Turkish war, 
through the widespread blackmail activities of retailers, wholesalers brokers, importers, 
and exporters. Therefore, there was a strong perception among Turkish people that non-
Muslim merchants were “harb zenginleri” (war-profiteers) (Clark 1972).  
 In the 1920s, the Turkish government nationalized many services (e.g., postal 
services and wine production) that were generally managed by non-Muslims and 
foreign companies. After the nationalization, almost all non-Muslims were fired from 
these services. But the state continued to clean all non-Muslims from bureaucratic 
positions to isolate “untrustworthy” elements of Turkish society from governmental and 
strategic positions. For example, “being of the Turkish race” has been a requirement 
since World War II for the professional positions within the army (Toktas 2005). 
However, Not only professional positions in the Army but also all bureaucratic 
positions were closed to non-Muslims. Another example showing that the state did not 
trust non-Muslims was that, a new special reserve force was constituted only of non-
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Muslims during the years of World War II. They were disarmed and used for non-
military jobs as free labor such as cleaning buildings, roads, and national parks. 
 Minorities were also subject to extra taxes, which was called “wealth tax” or 
“capital tax,” between 1941 and 1944 because of economic measures during World War 
II. Although this tax covered some Muslim businessman too, it particularly targeted 
non-Muslim people because the “wealth tax” levied on non-Muslims was ten times 
higher than Muslims. The wealth tax was a non-repetitive tax and evaluated by local 
authorities arbitrarily. People had to pay the tax within 15 days. Then another 15 days 
were also allowed with a high amount of interest. Those who do not pay their taxes 
within 30 days were published on newspapers and then sent to work camps. In Istanbul, 
1,869 non-Muslim citizens were arrested because they could not pay their heavy taxes. 
Then, 640 of them paid the tax in order to be released. The rest of them (1,229 people) 
were sent to a labor camp in Eastern Anatolia; and 21 of them lost their lives under the 
impact of harsh winter conditions (Karaosmanoglu 2010:196). Non-Muslims had to 
close down their businesses and to sell their belongings in a cheap price to be able to 
pay the tax. This unfair and brutal tax and attitudes led to the migration of many non-
Muslim people. For example, 20,000 Orthodox Christian left the country (Kuyucu 
2005:371); and 30,000 of Jews moved to Israel in 1948 (Karaosmanoglu 2010:197).  
Although the Kemalist elites argued that non-Muslims gained unfair wealth under 
war conditions in order to justify this tax, Prime Minister Sukru Saracoglu (1942-1946), 
the chief architect of the wealth tax, said in the Turkish parliament that their aim was to 
“get rid of the foreigners who dominate our markets and give the Turkish market back 
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to the Turks” (White 2012:83). The Kemalist elites aimed at restructuring the allocation 
of capital by transferring it from non-Muslims to the trusted fragments of society in 
order to create its own bourgeoisie class supporting the ideals of the new Republic 
(Bugra 1994, Keyder 1987).  
 Although the Wealth tax targeted the individual wealth of non-Muslims for the 
sake of the establishment of an economic structure controlled by the trustworthy 
segments of Turkish society, the state also violated the property rights of minority 
foundations and confiscated many properties that belonged to the communal 
foundations of religious minorities in the following years.  
Ottoman society depended on waqfs (charitable foundations) that were 
established with religious motivations. There were thousands waqfs that worked for 
social well-being and met the needs of Ottoman society by establishing hospitals, 
cemeteries, bridges, distribution of water to city dwellers, burial assistance for those 
who do not have any relatives, animal cares, and so forth. Waqfs were established based 
on an “act of foundation”  (vakfiyye senedi), which was a written document showing the 
name of founders, the aim of the waqf, and the source of its income. The basic financial 
sources of waqfs were the rent income of real estate and/or land that was endowed by its 
founders for the maintenance of its activities in accordance with the founders’ wishes. 
They also accepted endowments over time. For the protection and maintenance of 
waqfs, the state also supported them financially by deploying tax exemptions, granting 
lands, and so on. Although waqfs could not get involved in commercial activities, they 
had a huge impact on Ottoman economical life. By way of illustration, waqfs controlled 
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the three-quarters of arable land in Anatolia in the beginning of the new Republic in 
1923 (Yediyildiz 1996). 
Although the waqf system was an Islamic institution, non-Muslims communities 
(millets) also integrated into the system and met their communal needs (e.g., churches, 
schools, hospitals) through waqfs in the Ottoman Empire. However, waqfs established 
by non-Muslim communities did not have “the act of foundation” (vakfiyye senedi). 
They were established by the edict of Ottoman Sultans. The religious leaders of the 
non-Muslim communities controlled and maintained their own waqfs because they were 
the leaders of their own communities in the millet system. 
In the Republic, the state established “the Directorate General of Foundations” 
(Vakiflar Genel Mudurlugu) in 1924 to control and to regulate waqfs inherited from the 
Ottoman Empire. Although the state required establishing new foundations in 
accordance with the regulations of modern civil law since 1926, existing waqfs 
inherited from the Ottomans, including non-Muslim community foundations, continued 
to operate their own activities under the management of the Directorate General of 
Foundations (DGF). In 1935, the legislative framework of waqfs was reshaped through 
the Law of Foundations. In 1936, the DGF asked from waqfs to provide the list of their 
own properties and assets. Thus, non-Muslim community foundations gained a legal 
entity and were registered to the ledger of the DGF. Community representatives 
however preferred to not declare some of their properties in a case because of the lack 
of trust to the state.  
Non-Muslim community foundations continued to acquire new properties and 
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assets through wills and donations from the members of their own communities until 
1974. Particularly those who left the country donated their own properties to their own 
community foundations; however, these properties were hardly registered as the 
property of their own foundations. The state elites also knew that a large number of 
Greeks abandoned the country and bestowed their own properties on their own 
communal foundations. The DGF began to confiscate the properties of non-Muslim 
foundations that were not listed on the 1936 declaration. Although the DGF particularly 
targeted the properties of Greek Orthodox foundations under the impact of the conflict 
between Turkey and Greece about Cyprus, the confiscation process affected other non-
Muslim foundations too. 
In order to justify the confiscation process, the DGF required non-Muslim 
foundations submitting their own act of foundations although it was a well-known fact 
that non-Muslim foundations were established by the edicts of Ottoman sultans without 
an act of foundation. The DGF then interpreted the 1936 declaration as the act of 
foundation of non-Muslim community foundations even though the aim of the 1936 
declaration was to get information and to provide registration. In 1974, the Court of 
Cassation also judged that the 1936 declaration was the “act of the foundations.” More 
importantly, although the members of religious minorities were Turkish citizens, the 
court considered them “foreigners.” According to the court, any kind of property 
acquired by minority foundations after 1936 was illegal because “foreigners” and 
“foreign foundations” could not acquire property in Turkey. As a result, this approach 
justified the confiscation of the properties of minority foundations. The immovable 
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properties of the minority foundations were returned to their ex-tenants. However, if it 
was not possible to find its ex-tenant, they were transferred to the Turkish treasury. As a 
result, minority foundations lost their own communal properties such as hospitals, 
cemeteries, lands, and buildings.  
 Concluding Remarks 
This chapter examined the impact of Kemalist nation building project on 
religious minorities. The dedication of the Kemalist elites to create a homogenous 
nation based on the mobilization of ethnicity, language, and religion made religious 
minorities unwanted citizens of the new Republic and produced excluding policies and 
practices toward religious minorities. In addition to the historical incidents that I 
examine above briefly, one can add countless cases showing the hostile attitudes of the 
state toward religious minorities, but I believe these examples are enough to give a 
snapshot of the impact of the Kemalist nationhood project over religious minorities. 
Religious minorities were tired of these kinds of incidents that kept targeting them. 
Therefore, while many of them fled to another countries, those who remained in the 
country by and large established their own world by renouncing their ties with the larger 
society and became invisible in the country as a reaction to the repressive socio-political 
environment. The nationalist repression toward minorities lessened in the 1970s 
because the state focused on other threats such as the rise of revolutionary leftist 
movements, the Islamic revival, and the Kurdish movement. Religious minorities 
mostly were not in the agenda of Turkish society until the beginning of dialogue 
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activities between Islamic groups and religious minorities in the mid-1990s.
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CHAPTER 4 
BUILDING INCLUSION: CHANGING DYNAMICS OF THE 
RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN ISLAMIC MOVEMENTS AND 
RELIGIOUS MINORITIES 
 
 
 In the previous chapter, I examined the impact of state policies on religious 
minorities in the Kemalist period, and will show the shift in minority politics of the 
Turkish state in the post-Kemalist period in the next chapter. However, it is necessary to 
examine the relationship between Islamic movements and religious minorities to 
understand why the minority politics of the state has changed in the post-Kemalist 
period. In this chapter, I will examine the transformation of Islamic activism over time 
and its impact on the relationship between Islamic movements and religious minorities. 
I will focus on two kinds of Islamic activism: a socially-oriented Islamic activism (the 
Nur Movement and the Gülen Movement) and a politically-oriented Islamic activism 
(the Milli Görüş and the AK Party). While the Gülen movement had its origins in the 
Nur movement, the AK Party was established by those politicians who renounced their 
ties with the Milli Görüş. In particular, I will show the emergence of an inclusive 
Islamic identity toward religious minorities after the reinterpretation of Islamic narrative 
of Ottomanism and the reproduction of Ottoman multiculturalism and tolerance as “a 
usable past” under the impact of the globalization process which poses a serious 
legitimacy concern over Islamic movements. However, before examining these issues, I 
will provide a necessary historical background to the Islamic revival, the transformation 
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of Islamic movements, and the reconstruction of Islamic narrative of Ottomanism. 
 A Historical Background 
 Turkey made a transition from a single-party system to a multi-party system in 
1946 after WWII. After Turkey’s transition into the multi-party system, Turkey has 
been mostly ruled by weak and short-term continuing coalition governments with the 
exception of the Democrat Party (DP) years in the 1950s and the Motherland Party 
(MP) years in the 1980s, and recently the AKP government.  Although the DP and MP 
years led to the weakening of the Kemalist hegemony over Turkish society and the 
upsurge of counter-hegemonic movements, particularly Islamic groups, the DP and MP 
years did not change power dynamics in Turkey. Even if these terms were important 
steps toward the emergence of a new Turkey in terms of power dynamics, they were not 
able to put an end to the long record of army involvement in Turkish politics. 
 The DP won the elections of 1950, 1954, and 1957 and had ruled the country 
until the military coup of 1960. Although the DP mostly consisted of secular politicians 
and kept secularism in operation, the DP politicians were different from dedicated 
Kemalist elites in terms of their approaches to the relationship between the state and 
religion. The DP politicians appealed to Islam as part of the culture of Turkish people, 
used religion/Islam against the Republican People’s Party (RPP), and propagated that 
the RPP was a “godless party.” Conservative circles and Islamic groups by and large 
supported the DP in elections since the DP politicians supported Islamic movements at 
the social and cultural level. The DP government ended with the 1960 coup d'état. 
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According to the Generals who carried out the coup d'état, the liberal policies of the DP 
fed the “reactionary movements,” which were Islamic groups that were against the 
modernization process initiated by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and diminished the 
secularization process of the country. After the military coup, Prime Minister Menderes 
was executed, and Cemal Gursel, the Chief of the General Staff, became the president 
of Turkey.  
 While the Kemalist elites effectively shaped and controlled education, the 
economy, printing, and media outlets (particularly radio broadcasting (Ahiska 2010) in 
the single-party period in order for the creation of a modern, secular, and homogeneous 
nation, the liberal policies of the DP in the 1950s gave rise to the emergence of a new 
print culture (provincial newspapers, ideological newspapers, religious media) in 
Turkey (Brockett 2011). This situation led to the emergence of public debate over 
national issues and the competition of the different nationhood imaginations for the first 
time in the history of modern Turkey.  
 In particular, Islamic activists began to establish an alternative civil society 
through Islamic associations, press, books, provincial newspapers, movies, and 
literature after Turkey’s transition into the multi-party system. Turkey thus witnessed 
the increasing visibility of public Islamic intellectuals (e.g., Necip Fazil, Nurettin 
Topcu, Osman Yuksel Serdengecti, and Sezai Karakoc) in the multi-party period. These 
intellectuals established very active Islamic foundations and institutions such as Milli 
Mucadele Dernegi (National Struggle Association), Milli Turk Talebe Birligi (National 
Turkish Students Union), Aydinlar Ocagi (Hearth of Intellectuals), Turkiye Milli Kultur 
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Vakfi (Foundation of Turkish National Culture), and Ilim Yayma Cemiyeti (Association 
of Spreading Science). They were also involved in print activities, and published 
Islamic journals, newspapers, and magazines (e.g., Sebilurresad, Buyuk Dogu, Hur 
Adam) which were highly influential in the construction of the mindset of Islamic 
circles in the 1950s, the 1960s, and 1970s. These Islamic activists and intellectuals in 
this period were generally anti-Kemalist, anti-western, anti-capitalist, and anti-socialist. 
As a reaction to the westernization project of the Kemalist elites, they began to 
construct an alternative nationhood narrative based on nostalgia for the Ottomans as a 
source of a great and magnificent civilization. According to them, the westernization 
project of the Kemalist elites was disloyal to their own civilization.   
 Although these intellectuals were resistant to the Kemalist project in many 
issues, they received their education in the Kemalist institutions. Therefore, they 
embraced some pillars of the Kemalist nationalism. In particular, for these intellectuals, 
the Ottoman Empire collapsed because of the betrayals of non-Muslims and the 
collaboration of the Committee of Union and Progress with Jews (Duran and Aydın 
2013). 
 After the 1960 coup d’état, Turkey had experienced two more military coups in 
1971 and 1980. As a result of these military coups and numerous indirect military 
interventions, Turkish politicians kept feeling the influence of Turkey’s secularist 
generals over Turkish politics until recent times. After the end of the military junta 
years (1980-1983), Turgut Özal’s Motherland Party won the election in 1983, and 
Turgut Özal became the Prime Minister of Turkey between 1983 and 1989 and the 
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President of Turkey until his sudden death in office in 1993.  
  Although Turgut Özal was a conservative politician who had strong ties with 
Islamic movements, he was different from Islamic politicians because he did not pursue 
an Islamic agenda and bring his own religiosity into public. Özal, a strong supporter of 
political and economic liberalism, began to implement neoliberal policies under the 
observation of the IMF and World Bank. As a result of neoliberal policies, Turkey 
experienced a major social, economic, and political transformation in state policies in 
the 1980s and shifted its economic structure from protectionism to an open and free 
market economy and from an import-oriented economy to an export-oriented economy. 
These policies gave rise to an export boom because of Turkey’s integration into the 
global markets as well as the support and encouragement of the government toward 
small and medium size companies. 
 Big business groups favored by the Kemalist elites by and large did not support 
the liberalization of the Turkish economy in the beginning of this period because they 
were worried about the abolishment of state protection and competition from foreign 
investment (Agartan 2009). For them, it was also very difficult to adapt their economic 
activities to an export-oriented economy. In contrast to the state-favored business 
groups, small and medium size entrepreneurs in conservative Anatolian cities 
understood the spirit of the time, shaped their businesses in accordance with 
exportation, and learned how to find new markets in the world. As a result of this 
change, many conservative Anatolian cities such as Kayseri, Konya, and Gaziantep 
experienced enormous economic growth and became trade and industrial centers (Adas 
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2006, Adas 2009, Atasoy 2005, Atasoy 2008, Findley 2010, Jang 2005, Ozyurek 2006, 
Pamuk 2008, Yavuz 2003, Yavuz 2006, Yavuz 2009)  
 These Anatolian entrepreneurs had strong ties with Islamic values. Their 
formative years were shaped in accordance with religious and traditional values. Ayse 
Bugra (1994) points out that while the Kemalist elites pursued to create their own loyal 
entrepreneurial/bourgeoisie class, they did not like small and medium size Anatolian 
entrepreneurs as they did not fit the Kemalist understanding of modernity because of 
their religious and conservative values. The development of powerful Islamic economic 
actors was not allowed before the 1980s because of the state-led development 
promoting the modernization project of the Kemalist elites. However, in the liberal 
atmosphere of the 1980s, Islamic economic actors integrated into the neoliberal 
globalization process developed in a short time in Turkey.  
 Yet, Özal’s liberal policies are not enough to understand the emergence of 
conservative/Islamic economic actors. One also needs to take into consideration the 
increase of urbanization and education since the 1950s in the emergence of Islamic 
entrepreneurs (Göle 1997). After the 1950s, many people in the rural areas of Anatolia 
immigrated to urban areas and found an opportunity to access the opportunities of urban 
life such as education, political activism, job opportunities, and entrepreneurship. These 
new conservative generations utilized the atmosphere of the neoliberal years in the 
1980s and developed their small and medium scale family businesses.  
 A large number of studies (e.g., Adas 2003, Atasoy 2005, Findley 2010, Nasr 
2005, Ozyurek 2006, Tugal 2009, Yavuz 2009) agree that one of the most crucial steps 
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in the revival and the reinterpretation of Islam in Turkey is the emergence of an Islamic 
entrepreneurial class in the 1980s. Islamic entrepreneurs have supported Islamic 
movements financially; these movements have carried Islam from the private sphere to 
the public sphere. Islamic movements have utilized the opportunities of the liberal 
atmosphere effectively to reconstitute daily life through new institutions and companies 
(e.g., media outlets, hospitals, schools, dormitories, student apartments, relief programs) 
since the 1980s. Thus, Islamic movements have affected people and transformed 
personal identity and consciousness by means of their networks.   
 However, the emergence of an Islamic entrepreneurial class and the increase of 
wealth of Islamic circles had a transformative impact on the lifestyles of Islamic circles 
and the reinterpretation of Islam. For instance, before the 1980s, Islamic circles 
promoted to live a humble lifestyle based on “one mouthful food, one short coat” and 
“being satisfied with less.” They also believed that “too many words cannot be without 
lies; too much money cannot be without haram.” However, Islamic circles changed their 
consumption culture in accordance with the spirit of neoliberal times. For example, 
Islamic fashion and five star Islamic hotels have boomed in Turkey in the 1990s 
(Gokariksel and Secor 2009, Kilicbay and Binark 2002, Sandıkcı and Ger 2007). 
Islamic circles legitimized the new lifestyle through the Islamic tradition by giving 
some examples of the hadith (prophet sayings) in favor of their own consumption 
culture.  
 The legitimization process through tradition not only worked at the cultural 
level, but also had some serious political and economic results because it was also 
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carried out to show the compatibility of Islam with modern values such as democracy, 
human rights, and the free market economy. For example, it was a very popular 
approach within Islamic circles that the city of Medina in the reign of Prophet 
Muhammad was based on a kind of free-market economy because when people wanted 
Prophet Muhammad to intervene in the prices, he did not intervene in the market and 
prices. Then he said “it is God who determines prices.” According to those who 
promote the idea that Islam is compatible with the free market economy, it is “the 
invisible hand” of God that determines prices in the market. 
 With respect to religious minorities under the rule of the DP and the MP in the 
Kemalist period, Turkey experienced exceptional years. According to Rıfat Bali, a 
Turkish Jewish intellectual, the relationship between the state and minorities under the 
rule of the DP was a kind of “honeymoon” period (Bali 2012:33) -with the exception of 
the September 5-6 events- because the DP politicians and rulers developed a positive 
and close relationship with minorities for the first time and respected them and their 
rights.  
 On the other hand, Turgut Özal not only developed a close and positive 
relationship with religious minorities in the 1980s, but also had a transformative impact 
on the role of the Islamic narrative of the Ottomans in Turkey. As I said earlier, 
although Turgut Özal was a dedicated liberal politician, he was a religious politician 
who had strong ties with Islamic groups in Turkey. Like any ordinary person who has 
close ties with Islamic groups, Özal was also under the impact of Islamic nostalgia for 
the Ottomans. While the Islamic narrative of the Ottomans was an unfriendly agenda 
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toward religious minorities, Özal began to use the narrative of the Ottomans as a 
“usable past” to produce an inclusive polity and to promote multiculturalism and 
tolerance. For example, Turgut Özal was one of the most important supporters of the 
Quincentennial Foundation that was established in 1989 by a group of 113 Turkish Jews 
and Muslims to celebrate the five hundredth anniversary of the Ottoman aid to Jews in 
Spain and the welcoming of Jews to the Ottoman lands. The homepage of the website of 
the Quincentennial foundation explains its aim as follows: 
The savior hand that the Turkish people extended throughout centuries to those 
who suffered from cruelty and bigotry became a monument of dignity for 
humanity. The human attitude of the Turkish Nation towards Jews … was an 
example dedicated to mankind. It is a distinguished honor for The 
Quincentennial Foundation to continue to relate to the whole world this highly 
human quality of the Turkish Nation. 1992 marked the five hundredth 
anniversary of this most gracious welcome of the Sephardim to Turkish lands. 
Turkish Jews felt it was both fitting and proper to launch an extensive 
celebration in Turkey, in the United States and in Europe. 
(http://www.muze500.com/content/view/246/217/lang,en/) 
 
 As this statement shows, the aim of the foundation was to celebrate the five 
hundredth anniversary of the arrival of Jews in Spain on the Ottoman lands and to show 
“the human attitude of the Turkish Nation towards Jews” to the whole world. This 
foundation organized international meetings and activities to fulfill its own mission, that 
is, to show the tolerance of the Turkish nation. As part of this endeavor, the foundation 
also established “the Quincentennial Foundation Museum of Turkish Jews” in Istanbul 
in 1992. The role of the museum is not only to show the tolerance of the Turkish nation 
to visitors coming from all over the world, but also to play an important role in the 
identity-building of Turkish people by reminding that tolerance was/is essential to the 
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Turkish nation.  
 After providing a historical background of social, political, and economic 
developments from the 1950s onward briefly, we can turn our attention on the impact of 
these developments on the Islamic movements, the Islamic revival, and the changing 
dynamics of the relationship between Islamic movements and religious minorities over 
time.  
 Socially-Oriented Islamic Activism and Religious Minorities 
 Said Nursi (1876-1960), as the founder of the Nur Movement (one of the largest 
and most influential Islamic movements in Turkey), was one of the most influential 
figures in the history of modern Turkey. He was born in a Kurdish family in the 
southeastern part of Anatolia in 1876. He received a traditional Islamic education in 
religious schools. He was called “Bediuzzaman,” which means “the wonder of the 
Age,” in his teenage years by the Ottoman Islamic scholars and became a well-known 
Islamic scholar over time. His life was divided into three periods in terms of his 
activism; (1) The Old Said (1876-1922), (2) the New Said (1922-1950), and (3) the 
Third Said (1950-1969) (Vahide 2003). These three periods overlapped with the main 
periods of Turkish history. Each period of his life had different characteristics and 
strategies. 
 In his old-Said years, he engaged in political activities and struggled for the 
restoration of the constitutional monarchy (the Second Mesrutiyet) in the late period of 
the Ottoman Empire. Therefore, he collaborated with the Committee of Union and 
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Progress (CUP) against Ottoman Sultan Abdulhamit II. However, the strong influence 
of positivism and materialism over the leading cadre of the CUP led him to refrain from 
the CUP over time. He also supported the Turkish National Movement under the 
leadership of Mustafa Kemal. After the success of the Turkish National Movement, 
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk invited him to Ankara. He stayed eight months in Ankara and 
met the founding fathers of the new Republic. While he was in Ankara, he became 
aware of that the founding fathers were fully committed to secularism under the impact 
of French positivism and materialism. More importantly, the state elites aimed to 
impose their own values on ordinary people by using state power. He then concluded 
that the main problem of Turkey was not political, economic, or military, but positivist 
and materialist ideas shaping the worldview of the state elites. Although Atatürk offered 
him some positions in the new Republic, Said Nursi decided to avoid active political 
life and moved to Van, a city in eastern Turkey, to dedicate himself to religious 
activities. As a reaction the Kemalist project, he began to write his books on Islamic 
faith, which is called the Risale-i Nur Collection, to raise religious consciousness. 
However, the Kemalist state exiled him from one city to another, put him in prison for 
several years, and kept him under strict surveillance until his death in 1960. 
 While the Kemalist elites began a top-down secularization project, Nursi started 
a bottom-up movement aiming to increase religious consciousness as a response to the 
Kemalist project in the new Said years (Kuru and Kuru 2008, Mardin 2003, Mardin 
1989, Vahide 2003). Nursi’s response to the Kemalist project was not re-active and 
political, but rather it was forward looking and pro-active. He encouraged his followers 
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to disseminate his books and to refrain from a confrontation with the state. He 
completed his Risale collections during his exile and prison years in the second period 
of his life. His students disseminated the Risale collections in a secret way. These books 
attracted thousands and they came together secretly to read his books. 
 After Turkey’s transition to multi-party system, in the third period of Nursi, Said 
Nursi restarted to engage in political activities and supported the Democrat Party.  
While he sent letters about political issues to political leaders, Prime Minister Menderes 
and other politicians met with him. However, in this context, it is necessary to say that, 
Nursi never supported the use of Islam for political aims. He rejected the understanding 
of the Islamic state and political Islam, but rather he focused on Islamic beliefs and 
moral values. For him, Islam is a religion; and it does not belong to any group, and 
cannot be monopolized by any community.  If any group uses Islam as a means for its 
own political aim, there is a possibility of limiting Islam to that group. According to 
Nursi, the state should be neutral and the servant of the people. Therefore, he always 
supported modern institutions and values such as Republican state, democracy, and the 
separation of state and religion. 
 After taking a look at Said Nursi and the Nur Movement briefly, I want to focus 
on the approach of Said Nursi to non-Muslim minorities. As I said earlier, Said Nursi 
actively struggled for the restoration of the constitutional monarchy in the late period of 
the Ottoman Empire. Nursi suggested that the constitutional monarchy was going to 
lessen the increasing impact of secessionist nationalism over the Ottoman Empire 
because it was going to bring an equal approach to all subjects of the Ottoman Empire. 
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After the declaration of the constitutional monarchy in 1908, some Kurdish tribe 
members in the eastern region of Anatolia resisted the new system because they had 
some concerns about being ruled by Armenians. In his Risale collections, he explained 
that he had a trip to eastern Anatolia to convince Kurdish tribes that had serious 
concerns about the results of the constitutional monarchy. In order to convince Kurdish 
tribes, he told them: 
“Equality is not in honor and virtue, bur it is in law and legislation. In Islamic 
law, the king and slave are equal. Is it possible for a religion like Islam, which 
prohibits its adherents from tormenting an ant to allow its followers to torment 
humans and neglect the rights of human kind? The fourth caliph of Islam, Ali, 
the cousin of the Prophet, was equal to a simple Jew in the court. Similarly, the 
founder of the Ayyubi dynasty, Salah al-Din Ayyubi, of whom you are proud,6 
was also equal to a poor Christian in the court. These examples serve to show 
that Muslims and non-Muslims are equal before the Qur'anic law.” (Kuru and 
Kuru 2008, Mardin 2003, Michel 1999, Saritoprak 2000:326, Saritoprak 2008b, 
Vahide 2003, Voll 1999) 
 
 He was also asked on the same trip that: “Are non-Muslim Armenians now 
becoming governors or senior officials of a district?” His response was that: 
“Just as they can be watchmen, mechanics or janitors. This is because in the 
constitutional government, the ruler is the people and the government is the 
servant of the people. If the system of constitutionalism is implemented 
correctly, the governors and senior officials will not manage the people, but will 
be paid servants of the people.” (Saritoprak 2008a:33) 
 
 In that trip, he also encouraged Muslims to develop positive relations with 
Armenians in the region because he believed that the future of the Empire depended on 
the alliance and friendship between Muslims and Armenians. However, the declaration 
of the constitutional monarchy did not solve the problems of the Ottoman Empire and 
                                                
6 Nursi emphasizes the Kurdish origin of Ayyubi 
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lessen the desire of the secessionist movements. The outbreak of the Balkan wars and 
WWI brought about the end of the Ottoman Empire. During WWI, Said Nursi joined 
the Ottoman army to fight against the Russo-Armenian alliance in eastern Anatolia. 
While explaining the war years in his Risale collections, he said that secessionist 
Armenians were “the agents of Russia” and “Russian tool” that were used against the 
Ottoman Empire. In the biographical book of Said Nursi, one of the pieces of the Risale 
collections that was prepared by his students in the early 1950s while he was alive, a 
memory of war was expressed:  
“When the Armenians massacred the Muslim women and children as well as the 
men, Armenian children would sometimes be killed in retaliation. But to a 
degree Bediuzzaman was able to put a stop to this barbaric practice through his 
example true Islamic conduct, and was able to bring some humanity to the chaos 
of war. One time, thousands of Armenian women and children had been 
gathered together in the place where Bediuzzaman was. He issued an order that 
none of them were to be touched. Then later he released them and they returned 
to their families in Russian-held territory. The Armenians were so impressed at 
this example of Muslim morality that from then on they themselves refrained 
form slaughtering Muslim children. In this way, many innocent lives were 
saved.” (Nursi 2014:110)  
 
 During WWI, Nursi was captured by Armenians as a war prisoner, handed over 
to Russian soldiers, and stayed in Russia over two years. During the Russian revolution, 
he escaped from Russia and fled to Istanbul in the late 1917. The deportation of 
Armenians took place while he was in Russia. His biographical book also did not 
include any information about his approach to the deportation of Armenians.   
 While Said Nursi was not interested in any political activities in the single-party 
period of the new Republic, he began to develop positive relations with non-Muslims in 
Turkey after Turkey’s transition into the multi-party period. Said Nursi suggested that 
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Muslims should develop a positive relationship with the people of other religions as a 
reaction to the increasing impact of “aggressive atheism” and encouraged his followers 
to develop interfaith dialogue activities. For example, in 1946, shortly after the end of 
the Second World War, he said:  
 “The people of religion and truth need to unite sincerely not only with their own 
brothers and fellow believers, but also with the truly pious and spiritual ones 
among the Christians, refraining from the discussion and debate of points of 
difference in order to combat their joint enemy-aggressive atheism.” (Saritoprak 
2000:329) 
“It is time to end hatred and animosity. The two world wars have shown how 
ugly animosity is and how it can be destructive and wrong. It has been proved 
that there is no benefit from hatred. Therefore, the mistakes of our enemies, as 
long as they do not include attacks against us, should not make us hate them. 
The punishment of God in the Afterlife for those who disobey is enough.” 
(Saritoprak 2008a:31-32)   
  
 He not only supported the interfaith dialogue with the people of other religions, 
but also himself involved in developing a constructive relationship with non-Muslims. 
Therefore, he sent some gifts and his writings to Pope Pios XII in 1951 and received in 
reply on February 22, 1951. He also visited the Orthodox Patriarchate in Istanbul and 
met Patriarch Athenagoras in 1953. 
 After the death of Said Nursi in 1960, the Nur movement divided into many 
groups over time. The Gülen movement (Hendrick 2013, Turam 2007, Yavuz 2013) 
emerged as a result of the initiations of Fethullah Gülen7 and became one of the most 
active Islamic movements not only in Turkey but also in the world. Although the Gülen 
movement is commonly seen as part of the Nur movement, it also represents a 
                                                
7 He has lived in self-imposed exile in the US since 1999. 
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divergence from the Nur Movement because while Said Nursi and his writings were the 
indisputable authority for other Nur groups, Fethullah Gülen and his approaches are 
more important than Nursi’s in the construction and practice of the Gülen Movement. 
Therefore, one needs to understand the concerns and approaches of Fethullah Gülen to 
understand the Gülen movement. 
 Fethullah Gülen was born in 1941 in a village near the city of Erzurum, the 
northeastern frontier of Anatolia. Gülen learned of Nursi’s writings in his early teenage 
years in Erzurum. He became an active member of the Nur movement after he was 
appointed as a preacher working for the Directorate of Religious Affairs to the western 
city of Edirne in 1958. Then he was appointed as the director of a Quranic school in 
Izmir, one of the most secular cities, in 1966. When he moved to Izmir, he renounced 
his relations with the other members of the Nur movement and began his own activities 
in order to establish a religious community.  In the 1970s, Gülen became a well-known 
and influential preacher in Turkey. For example, while Turgut Özal was working for the 
state as the head of State Planning Organization in the late 1970s, he frequently flew 
from Ankara to Izmir in order to listen Gülen’s weekly sermons. 
 In the 1980s, the Gülen movement began to use the opportunities of the 
neoliberal years effectively and became a very influential Islamic movement in Turkey. 
The movement established many institutions in education, media, and finance with the 
financial support of the newly emerging Islamic entrepreneurs. Although the Gülen 
movement was active in many fields (e.g., media, social assistance, printing, banking, 
finance, and logistics), it particularly focused on education. The movement began to 
  131 
establish thousands of educational institutions such as primary and high schools, 
dormitories, and language schools in the 1980s. Particularly, the high schools operated 
by the Gülen movement became very popular because of their success in test scores and 
international science olympics. These schools did not have a religious education, but 
had a secular curriculum whose education language was English; therefore, even secular 
parents enrolled their children in these schools. Even if the institutions of the Gülen 
movement (e.g., schools, dormitories, language courses) seemed secular institutions 
formally, they were the recruitment hubs for the movement and played very active roles 
in the revival of Islam in Turkey. 
 The Gülen movement became a transnational movement in the early 1990s. The 
followers of Gülen began to establish institutions in the Turkic states in the Central Asia 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Then the movement spread its activities almost 
all over the world as a result of a successful experience in the Central Asia. Currently, 
the Gülen Movement is a giant transnational movement operating more than 160 
countries. Although it is not as visible as some other Islamic movements (e.g., al-Qaida, 
the Muslim Brotherhood), probably it is the most active Islamic movement operating in 
the world through its own institutions such as schools, universities, language courses, 
cultural and interfaith activities, commercial companies, and trade associations. The 
Islamic entrepreneurs also play a crucial role in the expansion of the activities of the 
Gülen movement. The followers of the Gülen movement cooperate with Islamic 
entrepreneurs; while the Gülen followers help Islamic entrepreneurs do business and 
establish new networks all over the world, these entrepreneurs financially support the 
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activities of the Gülen movement.  
 Although the activities and institutions of the movement vary from country to 
country depending on local regulations, the movement particularly focuses on education 
and intercultural/interfaith dialogue. The US can be a good example to understand the 
activities of the Gülen movement and its influence in the world. It operates more than 
120 charter schools in 25 states in the US. Most of their teachers are immigrants from 
Turkey. Most of these schools are high achieving schools. For example, some of them 
were listed the most successful high schools by Newsweek and US News and World 
Report and reported as “miracle schools” because of their academic success (see for 
details, http://www.harmonytx.org/Achievements.aspx).  In addition to these schools, 
the Gülen movement operates cultural and interfaith activities in the US through several 
highly active civil society organizations such as the Rumi Forum, the Pacifica 
Institution, and the Niagara Foundation. Each of these organizations focuses on one 
region and has their own sub-organizations such as local Turkish cultural centers and 
student associations at universities.8 
 After examining the transition of the Gülen Movement from a local movement 
to a transnational movement briefly, I want to focus on the transformative impact of the 
integration into the globalized world on the identity politics of the Gülen Movement. In 
particular, I aim to show how a religious movement produces an inclusive identity to 
construct a legitimate and stable identity in the globalized world by reinterpreting and 
                                                
8 For example, the Intercultural Friendship Foundation (IFF) is a registered student association that 
organizes many activities with the Niagara Foundation at the UIUC. 
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rediscovering Islamic tradition and bringing it into the present when the movement 
encounters the impact of the globalization process. 
 While Said Nursi represented an Ottoman Islamic scholar in terms of his 
approaches to social and political issues, Fethullah Gülen represents an Islamic scholar 
prototype who was shaped in the Republican years. The Gülen movement was not only 
an Islamic movement, but also a kind of nationalist movement which had close ties with 
Turkey’s right-wing nationalism until the mid-1990s (Aras and Caha 2000, Turam 
2007, Yavuz 2003). Fethullah Gülen’s formative years were shaped in the Erzurum 
region, where people commonly had a very strong sense of nationalism, patriotism, 
security, and the necessity of a powerful state as a result of the historical legacy of the 
region. This region had been under the impact of the conflict between Russia, Armenia, 
Iran, and the Ottoman Empire/Turkey and was one of the centers of immigration for 
Muslims who fled Caucasians to Anatolia in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. 
Erzurum was also one of the central cities in the coordination of the Turkish National 
Movement under the commandment of Mustafa Kemal. During the cold war, people in 
this region strongly felt the threat of Soviet Invasion. This historical and political 
context shaped Fethullah Gülen’s formative years and affected his understanding of 
Islam and his approaches to the relationship between the state and religion. In 
particular, he refrained from confronting the state and the state elites in order not to 
weaken the state authority. Although this kind of approach was similar to Said Nursi’s 
perspectives, Fethullah Gülen diverged from Nursi because of his strong sense of 
Turkish nationalism. 
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 As a result of the impact of Turkish nationalism on Gülen, the approach of the 
Gülen movement to religious minorities was similar to the Kemalist elites’ approach. 
For example, the discourse of the Gülen media outlets to the Ecumenical Patriarchate 
overlapped with the discourse of Turkish nationalists until the mid-1990s. Daily Zaman 
and weekly news magazine Aksiyon frequently supported conspiracy theories about the 
Patriarchate. For instance, they disseminated the ideas that the Patriarchate aimed to 
establish a Vatican style entity in the region of Phanar and that the Patriarchate aimed to 
regenerate the Byzantium Empire (Akgönül 2013:55-56). However, the discourse and 
approach of the Gülen movement toward religious minorities have radically changed 
after the beginning of the transnational activities of the movement in the early 1990s.  
Fethullah Gülen and his followers began to talk about the necessity of dialogue and 
tolerance and intensely engaged in interfaith dialogue activities from the mid-1990s 
onward in Turkey. Since then, it is almost impossible to find any news or comments 
against religious minorities in the media outlets of the movement.  
  Gülen himself supported the dialogue activities of the Movement and visited 
Greek Orthodox Patriarch Bartholomew, former Armenian Patriarch Karakin, Chief 
Rabbis of Turkey and Israel, the representative of the Vatican to Istanbul, and other 
prominent members of non-Muslim communities such as Ishak Alaton and Uzeyir 
Garih in the mid-1990s. These were not one-time visits, but Gülen developed a strong 
friendship with most of them. For example, even if Gülen lives in the US, Gülen and 
Patriarch Bartholomew meet when Patriarch travels to the US.  
 The Gülen movement established the Journalists and Writers Foundation (JWF) 
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in order to organize its dialogue activities in 1994.  The JWF began to organize iftar 
dinners in the month of Ramadan since its foundation and invited the 
representatives/leaders of different religious groups. Thus, these representatives came 
together with the initiation of the JWF for the first time in 1994. The iftar dinners 
organized by the JWF have continued since then and organizers choose an inclusive 
motto (e.g., “the children of this land” and “the common language of colors”) for each 
year to promote dialogue and tolerance. But more importantly, the JWF has brought 
together the representatives of different religions with periodical meetings since the 
mid-1990s to strengthen the dialogue with different religious groups and to help solve 
minority problems. For example, as a result of these periodical meetings, the JWF 
decided to organize a workshop about the treatment of non-Muslim minorities in the 
media on May 12-13, 2012. Many intellectuals, politicians, activists, and the 
representatives of different religious groups came together and discussed the treatment 
of non-Muslims in the Turkish media. The participants reached the conclusion that the 
language of the Turkish media supports the negative perception of non-Muslims in 
Turkey.  
 At the international level, interfaith activities have been one of the major 
concentration areas of the Gülen movement since the mid-1990s. For Fethullah Gülen, 
interfaith dialogue is a necessity and a must thing for Muslims in the globalized world 
because of the increasing impact of the idea of the clash of civilizations and of 
Islamophobia (Ünal and Williams 2000:193-194). He believes that Muslims should 
change the image of Islam through interfaith activities in the world, particularly in the 
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west. As an important step, Fethullah Gülen met with Pope Jean Paul II at Vatican in 
1998 to increase dialogue activities between Christians and Muslims. 
 The Gülen movement overemphasized its dialogue activities in the west, 
particularly in the US, after 9/11. According to Gülen, Muslims should show that a true 
Muslim cannot be a terrorist through interfaith dialogue activities. In each occasion, 
Gülen strongly condemns terrorist incidents that are carried out in the name of Islam 
and immediately sends his condolences to major newspapers (e.g., the New York Times 
and Washington Post) in the world. Gülen frequently uses some Prophet Muhammad’s 
sayings such as that “a Muslim is one who does no harm with his or her hand or 
tongue,” to emphasize that Islam and terrorism cannot be compatible. He addresses as 
follows: 
“How unfortunate it is that Islam, which is based on this understanding and 
spirit, is shown by some circles to be synonymous with terrorism. This is a great 
historical mistake; wrapping a system based on safety and trust in a veil of 
terrorism just shows that the spirit of Islam remains unknown. If one were to 
seek the true face of Islam in its own sources, history, and true representatives, 
then one would discover that it contains no harshness, cruelty, or fanaticism. It is 
a religion of forgiveness, pardon, and tolerance, as such saints and princes of 
love and tolerance as Rumi, Yunus Emre, Ahmed Yesevi, Bediuzzaman, and 
many others have so beautifully expressed. They spent their lives preaching 
tolerance, and each became a legend in his own time as an embodiment of love 
and tolerance.” (Gülen 2014:58) 
 
 As a result of the encouragement of Gülen since the mid-1990s, Gülen followers 
have carried out intercultural and interfaith dialogue activities and developed close and 
positive relations with effective people (e.g., clerics, politicians, civil society leaders, 
professors) all over the world, particularly in the US, in order to change negative 
perceptions about Islam and Muslims. Therefore, they organize cultural events and 
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meetings, visit churches and synagogues, and engage in the activities of other religions. 
They also organize Turkey trips and show “the generosity and hospitality of Turkish 
people.” The aim of all of these activities is to produce a positive perception of Turkey 
and Islam among effective people. Indeed, they are very successful; many influential 
and effective leaders (e.g., Pope John Paul II, Bill Clinton, Hillary Clinton, and Barack 
Obama) admit the contribution of the movement toward the world peace and dialogue 
between different cultures and civilizations. For example, Bill Clinton participated in 
the Third Annual Friendship Dinner organized by the Turkish Cultural Center of New 
York (a Gülenist organization) in 2008 and said: 
“In this interdependent world, the fates of people on opposite sides of the globe 
are increasingly linked, and it’s critical to keep the lines of communication open 
as much as we can.  That’s why the communication between the Turkish-
American community and the people of Turkey is so important.  It’s important 
to ensure your vibrant cultural heritage, to make sure it continues to thrive and 
inspire, and build a bridge that reaches over all faiths and creeds, and the 
ocean.  By being here tonight, you are contributing to lasting peace and security 
at home and abroad.  You’re contributing to the promotion of the ideals of 
tolerance and interfaith dialog, inspired by Fethullah Gülen, and his 
transnational social movement.  You do it through your everyday lives, and you 
are truly strengthening the fabric of our common humanity, as well as promoting 
the ongoing cultural and educational ties that bind our world together.   I want to 
thank you for your contributions to America, for your contributions to stronger 
Turkish-American relationships, and better understanding, and especially for 
your friendship to Hillary and to me.” 
(http://turkishinvitations.weebly.com/why-bill-clinton-mentioned-Gülen-at-the-
tccny-dinner.html) 
 
 According to Gülen, religious dialogue and tolerance are not new in Turkey. 
They are essential characteristics of the Turkish nation and had been perfectly practiced 
by the Ottoman Empire for six centuries (Ünal 2001:89). In the same manner, in 
Mehmet Gundem’s interview with him in 2005 (Gülen and Gündem 2005),  he says: 
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“Those who want to communicate themselves are obliged to listen to others, 
which should not be misunderstood and capitalized on. Today, a process has 
been launched that aims to communicate Islam's face through dialogue once 
more and in a manner that suits its beauty, which is today clouded as people are 
suppressed and immobilized by terror and bombs. This process will continue. 
Dialogue efforts introduced in the Vatican or other places are not and cannot be 
connected to our movement. Our dialogue and tolerance movement is exclusive 
to the Turkish nation and it has its origins in Turkey. If dialogue is to be feared, 
let others fear it.” 
“… Yes, there are such things, but such activities carried out in the Vatican or in 
some other place have nothing to do with our movement of tolerance and 
dialogue. Neither I, nor any of my friends who are devoted to this movement 
with me, can in no way be accused of being directed by somebody else. Our 
movement of dialogue and tolerance belongs completely to the Turkish nation 
and originates in Turkey. The dialogue activities are not an extension of the 
activities of others. On the contrary, these other activities originated from the 
idea of “if they are doing it, why shouldn't we? Why shouldn't we look for ways 
of expressing ourselves by planning meetings with them?”” 
 
 If tolerance and dialogue are essential elements of the Turkish nation and 
culture, why did not the Gülen movement show Turkish tolerance and begin dialogue 
activities until the mid-1990s? It is because the followers of the Gülen movement felt 
that building better relations with religious minorities was a crucial issue after they 
began to operate at the transnational level. The followers of the Gülen movement aimed 
to show the smiling face of Islam in a defensive way as a reaction to the increasing 
impact of Islamophobic discourse all over the world by engaging in interfaith activities. 
However, it was not sincere to develop interfaith activities all over the world without 
producing a positive relationship with Turkey’s non-Muslim religious groups.  
 Fethullah Gülen and his followers frequently refer to the Ottomans to legitimize 
the national and international interfaith activities of the movement as a reaction to fierce 
criticism from radical Islamic groups and intellectuals. While this process legitimizes 
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the interfaith dialogue activities at the national level as a reaction to the harsh critics of 
radical Islamic circles, it displays that Turks/Muslims are already tolerant as a response 
to the increasing impact of the Islamophobic discourse all over the world. On the other 
hand, it also plays an important role in the construction of a legitimate Islamic identity 
dedicated to tolerance, dialogue, and multiculturalism in the globalized world. 
 Politically-Oriented Islamic Activism and Religious Minorities 
 Although there were some other initiations, the National Order Movement (Milli 
Görüş) has been considered the mainstream politically-oriented Islamic activism in 
Turkey. In contrast to the Nur movement, Necmettin Erbakan and his entourage 
believed that it was not possible to resist the secularist repression over Islamic groups 
and to establish an Islamic society without political power; therefore, they suggested 
that Islamic circles should have engaged in political struggle. As part of this endeavor, 
they established the National Order Party in 1969. However, this party was closed down 
after the military coup of 1971. The Milli Görüş then established a series of political 
parties (the National Salvation Party (1972-1980), the Welfare Party (1983-1998), the 
Virtue Party (1997-2001), and the Felicity Party (2001-Present)) over time. All of these 
parties, with the exception of the Felicity Party, were closed down for violating 
Turkey’s secularism by the Supreme Court.  
 The Welfare Party (WP) was the most effective party of the Milli Görüş. It 
became the largest party in Turkey by gaining 21.38 percent of the vote in the 1995 
election. Necmettin Erbakan as the leader of the WP established a coalition government 
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with the True Path Party (TPP) and became Prime Minister in 1996. However, the 
Welfare Party had to leave the coalition government in 1997 as a result of the military 
intervention into Turkish politics, which is called the February 28 Process. Then the 
Supreme Court closed down the Welfare Party and banned Necmettin Erbakan from 
active politics. After the Welfare Party, the Milli Görüş founded the Virtue Party, but 
the Supreme Court also closed it down in 2001. After the closure of the Virtue Party, 
while Necmettin Erbakan’s followers established the Felicity Party, younger and more 
pragmatic Islamic politicians (e.g., Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Abdullah Gül, Bülent Arınç) 
declared that they renounced their ties with the Milli Görüş and established the AK 
Party in 2001. While the AKP got 34.28 percent of the votes, the Felicity Party got 2.49 
percent in the 2002 election after the division of Turkey’s mainstream political Islam. 
 The ideological root of the Milli Görüş can be traced to early Islamic 
intellectuals and the Islamic print activities that mushroomed after Turkey’s transition 
into the multi-party system. Particularly, Necip Fazil (1904-1983) was a highly 
influential figure in the construction of the ideological stance of political Islam in 
Turkey. He was born in 1904 in Istanbul. He received a secular education in his 
formative years and then studied philosophy at Sorbonne University. His life changed 
after he met a Sufi Sheikh in 1934 and became an effective Islamic intellectual and 
activist over time. 
 His ideology and political movement was called Büyük Dogu (the Great East) 
because of the title of the magazine that he published. As one may understand easily, 
his ideology was constructed on the rejection of the west and the westernization of 
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Turkey (Duran and Aydın 2013, Singer 2013). In his worldview, western civilization 
was capitalist, imperialist, materialist, brutal, and so on whereas Islamic civilization was 
humanitarian, tolerant, and moral. One of the best examples of Islamic civilization was 
the Ottomans. He suggested that although the Ottoman Empire had enough military and 
political power, the Ottoman rulers did not impose their own values such as religion and 
language, on non-Muslims and exploit the resources of newly invaded areas. However, 
when the west invaded new territories, it imposed its own values (e.g., religion and 
language) on local people and exploited their resources.  
 Necip Fazil promoted the early form of nostalgia for the Ottomans in the 1950s 
and 1960s, but his Ottomanism is different from today’s Ottomanism in Turkey because 
it was not an inclusive project, but exclusionary. According to him, one of the most 
important factors in the decline of the Ottoman Empire was non-Muslim minorities, 
particularly Jews, because they collaborated with the West against the Ottoman Empire 
(Duran and Aydın 2013, Singer 2013). Although historical research shows that Ottoman 
Jews were loyal to the Ottoman Empire, he suggested that Ottoman Jews led to the 
collapse the Empire because the Ottomans were the biggest obstacle to establish a 
Jewish State in Palestine. He also suggested that the founding fathers of modern Turkey 
were Sabbateans, which were a group of crypto Jews; therefore they dedicated their 
lives to state secularism that repressed Islamic activism. 
 As a result of these kinds of ideological sources, the Milli Görüş was a 
reactionary movement to the Kemalist project and the westernization of Turkish society. 
Although the parties of the Milli Görüş began to use a moderate discourse in the mid-
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1990s, they opposed to Turkey’s membership to the European Union and the integration 
into the globalized world. Erbakan regarded the EU as a “Christian Union,” and the 
application of Turkey for full membership in the EU was a betrayal to Turkish history, 
civilization, culture, and sovereignty. In contrast to the westernization of Turkey, he 
suggested that Turkish society should be shaped in accordance with Islamic values. 
 Although the founding politicians of the AKP originated from the Milli Görüş, 
they declared that they renounced their ties with the Milli Görüş in 2001 and identified 
the ideological position of the AKP as “conservative democracy.” They frequently 
emphasized that the AKP was not a “religion centric” party, but a “conservative” and 
“democrat” party dedicated to the consolidation of democracy, human rights, 
multiculturalism, and secularism as the separation of religion and state in Turkey. They 
also believed that Turkey’s integration into the EU was a necessity to consolidate 
Turkish democracy. The program of the AKP was shaped in accordance with the EU 
regulations (e.g., the Copenhagen Criteria and the Paris and Helsinki agreements), and 
the leaders of the AKP gave priority to Turkey’s integration into the EU after they came 
to power in 2002. 
 How did this transition happen? Initially, one can argue that the reason for the 
moderation of political Islam was the repression of the Kemalist elites, especially the 
February 28 Process. However, it is a reductionist approach to understand the 
moderation of political Islam because although political Islamists had been very active 
in Turkey for many years under the state repression, the moderation of political Islam 
did not happen in the past. In contrast, Islamic politicians used the Kemalist repression 
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to consolidate their own communal ties and to mobilize conservative circles in their 
own struggle against the Kemalist elites.  
 I do not claim that the state repression is not important but it is meaningful when 
it is taken into account with other factors. Therefore, I will bring here the transformative 
impact of the changing social base of political Islam after the integration of Islamic 
circles into the globalization process and the reinterpretation of Islam in accordance 
with the requirements of the globalized world. The changing social base of political 
Islam and the emergence of an Islamic entrepreneurial class, integrated into the 
neoliberal globalization, are the main factors in the emergence of a moderate Islamicly-
oriented party because the changing social base of political Islam needed a political 
party which was economically and politically liberal, but socially and culturally 
conservative. The AKP was a response to the need of the social base of political Islam 
that changed radically from the 1980s onward. 
 In the 1990s, the social base of the Milli Görüş was very different from its 
former social base because conservative circles had experienced a radical change since 
the 1980s. While they were rural and less educated in the 1960s and 1970s, they were 
becoming more educated and urbanized in the 1980s. One of the most important factors 
in the emergence of a more educated and urbanized conservative social base was the 
emergence of an Islamic entrepreneurial class in the 1980s as a result of Turgut Özal’s 
liberalization policies. Although there were some radical changes within the social base 
of political Islam since the 1980s, the leading cadre of the Milli Görüş was not aware of 
the needs of urbanized and educated conservative circles. For example, Erbakan 
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frequently talked about creating an economic and monetary union based on a potential 
Islamic dinar currency among Muslim countries and the union of the Islamic world as 
an alternative to the West, in particular the EU, in the mid-1990s while Islamic 
entrepreneurs mostly used the Euro and American Dollar and did business with 
European countries.  
 On the other hand, in addition to a radical Islamist discourse, one can also notice 
the increasing impact of a moderate discourse within the Welfare Party in the mid-
1990s because of the increasing impact of the younger generation of Islamic politicians 
over the party discourse. The younger generation of Islamic politicians was familiar 
with the gap between the leading cadre of the Milli Görüş and its social base. Indeed, 
the younger generation of Islamic politicians was the result/part of changing 
conservative circles. The AKP was the result of the gap between political Islam and its 
popular base, and a shift from an ideological stance to a market-oriented pragmatic 
stance. While the Welfare Party promoted an Islamist ideology at the political and 
economic level, the AKP emerged as a politically and economically liberal but 
culturally and socially conservative party to meet the needs of its social base. 
 The emergence of post-Islamist intellectuals in the 1980s and 1990s is another 
important factor in the reinterpretation of Islam and the moderation of political Islam in 
Turkey (Dagi 2004, White 2011). Post-Islamist intellectuals are quite different from the 
early Islamic intellectuals in term of their ideas and discourses. While the early Islamic 
intellectuals were effective in the construction of the Milli Görüş, post-Islamist 
intellectuals who sought the compatibility of Islam with some modern values (e.g., 
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democracy, secularism, pluralism) played an important role in the formation of a 
moderate political Islam and paved the way of paradigmatic change among Islamic 
groups. Post-Islamist intellectuals have criticized radical Islamism and promoted the 
compatibility of Islam with human rights, multiculturalism, and pluralism by adapting 
traditional Islamic principles to the modern world. For example, Ali Bulac says: “if the 
meaning of political Islam is to establish a theocratic state, it is finished” (quoted in 
Yilmaz 2005). He also believes that: “absence of domination by a religious elite in the 
governance; recognition of the right to be present in the public domain to the 
individuals; and ensuring that state is equally distant to all religious, philosophical and 
ideological groups. This sort of definition provided for the concept of secularism is 
consistent with Islamic precepts and the historical experience by the Muslims” (quoted 
in Yilmaz 2008). 
 While Islamic groups strengthened their communal ties by using an anti-
Western rhetoric before the mid-1990s, Islamic groups have changed their arguments as 
a reaction to the Kemalist repression and begun to use liberal, rather than Islamic, 
arguments to defend their values under the impact of post-Islamist intellectuals. On the 
other hand, the use of liberal discourse to defend Islamic values led to the alienation of 
the Kemalist elites from westernization discourse that allowed them to 
rationalize/justify their authoritarian project aiming to reach “the level of contemporary 
civilization.” The Kemalists began to feel that they were losing their privileges under 
the impact of the globalization processes and the EU, and changed their discourses as a 
reaction to the moderation of Islam in Turkey. Therefore, it has been common to see 
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anti-western, anti-global, and anti-EU discourse among Kemalist intellectuals since the 
transformation of Islamic discourse. For example, as a reaction to the increasing number 
of students wearing the headscarf in the mid-1980s, the Higher Education Council 
declared in 1986 that students should wear “contemporary clothing” in order to enter 
university campuses. But, “contemporary clothing” was an ambiguous concept. When 
some journalists asked Ihsan Dogramaci, the head of the Higher Education Council, 
what “contemporary clothing was,” his answer was “go and look at Europe, whatever 
you see there is contemporary clothing” (Cinar 1998:76). Then, universities banned the 
headscarfs on campuses. Thus, in the 1980s, the source of legitimacy or rationalization 
for the Kemalist elites was still Europe and westernization. However, Islamic circles 
and intellectuals have begun to use the concept of human rights, freedom of conscience, 
and individual rights in order to defend headscarf freedom since the mid-1990s. When 
Islamic circles changed their discourses and began to use democracy and human rights 
discourse for religious freedom, the Kemalist argument changed as well. The Kemalists 
then began to argue that “the special conditions of Turkey,” which was an Islamist 
threat, required limited religious freedom because of the increasing impact of Islamic 
movements, particularly for the rationalization and justification of the February 28 
Process. 
 With respect to religious minorities, the approaches of political Islamists and the 
Kemalist elites were similar to each other until the mid-1990s. However, the Kemalist 
elites mostly targeted Greeks and Armenians while the Islamic elites generally targeted 
Jews because anti-Semitic/anti-Zionist discourse was one of the crucial elements in the 
  147 
construction of political Islam in Turkey. The anti-minority discourse of political 
Islamists by and large did not go beyond a hostile discourse because the Milli Görüş did 
not have enough political power to put its agenda into practice. However, in the mid-
1990s, the Welfare Party became the largest political party after the local election of 
1994 and the parliamentary election of 1995. In the election campaigns, Islamist 
politicians harassed religious minorities. For example, some candidates of the Welfare 
Party declared that they were going to convert Greek and Armenian churches in 
Istanbul to mosques. In the parliamentary election of 1995, Cefi Kamhi, a Turkish Jew, 
became a deputy candidate from the True Path Party (TPP) at the request of Tansu 
Ciller, the leader of the TPP, and elected as a deputy member of the TPP. Before the 
elections, Islamic politicians also used the candidacy of Kamhi and propagated that all 
political parties with the exception of the Welfare Party were Zionist and the puppets of 
Israel. 
 Religious minorities worried about the future of the country after the victory of 
the Welfare Party in the elections of 1994 and 1995. Particularly, Jews believed that it 
was time to prepare their bags and move to another country, but they adapted “wait and 
see policies” (Bali 2012). After winning the local elections of 1994, the Welfare Party 
took control of many districts of Istanbul and Recep Tayyip Erdoğan became the mayor 
of Istanbul metropolitan city. In contrast to the expectations, the prominent members of 
non-Muslim minorities, including Jews, pointed out that the municipal leaders of the 
Welfare Party tried to develop a positive relationship with non-Muslim minorities (see 
the memoirs of Ishak Alaton and Jak Kamhi, two prominent Turkish-Jewish 
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businessmen: Alaton and Gundem 2012, Alaton and Gundem 2013, Kamhi 2013). The 
mayors of the Welfare Party frequently visited the institutions of non-Muslim minorities 
and helped them solve their municipal problems. After the national elections of 1995, 
the Welfare Party established a collation government with the TPP in 1996 although 
Islamic politicians severely criticized the TPP before the election. This situation shows 
that the discourse and practice of the Welfare Party did not overlap with each other in 
the mid-1990s. Initially one can consider that it was the result of the lack of a political 
mandate. However, I want to focus on another issue. While the elderly Islamist 
politicians shaped the rigid discourse of the Welfare Party in the mid-1990s, the 
younger generation of Islamic politicians increased their impact over the practical 
policies of the Welfare Party. For example, the municipal leaders of the Welfare Party 
elected in the local election of 1994 were mostly among the younger generation of 
political Islamists, which represented the changing social base of political Islam. They 
tried to develop a constructive relationship with non-Muslim minorities. 
 I would like to bring an anecdote from the life of Etyen Mahcupyan, a secular 
Turkish Armenian intellectual coming from a Catholic family background and currently 
the Senior Advisor to Prime Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, to illustrate the changing social 
base of political Islam and its impact on the approach of Islamic circles to non-Muslim 
minorities. In my interview with him, he explained to me that the Welfare Party 
conducted a survey among party members in order to take a general view about the 
expectations of its social base before the parliamentary elections of 1995. This survey 
showed that Etyen Mahcupyan and Ali Bayramoglu were the most wanted people by 
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the social base of the Welfare Party as deputy candidates for the Turkish Parliament. 
Although these two secular intellectuals gained public attention for their opposition to 
the secularist elites in the late 1990s, it seemed that they were popular among Islamic 
circles in the mid-1990s. It should have been a shocking result for the leaders of the 
Welfare Party. As a result of this survey, Necmettin Erbakan met Mahcupyan and 
wanted him to be a deputy candidate of the Welfare Party in the 1995 election. 
However, Mahcupyan told him that he did not want to be alone within an Islamist party 
and that he would have accepted this offer if the Party nominated other people who 
were coming from different perspectives (Field Interview, February 13, 2014). Then, 
the leading politicians of the Welfare Party did not nominate Mahcupyan as a deputy 
member in the elections. In this context, for the argument of this dissertation, it is not 
important whether Mahcupyan was nominated, but the result of the survey shows that 
the social base of political Islam was in a serious transition process in the mid-1990s. 
The social base of the Welfare Party were open to different perspectives and wanted 
two secular intellectuals, one of whom is Armenian, to represent them in the Turkish 
Parliament. 
 As I said earlier, the younger generation of Islamic politicians established the 
AKP as a result of the gap between the leading politicians of the Milli Görüş and 
Islamic circles. In contrast to the Milli Görüş, the AKP developed an inclusive 
discourse on non-Muslim minorities and a constructive relationship with them since its 
foundation. For example, after the foundation of the AKP, Tayyip Erdoğan offered 
Hrant Dink (a very influential and symbolic name among Armenians, the chief editor of 
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Agos, an Istanbul based Armenian newspaper, assassinated by an ultranationalist young 
man in 2006) to be a candidate for deputy membership within the AKP in the election 
of 2002 (Ter-Matevosyan 2010). However, Hrant Dink kindly did not accept this offer. 
 The perception of non-Muslims about Islamic politicians in turn has changed 
since the 1994 election. Although non-Muslims did not support the parties of the Milli 
Görüş, they strongly supported the AKP in elections. Although we do not have enough 
data showing the percentage of non-Muslims who supported the AKP in the election of 
2002, prominent members of religious minorities told me their own observations that 
non-Muslims by and large supported the AKP in 2002 because of the moderation of 
political Islam and the inclusive discourse of the AKP leadership on minorities. In the 
first term of the AKP government (2002-2007), the positive developments toward non-
Muslims had significant impacts on the choices of non-Muslim minorities in the 
election of 2007. After gaining more confidence with the AKP reforms and the 
approach of the AKP leadership to non-Muslims, an overwhelming majority of non-
Muslim minorities supported the AKP in the elections of 2007 and 2011 (Brink-Danan 
2011:116, Soner 2010:28). According to Agos, at least 60 percent of Armenians voted 
for the AKP in the election of 2007 (Ter-Matevosyan 2010:106).  Before the election of 
2007, the Patriarch of the Armenian Church, Mesrob II Mutafyan, stated that “the AK 
party is more moderate and less nationalistic in its dealings with minorities. The 
Erdoğan government listens to us; we will vote for the AK Party in the next elections” 
(quatation in Ter-Matevosyan 2010:106). When I asked an Armenian journalist why 
Armenian people support the AKP government, he told me that “the AKP is very 
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different from other parties; the leading cadre of the AKP respect us, our culture, our 
churches” (Field Interview, December 20, 2013). Although prominent members of the 
Greek community did not make a clear statement in favor of the AKP, similar to the 
Armenian patriarch, before any election, Mihail Vasiliadis, the editor of Apoyevmatini, 
a Greek daily newspaper based in Istanbul, reported that Greek community in Turkey 
also supported the AKP in elections because they are more liberal toward minorities 
(Soner 2010:28). 
 However, the case is a little bit different for Turkey’s Jews. For many Jews, 
increasing power of Islamic groups led to the increase of anti-Semitism in Turkey. 
Therefore, for them, it is not possible to find a strong support toward the AKP as much 
as other non-Muslim categories. The Jewish votes divided into two main categories: 
those who support the AKP because of some promising relations and those who have 
some concerns about the Islamic revival in Turkey.  A representative from the 
Rabbinate told me: “Majority of Jewish community support the AKP. The Rabbinate 
has a good and positive relationship with the AKP and their community sees this 
relationship. Of course, this affects the vote choice of our community members” (Field 
Interview, January 3, 2014). On the other hand, a Jewish university student told me: 
“the AKP shows its nice face toward our community, but in the future, they are going to 
establish an Islamic state; therefore, I do not support the AKP even if they try to help 
minorities. I know they are going to continue to rule the country, but they should not be 
too powerful; therefore, I vote for the RPP even if it is worse than the AKP” (Field 
Interview, January 6, 2014). 
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 According to religious minorities, one of the most important changes in the 
recent history of Turkey is that the AKP politicians have an extreme willingness to talk 
and discuss the concerns/problems of non-Muslims. The AKP leadership develops a 
close dialogue with the prominent members of non-Muslims and a constructive 
approach to their concerns.  For the first time, religious minorities perceive a great 
change toward the approach of state elites to the non-Muslim minorities in terms of 
cooperating with them. They had not seen this kind of approach to them in the past. In 
the last decade, minority leaders and the AKP leadership have come together many 
times. These are not only symbolic gestures, but some serious dialogues to learn their 
problems and to solve them. While some problems are solved, there are still some issues 
waiting for solution. Religious minorities generally believe that unsolved problems can 
be ameliorated though dialogue over time as long as the AKP is open to develop a 
positive relationship. 
 As I explained earlier, the Islamic nationhood imagination based on nostalgia for 
the Ottomans, particularly the narratives of Ottoman multiculturalism and tolerance, 
plays a major role in the emergence of a better relationship between Islamic movements 
and religious minorities. This can be seen on each occasion of the relationship between 
Islamic movements and religious minorities. For example, In a statement celebrating 
Easter in 2013, Tayyip Erdoğan said: “We, members of a deep-rooted tradition of 
respecting religious faiths and differences, believe that our culture of living together in 
peace and safety will prevail, just as it has done so in the past” (Hurriyet Daily News 
2013). 
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 Although Islamic politicians frequently use the narrative of the Ottoman 
tolerance in their relationship with religious minorities and have a constructive 
approach to non-Muslim minorities, the Islamic nationhood imagination, similar to the 
Kemalist nationalism, does not perceive non-Muslim minorities as part of the Turkish 
nation. Nationalist politicians frequently question the ethnic origin of Islamic politicians 
(e.g., Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Abdullah Gül) and run a black propaganda against 
them before each election. For example, Canan Aritman, the Izmir deputy of the RPP, 
publicly claimed that Abdullah Gül, AKP’s presidential candidate, could not be the 
president of Turkey before the presidential election of 2008 because his mother was 
originally an Armenian. In addition to these kinds of political claims, there are a large 
number of books and the news reports that claim that Abdullah Gül or Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan is not originally a Turk, but an Armenian, Jew, or Greek. As a reaction to these 
claims, Erdoğan and Gül filed a lawsuit and publicly denied them. For example, in a TV 
interview in 2008, Erdoğan said: “There are severe insults in the media that are directed 
to me. There are also many books written about President Abdullah Gül and myself. 
These books refer to us as Jews, Armenians, and – I beg your pardon– even Rums. Can 
you imagine? They are writing these books. What can you do to these people? The only 
way is to use the judiciary system. Is there any other choice?” (quoted in Adar 
2013:18). Recently, in a live TV interview on August 5, 2014, before the presidential 
election of 2014, while he was the presidential candidate of the AKP, he also said: 
“They have also said a lot of things about me. One of them came and said I was a 
Georgian. Then another came up and, I beg your pardon, saying I was Armenian. What 
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I have learned from my grandfather, my father and all of them is that I am Turkish. 
That’s it” 
 In a country where national identity has been strongly tied up with ethnicity, it is 
hardly surprising that politicians are condemned with having a different ethnic origin by 
their political opponents. However, the discourse of Islamic politicians, similar to 
Turkish nationalists, not only shows that being an Armenian, a Jew, or a Greek is an 
insulting identity for them, but also, their nationhood imagination does not include non-
Muslims into the Turkish nation. Even if Islamic politicians try to produce a hospitable 
polity for non-Muslim minorities, their nationhood imagination reproduces the 
distinction between Muslims as the owner of the country and non-Muslims as the “local 
foreigners” who are allowed to live in accordance with their own beliefs under the rule 
of Turkish tolerance. 
 Concluding Remarks 
 This chapter examined the moderation of Islamic movements and Islamic 
nationhood imagination over time and its impact on their relationship with religious 
minorities. Islamic movements have gradually abandoned the old approaches to 
religious minorities and have tried to produce an inclusive polity toward religious 
minorities since the early 1990s. After the integration into the globalization process, 
Islamic movements have come to build a legitimate Islamic identity in the globalized 
world. Islamic circles reinterpreted nostalgia for the Ottomans, which is embedded in 
the Islamic nationhood imagination, and reproduced the powerful narrative of Ottoman 
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multi-religious tolerance in the construction of a legitimate Islamic identity that 
embraces multiculturalism and diversity. The process of building inclusion within 
Islamic circles has resonated with the emergence of a better relationship with religious 
minorities.
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CHAPTER 5 
THE STATE AND RELIGIOUS MINORITIES IN THE POST-
KEMALIST PERIOD 
 
 
Although the AKP government has been criticized in recent years because of its 
authoritarian tendencies, particularly in its third term (2011-Present), numerous studies 
and reports (e.g., Ayoob 2008, Dagi 2004, Grigoriadis 2007, Ince 2012, Jenkins 2004, 
Karaosmanoglu 2010, Kaya 2009, Kose 2010, Kurban 2007, Morris 2005, White 2012, 
Yildiz 2007) have indicated that the AKP government made many crucial reforms that 
pave the way of liberalization of Turkish society in its first two terms (2002/2007-
2007/2011) by tackling many problematic issues. As part of these reforms, there are 
important changes affecting the lives of religious minorities in the post-Kemalist period. 
In this chapter, I examine recent changes in state policies toward religious minorities 
under the rule of the AKP government. 
As I tried to show in the previous chapters, Turkish Islamic groups have tried to 
develop a good and positive relationship with religious minorities because of their 
nationhood imagination shaped by the glorification of the Ottoman justice and 
tolerance. As a result/practice of this kind of nationhood imagination, the AKP 
government is the most reformist government in responding the needs of religious 
minorities since the beginning of the Republic even though the concerns of religious 
minorities rank highly low in the agenda of the country. Therefore, religious minorities 
  157 
perceive that they live in “unbelievable times” under the rule of the AKP government 
because of recent unexpected positive developments after living under 
secularist/nationalist oppression for long years.  
 However, recent developments are not extraordinary reforms when they are 
compared with the expectations derived from modern liberal democratic ideals because 
contemporary standards of democracy and human rights already require them. What's 
more, the government has still continued to violate some basic rights of religious 
minorities. Therefore, religious minorities are not satisfied with recent changes even if 
they are by and large happy with the AKP government in comparison with the previous 
governments.  
In this chapter, I examine some important steps breaking habitual approaches of 
the state toward religious minorities and explicit signs showing the direction of way in 
terms of minority rights by dealing with some well-known examples shaping collective 
memories of religious minorities. Then I try to show how/why the Turkish state has 
violated some basic rights of non-Muslims in the post-Kemalist period.  
 Identity Shift in the Constitution of Turkishness and Its Impact on the 
Relationship between the State and Religious Minorities 
After coming to power in late 2002, Islamic politicians problematized the 
nationhood understanding of the Kemalist nationalism that has been imposed by the 
state for long years because they suggested that it created a large number of problems 
throughout the history of modern Turkey, particularly in the process of EU integration. 
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In the October of 2004, “Human Rights Advisory Board of the Prime Minister” released 
“the Minority and Cultural Rights Report” prepared by a board under the leadership of 
Dr. Baskin Oran, one of the leading academics in defense of the minority and cultural 
rights (see for details: Oran 2007, Oran 2011). For the report, the origin of many 
problems created in modern Turkey is the dominant understanding of nationhood 
identifying Turkishness with ethnicity. This kind of understanding led to the alienation 
of minority groups from the larger society and the legitimization of the turkification 
policies of the state toward minorities. For the first time, the report (as an official 
document) also admitted the presence of unrecognized minorities (e.g., Kurds, Alevis) 
in addition to recognized minorities (i.e., Armenians, Greeks, and Jews). As a solution, 
the report suggested a new definition of nationhood for social cohesion of the country 
and proposed the term “Turkiyeli” (those who are from Turkey), which has a territorial 
meaning covering all ethno-religious differences that exist in Turkey, instead of the 
term “Turks,” which is dominantly understood as an ethnic category. 
The report immediately gained public attention and led to serious discussions in 
Turkey because an official report, for the first time, problematized the nationhood 
understanding that has been imposed for long years by the state elites. Indeed, the report 
faced a very strong reaction and resistance coming from Kemalist/nationalist elites. For 
example, President Ahmed Necdet Sezer (in office between 2000-2007) states that 
“promoting – apart from cultural rights – ethnic, religious and confessional differences 
of communities, which live together, could harm national unity and disintegrate the 
nation-state . . . In the unitary state, country, nation and sovereignty are single, 
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indivisible. The founding and real element of the Republic of Turkey is the Turkish 
nation” (quoted in Grigoriadis 2007:430). Those who prepared the report faced death 
threats and harsh insults from nationalist groups. A public prosecutor instigated legal 
action against the author of the report because of “inciting hate and enmity among the 
public” under article 216 of the Turkish panel code. 
While those who are against the term “Turkiyeli” argue that the term will lead to 
the disintegration of the country, the proponents of the report say that those who do not 
identify themselves with ethnic Turks alienate themselves from the country. They gave 
the example of Kurds. For them, while the Kemalist understanding of Turkishness does 
not include Kurds, Kurdish people can easily identify themselves with “Turkiyeli 
Kurd.” Similar to Kurds, Armenians, Greeks, and Jews can use the identification of 
“Turkiyeli.” Therefore, in contrast to the expectation of nationalists, the identity of 
“Turkiyeli” can produce an inclusive approach for everyone who lives in Turkey. 
Of course, it is naive to expect that a state report can change the nationhood 
understanding that has been indoctrinated by the state for long years, but the importance 
of this report is to show that Turkey’s new elites are not only eager to discuss some 
important issues about citizenship, ethnicity, and minority, but also ready for departure 
from the basic premises of Kemalist nationhood imagination by bringing “the 
undiscussed into discussion.” Thus, this report has triggered huge discussions about 
national identity and many taboo issues (e.g., Kurdish rights, Alevi rights, the Armenian 
massacre, the status of the Orthodox Patriarchate) in the last decade. On the other hand, 
the term “Turkiyeli” should be understood in the context of the nationhood imagination 
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of the Islamic elites although the Islamic elites do not have any concern about the 
understanding of “Turkiyeli Greeks”, “Turkiyeli Armenians”, and “Turkiyeli Jews.” As 
I explained in the earlier chapter, while the Islamic elites perceive Islam as an essential 
characteristics of Turkishness and Turkey as a Muslim country tolerating minorities, the 
term “Turkiyeli” shows that the Islamic elites see non-Muslims as part of Turkey as a 
country. While this kind of approach to national identity shows the desire of the Islamic 
elites to produce a more inclusive polity for those who were marginalized in the 
Kemalist period, it does not include non-Muslims into the Turkish nation.  
 The impact of the understanding of “Turkiyeli” can be seen in many aspects of 
the relationship between the state and religious minorities in the post-Kemalist period. 
Although the previous governments were not interested in the concern of religious 
minorities about national issues, the AKP government gets the opinion of religious 
minorities about new developments and national issues.  This allows the emergence of 
social and political trust between non-Muslims and Islamic politicians. For example, the 
AKP government has struggled for replacing the constitution that was written during the 
military junta of 1980-1983 with a new constitution in the recent years. Therefore, they 
have established the  “Constitution Conciliation Commission” in the parliament in order 
to prepare a draft.  This commission has come together with different segments of 
Turkish society, and listened to their concerns about and expectations of a new 
constitution of the country. The commission also invited the heads of religious 
minorities to the Turkish parliament. They talked to the members of the parliamentary 
commission working on a new constitution draft. Religious minorities were invited to 
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the Turkish parliament to talk about their concerns about a national issue in the history 
of modern Turkey for the first time.  On the other hand, the relationship between 
religious leaders of non-Muslim minorities and the AKP leaders can be a good 
illustration of the emergence of neo-millet system. Although the Kemalist elites denied 
that religious leaders are the representatives of non-Muslim minorities, it has been 
reversed in the post-Kemalist Turkey. Similar to the millet system, the AKP leaders 
perceive religious leaders of non-Muslims as the representative of non-Muslim 
minorities and invite them to the Parliament to find out their concern for the new 
constitution of the country. 
 This was a highly important invitation for religious minorities. After talking to 
the Parliament’s Constitution Conciliation Commission, the Ecumenical Patriarch 
Bartholomew I told reporters:  
It is the first official invitation to non-Muslim minorities in Republican history. 
We don’t want to be second-class citizens. Unfortunately there have been 
injustices in the past. These are all slowly being rectified. A new Turkey is being 
born. We are leaving the meeting with hope and are extremely grateful. (Akyol 
2012). 
 
Actually, the statement of Patriach Bartholomew I is an important summary of 
the changes that Turkey has experienced in the post-Kemalist Turkey. He points out that 
non-Muslim minorities were under serious pressure in the past under the rule of 
Turkey’s secularist regime; however, a new Turkey is emerging. They feel that they are 
still second-class citizens, but there are some positive changes that make him hopeful 
and grateful. When I asked an Armenian priest the importance of the invitation of the 
Armenian Patriarchate to the parliament, he told me that they had to obey the law 
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although they had never involved in the law making process in Turkey. He told me that 
they began to feel that they were part of the law making process in the country under 
the rule of the AKP government for the first time (Field Interview, October 7, 2013)  
Another example of the impact of the identity shift on religious minorities can 
be seen in the architectural polices of the Islamic elites. A large number of studies show 
that there is a close relationship between nationalism and architecture because 
architectural policies and productions are one of the best ways of representing national 
identities/imaginations and cultural representations (e.g., Bailey, Bozdoğan and 
Necipoğlu 2007, Herrle, Wegerhoff and Unit 2008, Quek, Deane and Butler 2012, Vale 
2014). The Kemalist elites by and large were insensible to the Islamic and Christian 
cultural/architectural heritage of Anatolia with the exception of some monumental sites. 
Therefore, there were many cultural, architectural, and historical heritages of both 
Islamic and Christian past that were abandoned in Anatolia. These abandoned historical 
sites were by and large in the charge of the Directorate General of Foundations (DGF). 
However, the policies of the DGF marginalized the cultural and historical heritage of 
non-Muslims, who lived in Turkey for many centuries. As a result of the disappearance 
of the culture of Greeks, Armenians, and Jews from cities, streets, and the daily life of 
Turkish people over time, new generations have been unfamiliar with these cultures. 
Greekness, Armenianness, and Jewsness have become “abnormal” in Anatolia over 
time although they existed there for many centuries. 
However, Islamic politicians try to protect not only the cultural heritage of the 
Islamic past of Anatolia, but also the non-Muslim heritage. Although Islamic politicians 
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give priority to the Islamic heritage, particularly the Ottoman sites and the work of the 
chief Ottoman architect Sinan, by restoring many historical sites, they are also willing 
to the protection of the cultural and historical heritage of non-Muslims in Anatolia. 
Therefore, the DGF under the rule of the AKP government began to take care of many 
abandoned historical sites (e.g., an Assyrian church in the city of Hatay, an Orthodox 
church in Gokceada, an Armenian Protestant Church in Diyarbakir, an Armenian 
Catholic Church in Diyarbakir, the Central Synagogue of Gaziantep, the Central 
Synagogue of Edirne) that belonged to non-Muslims in the past and to save them from 
further deterioration. These restorations do not aim to prepare these churches for the 
religious needs of non-Muslims because of the lack of non-Muslim population in the 
regions. Therefore, they are generally opened as a museum to protect the cultural 
heritage of the regions.  
 The Holy Cross Cathedral of Akdamar is a good illustration of the change of the 
state behavior toward the cultural heritage of non-Muslims. The Akdamar church, 
which was built in 915-921 AD, is seen as one of the most important examples of 
medieval Armenian architecture. Although the church was active until the exile of 
Armenians from the region, the church was vandalized and used as a polygon for a 
while after 1915. The governor of the province of Van was going to destroy the church 
in 1951. When Yasar Kemal, a well-known novelist, learnt by coincidence that the 
church was going to be demolished, he immediately contacted some authorities in the 
Ministry of Education about the demolishment and convinced them that it should have 
protected because of its historical importance. Thus, the initiatives of Yasar Kemal 
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stopped the demolition of the church by the governor, but it was abandoned to decay. In 
the early 1990s, activists and organizations (e.g., the Word Council of Churches) paid 
attention to the Cathedral because of the deterioration and tried to convince Turkish 
authorities to restore it, but it did not happen. Actually, the state elites were not only 
unaware of this kind of non-Muslim cultural properties, but also did not care. Activists 
also initiated a campaign and collected more than 10,000 signatures for the restoration 
of the Akdamar Church in the early 2000s. When the AKP came to power, it took a 
constructive action and restored the church.  
 It was reopened in 2007 as a museum with a ceremony in which some 
representatives of the AKP administration the Minister of Culture, the Governor of the 
Province of Van, the Mayor of the City of Van, ambassadors of some countries, 
Armenian Patriarch Mesrob II, a delegation from Armenia, many journalists, and some 
NGO representatives participated. Although it is a museum, Armenians have carried out 
a sacrament once a year since the opening of the Cathedral in 2007. An Armenian priest 
told me that in the first year, local authorities started campaigns to host Armenians 
visiting the city for the first sacrament, and 2,000 families hosted Armenians to create 
dialogues between Armenians, Turks, and Kurds in the region (Field Interview, October 
9, 2013). After the completion of its restoration, prior to the opening, Armenians 
noticed that there was no cross on the dome of the Cathedral. The State authorities 
initially argued that it was a museum; therefore, it was not necessary. However, the 
representatives of Armenian community convinced them after negotiations. A cross was 
sent from the Armenian Patriarchate of Turkey and put on the top of the Cathedral. 
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Then an Armenian priest sanctified it (Field Interview, October 9, 2013). 
 Another example of restoration is the Surp Grigos Church in Diyarbakir. The 
Surp Grigos Church in Diyarbakir, built 7 centuries ago, was one of the biggest 
churches in the Middle East. It was a kind of religious and cultural center for Armenians 
for long years. Although Armenians frequently pointed out the importance of the 
church, they could not convince the state authorities to restore it in the past. However, 
the AKP government also restored it and prevented it from further damage. An 
Armenian priest told me that they had waited for its restoration for long years. They 
wanted to restore it, but they could not get permission from the Directorate General of 
Foundations in the past. It was restored by the state under the rule of the AKP 
government (Field Interview, October 9, 2013). After the completion of the restoration, 
many Armenians all over the world visited the city of Diyarbakir and participated in the 
ceremony of opening. It is highly meaningful for Armenians because these are living 
memorials showing that Armenians lived in the region once upon a time. Therefore, for 
Armenians, these are not only a restoration project, but also important steps toward the 
recognition of the thousands of years of Armenian presence in Anatolia after a long 
process of abnormalization in the Republic. 
On the other hand, it was generally very difficult to get permission from local 
authorities for the renovation and restoration of their own community buildings such as 
churches and schools in the past. For religious minorities, this was another way of 
saying that they were unwelcome in the country. However, under the rule of the AKP 
government, non-Muslim minority foundations have gotten permissions to restore the 
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buildings belonging to their own communities without any problem. When I visited the 
Orthodox Patriarchate and the Armenian Patriarchate, the annex and library buildings of 
the Orthodox Patriarchate and the main church of the Armenian Patriarchate were under 
the renovation process. When I asked an Orthodox priest some questions about the state 
policies toward the restorations of their own buildings, he told me that even it was not 
possible to hammer a nail into the wall in the past. Then he began to explain the story of 
the main building of the Orthodox Patriarchate. The main building of the Orthodox 
Patriarchate, which was originally a timbered building constructed in the early years of 
the 1600s, burned down completely and the Church of St. George, the principal church 
of the Orthodox Patriarchate, was heavily damaged in a fire in 1941. After the fire, the 
Orthodox Patriarchate wanted to restore the building and the Church. But, the 
restoration of the Patriarchal Building was not allowed by the relevant state authorities 
until the 1980s. When the representatives of the Orthodox Patriarchate explained the 
situation to Prime Minister Turgut Özal, who was one of best example of neo-
Ottomanist politicians, in 1987, they were able to get the permission for the restoration 
of the building and the Church because of Turgut Özal’s initiations (Field Interview, 
November 14, 2013).  
 Surveillance, Security, and Minorities 
The difference between the Kemalist and post-Kemalist period in terms of 
minority politics can also be seen in the security approach of the state toward 
minorities. The paranoid approach of the state toward minorities has been in a transition 
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period since the beginning of the AKP government. As a first step, the AKP abolished 
“the Minority Commission” (Azınlıklar Tali Komisyonu) within the Ministry of the 
Interior in 2004.  The Commission - composed of the members of the National Security 
Council, the General Staff, and the National Intelligence Service, the Directorate 
General of Foundations, the Directorate of Religious Affairs, and the Minister of 
Education - was secretly established in 1962 after the military coup of 1960. The aim of 
the Commission was to keep minorities under surveillance and to prevent religious 
minorities from any kind of activities threatening the state. It became public in 2000, 38 
years later after its foundation, when a document of the commission was leaked to the 
media. The Leaked document showed that the commission discussed the demand of the 
Armenian Patriarchate to open a theology department at Istanbul University in order to 
train clergy and the future of the Halki Greek Orthodox Seminary on May 9, 2000. The 
document shows that the commission members reached the conclusion that it was a 
national threat to open a non-Muslim clergy-training department at Istanbul University 
and necessary to discuss the reopening of the Halki seminary in “the National Security 
Council” because it was a serious attempt to shift in the understanding of national 
security and politics. 
 Although the Commission did not have any constitutional/legal basis, it played a 
crucial role in conducting and regulating state policies toward minorities. When I asked 
an Armenian journalist how a secret commission could regulate everything about 
minorities without having any legal basis, he explained as follows: 
Non-Muslim minorities did not know that there was a commission regulating 
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everything about minorities until recent years, but they always felt the presence 
of an invisible mechanism regulating minority affairs within the state. Whenever 
minority representatives visited politicians for any kind of issue concerning 
minorities and demanded reforms, politicians listened to them and reassured that 
they would take an action. However, the commission kept intervening in the 
process and prevented politicians from improving the situation of minorities 
because the commission imposed its own interpretation. It was more powerful 
than politicians and its decisions were superior to the law. (Field Interview, 
December 27, 2013)  
 
 As the leaked document shows that state elites still perceived that non-Muslim 
minorities were a serious threat to the nation even if their percentage was less than 1 
percent in the early 2000s. As a result of the abolishment of the commission, non-
Muslims believe that it is an important sign of shift in the state’s approach to the 
minorities. After the abolishment of the committee, the AKP established “the 
Commission to Assess the Problems of Minorities,” composed of civil authorities, in 
2004. Its job is to help the minorities and to solve their problems, not to monitor them.  
When I asked some non-Muslim intellectuals and religious leaders whether they know 
the new commission, they told me that they heard but they did not have any information 
about its activities. 
Although the minority commission was the one of the biggest barriers to 
attaining minority rights, probably the most important change affecting minorities in the 
last decade was the Ergenekon trial that led to the purging of the deep-rooted 
xenophobic nationalist network within the state. When I asked an Armenian journalist 
the importance of the Ergenekon trial, he told me that the Ergenekon network was not 
only a major threat to the security of non-Muslims, but also a crucial obstacle to obtain 
their own basic rights because the Ergenekon was a highly influential organization 
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shaping almost all strategic state institutions, including the minorities commission 
(Field Interview, February 13, 2014).  
My aim is not to examine the Ergenekon trail with details here, but to focus on 
its impact on non-Muslim minorities; however, I need to provide some preliminary 
information in order to grasp its meaning for minorities. The Ergenekon,9 which is often 
called “a deep state,” is a clandestine secularist ultra-nationalist network composed of 
civil and military people within the state.  Although the origin of the Ergenekon 
network goes back to the Teskilat-i Mahsusa (The Special Organization), which was a 
secret organization established by the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) in the 
late period of the Ottoman Empire, the organization acted as local guerrilla networks 
during the Greece’s invasion of Anatolia in the early 1920s and mobilized people 
against Greeks and other allied states of World War I. However, the Ergenekon network 
became a professional paramilitary defense force in the 1950s after Turkey’s 
participation in NATO since NATO established stay-behind organizations, which are 
frequently called “Operation Gladio,” in NATO countries in case of a Soviet invasion. 
These organizations generally recruited their members from security forces. Although 
the main purpose of the stay-behind organizations was to struggle against communism, 
they generally deviated from the stated purpose and engaged in patriotic activities to 
protect the nation from other enemies that they deemed to be traitorous, suspicious, 
dangerous, and so on. While fighting against the enemies of the nation, the stay-behind 
                                                
9 The term Ergenekon was originated from Turkish national myths and legends and it refers to the 
homeland of Turks in the Altay Mountains. 
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organizations did not hesitate to be involved in terrorist acts, crimes, assassinations, 
bombings, organizing mass demonstrations, coups d’état, and so on. According to 
Italian Magistrate Felice Casson, who discovered the existence of Operation Gladio, 
Turkey has the most powerful branch of NATO’s stay-behind organizations (Zaman 
2009). This is probably the reason why the Ergenekon or Turkish Gladio was still 
highly active until recent years even though other NATO countries purged stay-behind 
organizations after the end of the Cold War. 
The Ergenekon network did not necessarily have a strict hierarchical 
organization and a single master plan, but was controlled by high-ranking civil and 
military bureaucrats (e.g., Generals, University Presidents, Judges) dedicated to the 
founding principles of modern Turkey (Bruinessen 2009). The network had the ability 
to mobilize different agents (e.g., workers unions, trade unions, university presidents, 
the media, mafia organizations) for its own interest. While the Ergenekon struggled 
against leftist movements in the 1960s and 1970s, it has generally focused on the 
Kurdish movement and the Islamic revival after the coup d’état of 1980. 
Although the Ergenekon network perceived non-Muslim minorities as a threat to 
the Republic, it particularly increased violent attacks toward non-Muslims in the last 
decade. Indeed, there must be some reasons leading to the concentration of the 
Ergenekon on religious minorities.  According to Orhan Kemal Cengiz (Cengiz May 23, 
2009), a Turkish Human Right activist, there are three important factors: (1) the 
Ergenekon network aimed to give an impression that when Muslim politicians come to 
power, hate crimes against non-Muslims increased; (2) it aimed to produce a strong 
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barrier to Turkey’s membership to the EU by showing that religious minorities were 
under repression in Turkey; and (3) it sent messages to non-Muslims saying that the 
purification of Turkey from non-Muslims is still an ambitious project even if they 
constitute less than 1 percent of the population. In addition to these three factors, one 
would add that the network tried to hinder reforms about minorities under the rule of the 
AKP government. 
The Ergenekon trial began on June 12, 2007 after the police force found arms 
and grenades in an apartment unit in Istanbul. More than 800 people, including 
journalists and academics, had been detained gradually over time as part of the 
investigation since 2008 because of allegations about planning to overthrow the elected 
AKP government. The 13th High Criminal Court of Istanbul described the Ergenekon as 
a terrorist organization and announced its verdict about the suspects in August 2013. 
While 254 people were convicted of various crimes, some important figures of the 
Ergenekon network, including a former Chief of the General Staff, were sentenced to 
life imprisonment.  However, many of them were released in March of 2014 before the 
verdict of the Court of Final Appeals because of a newly passed law decreasing the 
maximum period of detention to five years.  Currently, a large number of the convicts 
have been waiting for the result of their appeals on the outside of the prison. 
According to the trial (see for details, Bruinessen 2009, Eseyan 2013a), there is 
a certain clique in the military that aims to topple the AKP government in order to 
continue the Kemalist influence over the Turkish state. The Ergenekon network 
endeavored to foment an atmosphere of terror and chaos by provoking social 
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polarizations between secular/Islamic, Sunni/Alevi, and Muslim/Non-Muslim to make 
the country ready for a military intervention; therefore, the network got involved in 
organizing mass demonstrations leading to the emergence of unrest toward the 
government, the murder of Christian missionaries, and assassinations against the 
prominent members of non-Muslim communities and Alevi communities. Particularly, 
some events in the years of 2006 and 2007 were interesting in order to understand the 
progress of Ergenekon’s plan and its impact on religious minorities. Here are some 
examples: the bombing of a secularist newspaper (the Daily Cumhuriyet) on 11 May 
2006, an armed attack on the council of the state and the murder of a senior judge on 17 
May 2006, the murder of Roman Catholic Priest Andrea Santoro in the city of Trabzon 
on 5 February 2006, the assassination of Armenian journalist Hrant Dink in Istanbul on 
19 January 2007, and the attack of a bible publishing house (the Zirve Publishing) and 
the murder of three evangelical Christians in the city of Malatya on 18 April 2007. 
According to the indictment, the beginning of the Ergenekon investigation and 
detentions prevented the Ergenekon network from carrying out further attacks against 
notorious people such as Patriarch Bartholomew I, 2006 Nobel Literature Laureate 
Orhan Pamuk, liberal Islamic journalist Fehmi Koru, and leading Kurdish politicians 
Ahmet Turk, Osman Baydemir, and Leyla Zana (Eseyan 2013a). 
According to the indictment, there is a close relationship between the Ergenekon 
and the self-declared Turkish Orthodox Patriarchate. Although it does not provide any 
religious services because of the lack of any member with the exception of the members 
of the Erenerol family, the building of the Turkish Orthodox Patriarchate was used as 
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the headquarters of the Ergenekon network. Sevgi Erenerol, spokesperson of the 
Turkish Orthodox Church, was very active against Greeks and Armenians. According to 
an Armenian journalist, she was one of the most recognizable activists assaulting 
Greeks and Armenians (Field Interview, February 23, 2014). She was detained in 2008 
as part of the Ergenekon investigation and sentenced to lifetime imprisonment because 
of her strong connections with the murder of the Evangelical Christians at Zirve 
Publishing. 
Particularly ultranationalist lawyer Kemal Kerincsiz, who was also sentenced to 
a lifetime imprisonment as part of the Ergenekon investigation, was a highly well 
known figure among religious minorities because of his aggressive rhetoric and 
initiatives against them. For example, he had been closely involved in anti-Orthodox 
Patriarchate activities for many years. The Spokesperson of the Patriarchate told me that 
he used to mobilize nationalist people against the Orthodox Patriarchate, organize 
protests in front of the Patriarchal House in Phanar, and block off the roads for days and 
nights to not allow movement from/to the headquarters of the Orthodox Patriarchate 
(Field Interview, November 22, 2013). No one, including the police force of Istanbul 
and the governor, could have intervened in his activities until the beginning of the 
Ergenekon investigation. He disseminated the idea that the Orthodox Patriarchate aimed 
to establish a Vatican style entity in Turkey and that its ecumenical role was a threat to 
Turkey’s national sovereignty. 
Kemal Kerincsiz was also famous for his act of taking many intellectuals (e.g., 
Hrant Dink, Orhan Pamuk, and Elif Safak) who defied dominant narratives about 
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minority issues (e.g., Armenian issues and the status of the Orthodox Patriarchate) to 
court for “insulting Turkishness” under the penal code of article 301. For instance, in 
2005 Orhan Pamuk told the Das Magazin, a Swiss magazine, “on this soil, 30.000 
Kurds and one million Armenian were killed” (New York Times 2005). After this 
declaration, Kemal Kerincsiz took him to court because of the idea of “insulting 
Turkishness” (Tavernise 2008). But more seriously, Pamuk had to leave the country 
because- according to documents revealed by the court- he was on the death list of the 
Ergenekon network. 
The Ergenekon trial has had a serious impact over religious minorities in Turkey 
because the Ergenekon network used religious minorities as a means to put its aim into 
practice in its struggle against the AKP government.  For religious minorities, the 
Ergenekon trial is one of the most crucial developments that can lead to the emergence 
of a hospitable and secure country. When I talked with minority leaders, they said that 
the threats and assaults to their churches and the protests in front of major minority sites 
have declined sharply since the beginning of the Ergenekon investigation. A journalistic 
study provides statistical evidence for this observation. While there were totally 110 
assaults against minority sites (particularly Greek and Armenian churches) from 2004 to 
2007 (37 of them occurred in 2007), the number of assaults recorded by the police was 
11 in 2008, 8 in 2009, and 8 in 2010 (Arslan 2012:78-79). 
 Before visiting minority institutions, particularly the Greek Orthodox and 
Armenian Patriarchates as part of my fieldwork, I was expecting high-level security 
measures, armed guards with metal detectors, checking identity cards, and so on. 
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However, I noticed that they do not have high-level security measures. When I visited 
the headquarters of the Orthodox Patriarchate for the first time, an elderly man was 
standing in the lodge. I explained my situation briefly and told him that I wanted to talk 
with some representatives within the Orthodox Patriarchate. He told me that he would 
call someone to help me and by the time I could visit the principal Greek Orthodox 
cathedral, which have highly important values for Orthodox Christians. On my next 
visit to the Patriarchate, I asked the elderly man how the security measures in the past 
were. He explained that while they had strict security measures in the past, they 
currently have basic security measures such as security cameras. When I asked what 
changed, he told me that those who could attack them were in jail. As a result, security 
is still an important concern for non-Muslims, but they have felt more secure since the 
beginning of the Ergenekon investigation. 
 However, the situation and concern of Jews is different from Greeks and 
Armenians in terms of security. While ultra-nationalism is the source of threat to Greeks 
and Armenians, the threat to Jews comes from extremist Islamic groups. In contrast to 
Greek and Armenian sites, Jewish sites have very strict security measures. Jewish 
communal sites are not open to public. Visitors need to get appointment to visit 
synagogues and other Jewish sites. While entering Jewish sites, visitors need to walk 
through a metal detector. When I asked Jewish leaders when they began to take high 
level security measures, they told me that it started after the attack of a Palestinian 
terrorist to the Neva Shalom synagogue in 1986 because of the conflict between Israel 
and Palestinians. The terrorist opened fire with a machine-gun in the synagogue and 
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killed 22 people. Then, two suicide bombers who were members of Turkish Hizbullah 
attacked to the Neva Shalom synagogue in 1991, but no one died because of high-
security level.  
 However, Turkey faced its 9/11 in 2003. On November 15, 2003, Al-Qaida 
linked Turkish suicide bombers attacked to two synagogues (the Neva Shalom 
synagogue and Beth Israel synagogue) in Istanbul with car bombs. They exposed the 
cars outside the synagogues during a religious service in Sabbath morning. While 24 
people, 6 of whom were Jews, died, more than 300 people were injured. Most of 
victims were non-Jewish Turkish bystanders. Five days later, on November 20, 2013, 
the same group attacked the British Consulate of Istanbul and the headquarters of the 
HSBC Bank with two suicide trucks. Although there were some concerns about the 
presence of some al-Qaida cells in Turkey, religious terrorism is extremely marginal in 
Turkey. While Turkish Islamic movements do not support religious terrorism, radical 
Islamic groups have had serious difficulties in recruiting new members. According to 
Al-Qaida militants, Turkey is a Muslim traitor because it is a secular, a member of the 
NATO, and a close ally of western powers. These attacks, which occurred in the early 
years of the AKP government, became a political and intellectual test of the AKP 
government toward its determination to fight against any kind of terrorism. After these 
attacks, Jews believe that the AKP government became a very sensitive to the 
protection of Turkish Jews. Whenever they organize a communal event, the AKP 
government takes strict security measures in case of a possible terrorist attack. 
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 Being An Armenian in the Post-Kemalist Turkey 
While non-Muslim minorities created their own world that was independent 
from the general concerns of the larger society and lived there for many years as a result 
of the suppression of religious minorities in the Kemalist period, they, particularly 
Armenians, have found a window of opportunity to fight against the material, cultural, 
political dispossession carried out by the state in the changing political spectrum in 
recent years. Turkey has experienced a real “paradigm shift” in terms of discussing 
minority issues, particularly Armenian issues. For example, the Armenian massacre was 
an extremely sensitive issue in Turkey. It was not easy to go beyond Turkish nationalist 
narratives about the events of 1915, to use the term “genocide” in the media, or to make 
a reasonable and free debate about it until recent years. When people talked about it in 
the media or in academia, they could be threatened, assaulted, and persecuted. They 
were generally taken to court because of “insulting Turkishness” under the penal code 
of 301, as we saw in the case of Orhan Pamuk. However, discussing the events of 1915 
has been slowly changing in the last decade even though this “paradigm shift” has not 
taken place in a smooth way. 
In 2005, Boğaziçi (Bosphorus) University, one of the top pubic universities, 
attempted to organize a conference about Armenians in the late period of the Ottoman 
Empire and the events of 1915. It was going to be the first public event in which people 
could freely discuss what happened to Armenians in the early years of the twentieth 
century. Turkish nationalist groups, particularly Kemal Kerincsiz and his crew, 
immediately organized demonstrations and protests against the organization of the 
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conference. Kemal Kerincsiz took the university and the organizers to court because of 
the act of “insulting Turkishness.” An order of an Istanbul court then decided to stop the 
organization of the conference.  
However, the approach of the AKP government was very positive toward the 
organization of the conference. Prime Minister Tayyip Erdoğan and Minister of Foreign 
Relations Abdullah Gül made some public declarations supporting the conference and 
criticized the decision of the court. According to Armenian journalist Markar Eseyan, it 
could not have taken place without the support of Tayyip Erdoğan, Abdullah Gül, and 
Ahmet Davutoglu, the chief consultant to Prime Minister Erdoğan. He explained the 
role of Erdoğan, Gül, and Davutoglu and what happened behind closed doors in his 
Yenisafak column (Eseyan 2013b). After the court order, Davutoglu, as a chief 
consultant, encouraged Erdoğan to support the conference. Erdoğan then wanted 
Davutoglu to meet with the organizers of the conference to encourage them to hold the 
conference in a different institution. Organizers then circumvented the court decision by 
moving the conference to Bilgi University, which is a private university that is known 
for its liberal approaches. For the first time, the events of 1915 were discussed freely in 
2005 by going beyond the official narratives. However, the conference took place under 
vehement protests and demonstrations. A large number of right and left wing 
nationalists waved Turkish flags, hurled eggs and tomatoes at participants, and chanted 
nationalist and threatening slogans such as “this is Turkey: love it or leave it!” and  
“treason will not go unpunished!”  
In order to understand the seriousness of the issue, one needs to examine the 
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assassination of Hrant Dink. Many Turkish intellectuals perceived Hrant Dink as a 
constructive intellectual because he was not only against Turkish nationalism and 
Turkey’s denial of history, but also Armenian nationalists and the Armenian diaspora 
instigating hatred for Turks. Dink founded the weekly newspaper Agos in 1996. Agos 
has been published in both Turkish and Armenian languages in contrast to other 
Armenian newspapers. In a short time, it has become not only a voice of Armenians, but 
also other non-Muslims in Turkish society by defending the rights and history of non-
Muslims. Agos, at the hand of Hrant Dink, turned into a school of thought about how to 
manage repression, how to react to nationalist hate, and how to live together.  
The public presence of Dink in Turkish society made him a symbol of the 
opening up of not only Armenians but also other non-Muslim communities. However, 
this situation made him a target of nationalist groups. For example, Kemal Kerincsiz 
sued him for “insulting Turkishness” because of one of his newspaper articles about the 
Armenian massacre. Indeed, he was found guilty and sentenced to six months prison 
even though the court suspended it. In a short time after the court decision, Dink, 53, 
was assassinated by an ultranationalist 17 year-old boy in broad daylight in front of the 
building of his newspaper, Agos, at the center of Istanbul on January 19, 2007. His 
death made a huge impact on not only Armenians/non-Muslims, but also Turkish 
people. After learning of his assassination, thousands people gathered in front of his 
home and Agos simultaneously and began to say “we are all Hrant Dink, we are all 
Armenians” to show their supports to the Armenian community as a response to 
Turkish nationalism.  More than 100.000 people joined his funeral procession and said 
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the same slogan “we are all Hrant Dink, we are all Armenians.”  
The assassination of Dink led to the increase of sensitivity toward non-Muslims 
within Turkish society. Ten thousands of people have marched on each January 
nineteenth since 2008 on the anniversary of the assassination from the Taksim Square to 
the offices of Agos under the banner of “we are all Hrant Dink and we are all 
Armenians.” At 14:56, participants observe a minute of silence for Dink in front of the 
building of Agos. Then, by tradition, an activist/intellectual gives a brief speech from 
the window of the offices of Agos.  In 2013, the sixth anniversary of Dink’s death, MIT 
Professor Noam Chomsky and Islamic intellectual Hidayet Sefkatli Tuksal addressed 
the crowd. With the exception of nationalist groups, almost all segments of Turkish 
society try to be visible in his memorial to show their support to non-Muslims. 
Mainstream Islamic newspapers, TV stations, and intellectuals encourage their own 
readers to join his memorial. The slogan “we are all Hrant Dink, we are all Armenians” 
is also welcomed by many segments of society, including the AKP leadership (Ince 
2012:163).  
Turkey has experienced a crucial turning point after the assassination of Dink in 
terms of the recognition and reconciliation of minorities. The awareness and 
responsiveness of people to the assassination was a serious sign showing that there are 
powerful masses that can resist the discrimination and prejudices against minorities. On 
the other hand, the slogan “we are all Hrant, we are all Armenians” can be seen as part 
of recent discussions about citizenship, national identity, and Turkishness.  It shows that 
Turkish society is looking for its own identity that can include everyone who lives in 
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Turkey.  
Another development that shows a paradigm shift in terms of minority issues is 
the commemoration of the events of 1915 since 2010 each year on April 24th as the 
Armenian Remembrance Day, which is the day of symbolizing the mass deportations 
and the annihilation of Ottoman Armenians. “The Organization of Dur De” (Say Stop to 
Racism and Nationalism) has organized these meetings. The organizers have been 
planning with state officials, and they believe each year they have gotten a better 
reception. In the first year (2010), a group of Armenians and Turks come together at the 
Taksim Square in Istanbul. They openly used the term “Armenian Genocide,” carried 
roses, and listened to Armenian Music. They gave a public declaration signed by many 
writers, journalists, intellectuals, and activists to the media. The declaration started with 
a sentence “this pain belongs to all of us, a crime against humanity, the devastating act, 
the great guilt.” Although the numbers of participants were 700-800 people in 2010, it 
has been increasing each year. While 2.000 people participated in the commemoration 
in 2011, it was approximately 3.000 in 2012 in Istanbul. In 2014, more than 5.000 
people gathered at the Taksim Square to commemorate the tragic events of 1915. In 
addition to Istanbul, people have begun to commemorate the Armenian Remembrance 
Day in other cities such as Adana, Izmir, Urfa, Malatya, Diyarakir, Dersim since 2011 
(Cengiz 2013). 
 These are highly important developments for Armenians. An Armenian priest 
told me that that “no one could have imagined ten years ago that it is possible to hold a 
meeting about the commemoration of the Armenian massacre in Turkey” (Field 
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Interview, October 9, 2013). He believes that they live in “unbelievable times” because 
people can debate and commemorate it freely, as never before. An Armenian journalist 
from Agos told me as follows: 
We could not use the term genocide in Agos. We could sometimes use it but 
within a quotation mark. Now, we can use and discuss it without any hesitation. 
People can use the term genocide in the media and in print. Many books about 
the genocide written by Armenian and international scholars were translated into 
Turkish in the last decade. Thus, the new generation of Turkish researchers can 
find some alternative sources beyond official narratives. (Field Interview, 
December 27, 2013)  
 
In addition to the emergence of free discussion and commemoration atmosphere, 
the State’s denial strategy of the Armenian massacre has also been gradually changing 
under the rule of the AKP government. In the past, the state propagated that the mass 
killings of Armenians were “Armenian lies” or “Armenian allegations.” However, in 
recent years, Islamic politicians made some important statements admitting the mass 
killings of Armenians. When I asked an Armenian journalist about the approach of the 
state to the events of 1915 in the December of 2013, he explained as follows:  
People learnt that the Armenian genocide had never taken place in history for 
many years. In contrast, they learned that Armenians killed Turks. This is still a 
very strong perception. National perceptions cannot change in a decade; 
therefore, I do not expect from the state to admit the genocide. No Turkish 
politicians want to be recorded in history as a politician who acknowledges the 
Armenian genocide at this point. For us, the crucial thing at this point is to be 
able to discuss the matter freely and openly in public. I believe the approach of 
the state is going to change one day because of the change of the mindset of 
people over time. It has already started. (Field Interview, December 27, 2013) 
 
A few months later, on April 23, 2014, the eve of the 99th anniversary of the 
exile of Armenians, Prime Minister Erdoğan issued a long written statement regarding 
the Armenian issue and offered his condolences over the mass killings of Armenians.  
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He became the first political leader offering his condolences to Armenians. His 
statement was published on the Prime Minister’s website in nine languages, including 
west and east Armenian languages. This shows that it was not a result of a rushed 
decision, but the result of a long thinking and editorial process. In the statement, 
Erdoğan briefly says: 
The 24th of April carries a particular significance for our Armenian citizens and 
for all Armenians around the world, and provides a valuable opportunity to 
share opinions freely on a historical matter…Expressing different opinions and 
thoughts freely on the events of 1915 is the requirement of a pluralistic 
perspective as well as of a culture of democracy and modernity…It is 
indisputable that the last years of the Ottoman Empire were a difficult period, 
full of suffering for Turkish, Kurdish, Arab, Armenian and millions of other 
Ottoman citizens, regardless of their religion or ethnic origin…Any 
conscientious, fair and humanistic approach to these issues requires an 
understanding of all the sufferings endured in this period, without discriminating 
as to religion or ethnicity… It is a duty of humanity to acknowledge that 
Armenians remember the suffering experienced in that period, just like every 
other citizen of the Ottoman Empire. It is with this hope and belief that we wish 
the Armenians who lost their lives in the context of the early 20th century rest in 
peace, and we convey our condolences to their grandchildren. (The Prime 
Ministry of the Republic of Turkey) 
 
Prime Minister Erdoğan’s statement shows that there is a clear departure from 
the previous approach of the state to the events of 1915. For Armenians, Erdoğan’s 
statement is the recognition of both the mass killings of Armenians in the early period 
of twentieth century and the acceptance of April 24th as the commemoration of the 
events as the “Armenian Remembrance Day” in the country. The Armenian patriarchate 
and many Armenian intellectuals welcomed the message. Patriarch Aramyan visited 
Prime Minister Erdoğan and thanked him for the statement. He believes that this 
statement shows “the dawn of a new era” (Daily Sabah 2014). 
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Although Islamic elites admit the mass killings of Armenians, they refrain from 
using the term “genocide” because in their mind, the term “genocide” is almost identical 
with the Holocaust. For them, the events of 1915 were very different from the 
Holocaust. In this context, a statement of Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu is highly 
important in order to understand the mindset of Islamic elites: 
I am not saying that nothing happened in 1915, but I wouldn’t classify the 
incident as genocide, and I believe the usage of this term is a personal 
preference. We need to develop new language regarding this issue. We do not 
deny their pain. On the contrary, we understand it. Let's try to sort it out together 
but not with a one-sided charge sheet against Turkey… We are not like the 
Germans. Our history does not have a record of ethnic cleansing or 
ghettoization. [Before 1915] there had been losses, concerns and worries about 
the Muslims in the Balkans and Caucasus, as well. These incidents led to 
paranoia on the Turkish side. The Turks were terrified with the idea that they 
would be forced to move out of Anatolia. However, this psychology cannot be 
likened to that of the Nazis. You cannot represent the Turks as a murderous race. 
We cannot accept a one-sided charge change from a denial is an official 
approach to acceptance sheet against Turkey. (Taspinar 2012)  
 Being A Greek Orthodox Christian in the Post-Kemalist Turkey 
 Although the number of Greek Orthodox Christians in Turkey is a few thousand, 
the existence of the Orthodox Patriarchate in Istanbul has increased the importance of 
Greek Orthodox minorities in the country. The AKP government and the Orthodox 
Patriarchate developed good and positive relations in the last decade. By way of 
illustration, in an interview with Atlas Tarih, bi-monthly popular history magazine, in 
its October-November issue of 2011 Father Dositheos, the spokesperson of the 
Orthodox Patriarchate, said “God sent Muslim Erdoğan to us” in order to point out the 
positive relationship between the AKP government and the Orthodox Patriarchate and 
recent changes under the AKP government (Tezcakar 2011). 
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 As I examined in the previous chapters, whether the Orthodox Patriarchate is 
ecumenical is a highly critical discussion in modern Turkey. While the state approach 
by and large was to see it as a national church providing religious services to Greek 
Orthodox Christians in Turkey, the mindset of state elites has been changing toward the 
status of the Orthodox Patriarchate de facto under the rule of the AKP government even 
if there is not any legal progress toward the recognition of its international role. In 
contrast to previous governments, the AKP leaders do not strictly refuse the use of the 
title “Ecumenical.” For example, when Prime Minister Erdoğan was asked whether the 
Patriarch is ecumenical or local in January 2008, he said that the state should not 
interfere with these kinds of issues (Today's Zaman 2008). During my interview with 
Father Dositheos, the spokesperson of the Orthodox Patriarchate, he explained the 
approach of the AKP government to the status of the Orthodox Patriarchate as follows:  
The Orthodox Patriarchate has had a profound and incalculable spiritual and 
cultural influence in many regions of the world. The Patriarch has been invited 
to many international meetings, particularly in European Union Countries. In the 
past, when the Patriarch’s title of Ecumenical was used in an international 
meeting, Turkish politicians and diplomats that were in attendants would 
abandon the meeting immediately to show that they did not accept his title of 
Ecumenical. However, the current government does not use the title of 
Ecumenical officially, but politicians and diplomats no longer leave any 
meetings and even use it in their talks. (Field Interview, November 22, 2013) 
 
In December of 2013, the prestigious Boğaziçi University granted honorary 
doctorate to Patriarch Bartholomew I because of his efforts on environmental issues. 
Although Patriarch Bartholomew I received honorary doctorates from many universities 
all over the world, this was the first honorary doctorate granted to him from a Turkish 
university. The University used his title “Ecumenical” in the invitation letter for guests, 
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and Patriarch Bartholomew I was announced as the Ecumenical Patriarch at the 
commencement ceremony. Patriarch Bartholomew I thanked the president of Boğaziçi 
University for the use of the title Ecumenical in his speech. In contrast to previous 
governments, the Turkish government did not intervene in the process. More 
importantly, there were not any protests and demonstrations against the ceremony 
although Turkish nationalists protested the use of the title “Ecumenical” in each 
occasion in the past. A Greek publisher who voluntarily works for the Patriarchate told 
me as follows: 
It was not possible to imagine for the Orthodox community to not only receive 
an honorary doctorate from a Turkish university, but also the use of the title of 
Ecumenical by a public university. In the past, a university president could not 
have used the title Ecumenical publicly. He/She was either forced to resign or 
dismissed from his position by the Higher Education Council. Probably the 
president of Boğaziçi University believed that it would no longer be a problem 
in Turkey. In order to understand the importance of this development, it is useful 
to take into consideration that the Patriarch expressed his appreciation to the 
university president in the ceremony for acknowledging the ecumenical role of 
the church. (Field Interview, January 6, 2014) 
 
Whether the Patriarchate is ecumenical or not is not only a symbolic issue, but 
also has some fatal consequences for the survival of the Orthodox Patriarchate in 
Istanbul. Indeed, the recognition of the Orthodox Patriarchate as a national church was a 
strategic move of the Turkish state in the 1920s to be able to take the control of and to 
interfere with the Orthodox Patriarchate. For example, the Turkish state imposed that 
the Patriarch could only be a Turkish citizen and be elected only by clergymen who 
have Turkish citizenship. In the early years of the Republic, each election of Patriarchs 
was a serious concern for the state elites; therefore, the Turkish state was involved in 
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almost all elections until the election of Bartholomew I and rejected some bishops as 
candidates for the Patriarchate. However, President Turgut Özal did not want to get 
involved in the election process of Bartholomew I in 1991. 
On the other hand, there are serious concerns among Orthodox Christians about 
the future of the Orthodox Patriarchate because of the decline of the population of 
Greek Christians who live in Turkey and the difficulties in the election of the next 
Patriarch among a small number of Turkish citizen bishops for the throne of the 
Ecumenical Patriarchate, the Archbishop of Constantinople-New Rome, which is 
considered the second most important authority in the Christian world. Indeed, the 
concern of Patriarch Bartholomew I about the future of the Patriarchate can be seen in 
his speeches. For example, in his interview with CNN International’s “World’s Untold 
Stories” on August 27, 2010, he says:  
We are not all in despair for the future of our church… It is not easy, but it is not 
impossible…We trust a divine providence, and the guarantee given to us by our 
Lord himself, that the church can survive… This is our faith, this is our 
conviction, this is our hope, this is our prayer. And all the rest we leave at the 
hands of God. (Wunner 2010)  
 
 The representatives of the Patriarchate talked to the AKP leaders about their 
concerns about the future of the Patriarchate. As a temporary solution to the problem, 
the Erdoğan government has granted Turkish citizenship to 18 orthodox archbishops. 
Thus, after granting of citizenship to bishops, the Orthodox Synod of Metropolitan 
Bishops continues to survive and will be able to choose the next Patriarch. If the attitude 
of the Turkish state had not changed, the Orthodox Patriarchate would probably have 
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moved to another place, and Bartholomew I, the 270th holder of the title, could be the 
last Patriarch of Constantinople-New Rome. When I asked Father Dositheos what the 
most important change is for Orthodox Greeks, his answer was the granting of 
citizenship to synod members (Field Interview, November 29, 2013). I believe it clearly 
reveals why he said “God sent Muslim Erdoğan to us” in his interview with Atlas Tarih. 
On the other hand, this has been seen as an important step toward the recognition of the 
ecumenical role of the Patriarchate because the Turkish state recognizes its ecumenical 
role de facto by granting citizenship to archbishops. 
Despite some positive developments in recent years, the Holy Theological 
School of Halki (the Halki Seminary) has continued to be closed by the AKP 
government even if the opening of the Halki seminary has been a popular topic since 
the beginning of the AKP government. The Halki seminary was established in 1844 at 
the top of a hill on the Island of Heybeliada, an hour from Istanbul with ferry, in the sea 
of Marmara in order to train new clergymen for the needs of the Orthodox Patriarchate. 
The Halki seminary was the main theological school of the Orthodox Patriarchate until 
the Turkish state closed down in 1971 as a result of the closure of all private higher 
educational institutions, including the Armenian School of Theology, in the shadow of 
the military coup of 1971. Although the law targeting private higher educational 
institutions has abolished, the Halki Seminary and the Armenian School of Theology 
are still closed. However, The Halki is a vital institution for the survival of the 
Orthodox Patriarchate and its ecumenical role in the Orthodox world. The Orthodox 
Patriarchate wants to manage its own educational institutions to train its own clergy, to 
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accept students from all over the world, and to send graduates to other countries to 
provide religious services.  
Although many prominent members of the AKP, including President Gül, Prime 
Minister Erdoğan, Deputy Prime Minister Arinc, made some positive statements about 
the reopening of the Halki Seminary, there has not been any concrete steps in the last 
decade. When I asked Father Dositheos why it is still closed, he told me that although 
the Erdoğan government was very helpful for them, they could not understand the 
reason until recent times. They assumed that it was related to the Ergenekon network 
until recent years and that Ergenekon’s connections within the state were still effective 
in shaping state policies and produced a serious obstacle to reopen it. After the 
elimination of the Ergenekon network, they had a strong expectation for the reopening 
of the school in 2013 (Field Interview, November 29, 2013). But, they have faced 
another problem. The Erdoğan administration wants to use the Halki seminary as a 
means for the improvement of the situation of Muslim minorities in Greece even though 
the Orthodox Patriarchate is not responsible for minority problems in Greece. In 
contrast, the Orthodox Patriarchate supports minority rights in Greece and condemns 
Greek authorities.   
Recently, the AKP politicians have openly declared that the Halki Seminary will 
not be opened until the opening of a mosque for Muslims in Athens, which is the only 
European capital without a mosque, and the election of the head Mufti (the religious 
leader of Muslim minority) in the western Thrace by Muslims themselves. In his speech 
during the AKP’s group meeting in the parliament on October 8, 2013, Prime Minister 
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Erdoğan said : 
This [the opening of the Halki seminary] is an instant [decision] for us, but when 
we decide to return something, we also have a right to expect something as 
well… Currently, we have two mosques in Athens… The heritage of the 
Ottomans… One of them is the Fethiye Mosque, which was demolished. We 
asked them [Greek Authorities] to let us rebuild it… On the other hand, there is 
no mosque providing religious service for Muslims in Athens. We have been 
talking this issue for ten years with Greek authorities. They have made many 
promises. But, we are wasting our time... The Patriarchate has an orphanage 
home in Buyukada. It is a magnificent place. We returned it to the 
Patriarchate… According to the Lausanne Treaty, all synod members should be 
Turkish citizens, like Bartholomew. I told Mr. Bartholomew, ‘you bring your 
own bishops; we grant them to Turkish citizenship. Thus you can gather 
together your synod members in accordance with the Treaty.’  We have granted 
17 bishops citizenship until now. But, there are my brothers in western Thrace. 
They cannot choose their own Muftis. Greek authorities appoint Muslim muftis. 
Did I appoint Bartholomew? As I do not appoint the patriarchs, they cannot 
appoint the muftis. My Muslim brothers should elect their own religious 
leaders… Although we make many reforms, everyone gets stuck in the Halki 
seminary…This problem can be solved immediately, but they [Greek 
authorizes] need to admit our demands. We can decide at the same time the 
reopening of the Halki seminary, the Fethiye mosque, and the election of the 
muftis by Muslims. (The Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi (AK Party)) (Wunner 
2010)  
 
The case of Halki seminary is one of the best ways of the illustration of the 
triadic relationship between national minorities, nationalizing states, and external 
national homeland in Eastern Europe. Turkey as the external national homeland of 
Muslim Turks in Greece tries to protect the rights and interests of Muslims in another 
nationalizing state, which is Greece, by using its ethnonational affinity, Greek 
minorities in Turkey. 
While the shared point between the Kemalist elites and Islamic elites is that Greeks who 
live in Turkey are “foreigners” or part of Greece, the difference between Kemalist 
Turkey and post-Kemalist Turkey is the shift of attention from ethnic affinity to 
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religious affinity. While the Kemalist elites tried to protect their ethnic brothers in 
Greece, the Islamic elites try to protect their “Muslim brothers” and their religious 
needs in Greece. On the other hand, those who need a mosque in Athens are mostly 
non-Turkish Muslims because Turkish Muslims in Greece by and large live in western 
Thrace. Thus, Erdoğan’s demand for mosque is not for Turkish Muslims, but non-
Turkish Muslims who live in Athens. Moreover, Erdoğan’s initiatives for the restoration 
of the Fethiye mosque also show the sensitivity of the Islamic elites toward Ottoman 
heritage in the Balkans.  
 Being a Jew in the Post-Kemalist Turkey 
 In addition to the lack of an equal treatment, which is the shared concern of 
religion minorities, anti-Semitism is a major concern for Jews in Turkey.  Although the 
AKP government started with a new hope for Jews because of the AKP leaders’ strong 
condemnation of anti-Semitism, the AKP government’s strong affinity with Palestinians 
has affected negatively the Jewish life in Turkey. Jews believe that anti-Semitism has 
increased in Turkey because of Islamic revival. Particularly, whenever Israel begins a 
new operation in Palestinian, Turkish Jews are felt guilty and responsible for Israel’s 
operations against Palestinians. 
 In the early years of the AKP government, Islamic politicians, particularly Prime 
Minister Erdoğan, kept condemning anti-Semitism. After receiving an award from the 
Anti-Defamation League in 2005 because of the “recognition of the heroic rescues of 
Jews by members of the Turkish Diplomatic Corps during World War II,” in his speech 
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at the ceremony, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan explained his views about anti-
Semitism as follows: 
Anti-Semitism is a shameful mental illness; it is a perversion. The Jewish 
genocide is the heaviest crime against humanity throughout history. Genocide, 
discrimination, Islamophobia, Christianophobia, ethnic cleansing are all 
different forms of the same illness… It is the task of leaders around the world to 
join me in condemning the spread of hatred, whether through publications or 
otherwise. Our consistent policy towards anti-Semitic diatribes can be nothing 
short of zero tolerance. (Lagendijk 2014, The Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi (AK 
Party))  
 
 Although the AKP government eagerly tried to develop good and considerable 
relations with the state of Israel in its early years (Fuller 2008), the relations seriously 
damaged because of the Palestinian issue after the discussion between Turkish Prime 
Minister Erdoğan and Israel President Peres at the 2009 Davos meeting and the death of 
9 Turkish activists by Israeli soldiers on the Mavi Marmara flotilla which carried 
humanitarian aid to Palestinians on the international water (May 10, 2010). Prime 
Minister Erdoğan has been a very critical of Israel since then. For example, he 
frequently represents Israel’s operations in Gaza as “state terrorism” and suggests that 
the state of Israel “surpassed Hitler in barbarism.” 
 Islamic politicians generally emphasize their opposition to the operations of 
Israel against Palestinians rather than to Jews as an ethno-religious category; therefore, 
they differentiate anti-Semitism from anti-Zionism. Although meaning of Zionism 
varies from society to society, it primarily refers to the establishment of a secure Jewish 
homeland/state. Turkish Islamic politicians by and large do not question the legitimacy 
of Israel as an independent state; however, they suggest that Zionism is the same as 
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anti-Semitism. They believe that while anti-Semitism is a form of an ethno-religious 
prejudice against Jews, Zionism produces hostility and discrimination against Muslims, 
particularly Palestinians. Furthermore, for Islamic politicians, Zionism is the source of 
the ethno-religious cleansing of Palestinians in the region.  Therefore, while Islamic 
politicians are fervently anti-Zionist, they see anti-Semitism as a crime against 
humanity.  
 However, although Islamic politicians repeatedly condemn anti-Semitism, the 
distinction between anti-Semitic discourse and anti-Zionist discourse is not clear in their 
speeches and activities. For example, the terms “Jews” and “Zionists” are frequently 
used in an interchangeable way in their talks. On the other hand, there are not aware that 
their strong anti-Zionist discourse not only keeps alive anti-Semitism in Turkey, 
particularly in Islamic circles, but also aids the expansion of anti-Semitism in Turkish 
society.  Especially, at the social level, ordinary people cannot differentiate anti-
Zionism and anti-Semitism; thus, anti-Zionist or pro-Palestinian discourse immediately 
turns into anti-Semitic discourse affecting Turkish Jews negatively. This is highly 
visible not only on the Islamic media, but also ultranationalist media outlets.  
 While Prime Minister Erdoğan was asked about the increase of anti-Semitism in 
Turkey in a television interview during the Israel operations in the July/August 2014, he 
told:  “I don't approve of any attitude against Jews in Turkey, they are our citizens and 
they are under our guarantee.” Recently, after becoming president, he said at the 
Council on Foreign Relations (2014):  
The Palestinian issue is an important issue that has an impact not just on the 
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Palestinians, but on all the Muslims and everyone who has a conscience in the 
world. And in fact, the Palestinian issue lies in the heart of many of the issues in 
the region. And the Israeli government, although they know this sensitivity very 
well, have not refrained from putting its own people and the people of the region 
in fire. What I'd like to say here is that I make a distinction here between the 
people of Israel and the administration, the government in Israel. And I 
underline this point in order to be better understood, because with respect to the 
steps taken in the region, there have been various comments made about Turkey 
and about myself. And that is that I am very sad to see that my country, myself, 
and my colleagues, sometimes, are labeled as being anti-Semitic. But Turkey, in 
no part of its history, has ever been racist. It has never been anti-Semitic in any 
time in its history. Maybe I am one of the first prime ministers in the world to 
have said that anti-Semitism is a crime against humanity. And because Turkey, 
its people and its state, have always stood with the oppressed. When the Jews 
were under pressure or oppressed, Turkey extended a helping hand to them. 
When Jews were expelled from Spain in the 15th century, they sought refuge in 
Ottoman territory, and they lived peacefully there for centuries. In the same 
way, our country embraced the Jews were fleeing Hitler's persecution. There are 
times when I personally am labeled as an anti-Semitic person. Criticizing Israel's 
massacres that defy international law, trample on human rights and life is not 
anti-Semitism. Holding a state that massacres 10 people by stopping an 
international ship taking aid to Gaza isn't anti-Semitism. 
And it isn't anti-Semitism to criticize an administration that massacres, kills 
babies, children, innocent babies, children, in their homes, mosques, hospitals, 
schools, beaches, parks, without any discrimination. Our criticism is not directed 
to the Jews. It is only and solely directed at the Israeli administration and its 
policies, and no one should distort this. There is a distinction here. Whenever we 
criticize the massacring of innocent women in Palestine, some circles engage in 
a campaign to distort the perceptions about Turkey. Whenever we criticize the 
killing of innocent children, babies, in the Middle East, some media 
organizations target us. But these smear campaigns, these attempts to distort 
perception about us, will not take us away from the path which we believe to be 
true. And I ask you please to not listen to such distortion because we have to live 
together in the world, which is focused on people, not on interests. So, do not 
listen to this black propaganda, and do not give premium to such propaganda, 
because we would like to see peace prevail between Israel and Palestine, just 
like we would like to see peace prevail on issues, other issues in the region. And 
we're pursuing constructive policy in this effort.  
 
 Although Erdoğan frequently says that they are against the operations of the 
state of Israel and that it is their historical responsibility to defend Palestinians, Jews in 
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Turkey have deeply worried about the increase of anti-Semitic discourse in Turkey. 
While I was talking with a Turkish Jew about the impact of the anti-Zionist discourse of 
Islamic politicians, she explained as follows:  
“We know Islamic politicians do not target us or any ordinary Jews. In contrast, 
we have very good relations and they are very helpful for us. Whatever we want, 
they want to help us. They say “you are different, you are our Jews.”   However, 
the line between anti-Zionism and anti-Semitism is very thin. They are not very 
careful while they are talking about Israel and Zionism. They frequently use the 
term “the Jews.” We explained our concerns to them. Some leading politicians 
of the government are very careful. They began to use the state of Israel, instead 
of the term “the Jews” after we talked. But there are many politicians, and many 
of them are not very careful. On televisions, we frequently hear Jews, Jews, 
Jews…” 
“In the daily life we see some people who wear t-shirts with Hitler pictures in 
front of our synagogues. We see quotations from Hitler on Twitter and 
Facebook.  We frequently hear some people saying “Hitler was right.” This 
situation makes us very uncomfortable. Particularly after the Mavi Marmara 
incident, many Jews thought that it was time to move to another country. We are 
treated as the defenders of the state of Israel. We feel that we have to condemn 
the state of Israel for own security. Do we have to?” 
“The government is very careful about the protection of Turkish Jews. They do 
not have any problem with us. In contrast, they have a very strong sense of 
responsibility to protect us. If extremists attack to our synagogues, or us, 
everyone is going to say that Islamists kill Jews in Turkey. They do not want 
this kind of thing. When we organize an event such as wedding or funeral, the 
government sends many police in order to protect us from any possible attack. 
Can you see the dilemma? While they promote hostility toward Jews though 
rigid anti-Zionist discourse, they send hundred polices in order to protect us 
from those who are under the impact of anti-Zionist discourse.” (Field 
Interview, January 3, 2014) 
 
 Turkish Jews expect “zero tolerance” to anti-Semitism from the government. 
Therefore, they demand legal restrictions against anti-Semitism. However, they are also 
aware that anti-Zionism is central to the discourse of Islamic politicians in Turkey 
because Islamic politicians believe that it is a historical responsibility/duty to safeguard 
the Palestinians for them. In this context, neo-Ottomanism is a double-edged sword. 
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While the AKP leaders feel that they need to protect Turkey’s Jews from any threat, 
they perceive themselves as the guard of the Palestinians. Although the AKP 
government is eager to develop very close and positive relations with Turkish Jews at 
the political level, the rigid anti-Zionist discourse of Islamic politicians affect the 
Jewish life negatively in Turkey at the social, cultural, and economic level. 
 Improvements in the Property Rights of Minority Foundations 
One of the most controversial and harsh behavior of the state toward non-
Muslim minorities in the Kemalist period was the property right of their foundations 
(waqfs) in Turkey. Although I examined the impact of the state on minority foundations 
in the previous chapters, I need to give a brief background here in order to understand 
what changed in the post-Kemalist period. In 1936, the state wanted non-Muslim 
minorities to declare all their movable and immovable properties of their community 
foundations. Until 1974, the minority foundations were allowed to accept donations, to 
sell their properties, and to buy new properties. In 1974, Turkey’s Court of Cassation, in 
the atmosphere of 1971 military coup, declared that all acquisitions of minority 
foundations after 1936 were gained illegally because “foreigners” could not gain any 
asset in Turkey even though they were citizens. Then, all properties of minority 
foundations and institutions that were gained 1936 were transferred to their donors. 
When donors could not be found all properties were transferred to the Treasury of the 
Republic of Turkey. However, it was not possible to find many donors of the properties 
of minority foundations because a large number of non-Muslim people donated their 
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properties to their communal foundations and institutions when leaving the country. 
Therefore, minority foundations and institutions lost their many properties.  
The Protection and promotion of cultural and religious identity also depended on 
their own foundations because foundations were the main element of communal 
activities. Non-Muslim minorities operate all kinds of communal activities through their 
own foundations. The confiscation process in the 1960s and 1970s decreased sharply 
their financial resources and curbed their communal activities because the properties of 
minority foundations were the primary source of income, particularly their rental 
income. Without enough financial resources, it was very difficult to continue cultural, 
religious, educational activities because all communal facilities such as churches, 
schools and hospitals have been under the system of waqfs.  
 Under the rule of the AKP government, there is a gradual improvement of the 
property rights of minority foundations. In 2003, the AKP amended the law of 
foundations. While non-Muslim foundations were also allowed to acquire new 
immovable properties with the permission of the General Directorate of Foundations  
(GDF), the decisions of the GDF were open to be taken to court. Thus, minority 
foundations were able to apply courts to demand their properties that were confiscated 
by the DGF in the 1960s and 1970s. However, courts generally rejected the applications 
of minority foundations. In 2006, non-Muslim minority foundations were granted the 
ability to buy new properties and sell their own properties without getting permission. 
The AKP government also passed a new law that returns all properties that was 
confiscated by the state to minority foundations. However, President Ahmet Necdet 
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Sezer, a former head of Turkey’s Supreme Court, vetoed it. More importantly, President 
Sezer defended the court decision of 1974 and argued that it is a threat to national 
interest and security to make changes in favor of “foreigners.” Actually, the argument 
of President Ahmet Necdet Sezer was a powerful indicator suggesting that Turkey’s 
Kemalists, including high-level judges, still have a strong alive phobia toward 
minorities. 
After the election of Abdullah Gül as president, the AKP passed the law about 
the confiscated properties of minority foundations in 2011 and legalized the return of all 
properties confiscated by the state since 1936 in order to totally solve this problem. If 
some properties are not available due to some reasons (i.e., demolished, or transferred 
to third party groups), minority foundations are paid the market value of the property by 
the state. As part of the new law of foundations, minority foundations are also 
represented in the assembly of the General Directorate of Foundations. Minority 
foundations elected Mr. Lakis Vingas as a representative of non-Muslim foundations in 
the council of the General Assembly of the GDF. 
In Turkey, there are currently 161 minority foundations. While 120 of them (70 
Greek Orthodox foundations, 50 Armenian foundations, and 20 Jewish foundations) 
belong to recognized minorities, the rest of them belong to other non-Muslim minorities 
such as Assyrians, Chaldeans, and Bulgarian Orthodox. These foundations are applied 
to the DGF to repossess the properties that confiscated by the state. Then the GDF 
reviews all applications in its own general assembly twice in a month.  
 The GDF has continued to review the applications, but until now, many 
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properties (e.g., schools, churches, cemeteries, factories, hundred of buildings and 
apartments) have been returned to minority foundations. For example, 157 houses, 21 
apartment complexes, one factory, three cemeteries and three nightclubs were returned 
to the Balikli Greek Hospital Foundation. Armenian foundations received some 
important properties such as the historic Surp Haç Tıbrevank High School in the 
Üsküdar district and the Selamet Han in Eminönü, which belongs to the Yedikule Surp 
Pırgiç Hospital Foundation in Zeytinburnu.  
 Concluding Remarks 
 In this chapter, I examined recent changes affecting religious minorities under 
the rule of the AKP and showed the approach of the state to religious minorities in the 
post-Kemalist Turkey. Turkey has experienced a radical transformation in terms of state 
policies toward non-Muslim minorities in the last decade. The AKP government carried 
out many reforms to solve their problems that they faced in the previous terms. These 
reforms abolished many restrictions imposed on minorities such as their property rights, 
association freedom, religious and institutional freedoms, and the abolishment of 
committees keeping minorities under surveillance. On the other hand, some violations 
of the basic rights of religious minorities (e.g., the Halki seminary) produced in the 
Kemalist period still continue to affect religious minorities because of the impact of the 
legacy of the Kemalist period and the nationhood imagination of the Islamic politicians. 
Even if there are still some problems, the AKP reforms demonstrate a radical shift in 
state policies toward religious minorities. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 In this dissertation, I have examined state policies toward non-Muslim 
minorities in Turkey within the theoretical framework of religious freedom and have 
shown that state policies toward religious minorities in modern nation-state polities 
cannot be understood without taking into account the practical uses of the category of 
the nation. In particular, depending on the distinction between the Kemalist period 
(1920-2002) and post-Kemalist period (2002-Present), I have examined the impact of 
the nationhood imaginations of the Kemalist and Islamic elites on state policies and 
have demonstrated that state policies shaped under the rule of the Islamicly-oriented AK 
Party government in the post-Kemalist period is more inclusive than those under the 
influence of the secularist Kemalist elites in the Kemalist period. 
 The Ottoman millet system by and large produced a pre-modern form of 
religious pluralism until the rise of nationalism in the nineteenth century although non-
Muslim minorities were second-class subjects to Muslims. After the collapse of the 
Ottoman Empire, Mustafa Kemal and his entourage established the Republic of Turkey 
as a “nationalizing state” in the 1920s, as a reaction to both other Eastern European 
“nationalizing states” seeking ethnic, linguistic, and religious homogeneity and the 
multicultural heritage of the Ottoman Empire. The traumatic impact of secessionist 
movements on the multicultural Ottoman Empire and the western interference in 
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minority issues in the late period of the Ottoman Empire led to the development of a 
strong sense of internal and external enemies. Therefore, for the founding fathers of 
modern Turkey, Turkey’s multiethnic structure was a potential threat to the unity and 
future of the new Republic. They endeavored to construct a homogenous nation through 
the exclusion, marginalization, assimilation, and isolation of those who were not 
constructed as parts of the Turkish nation, in particular non-Muslim minorities. 
 Although non-Muslim minorities had specific rights and entitlements de jure, 
the hostile attitudes of the state under the rule of the Kemalist elites led to constant 
surveillance of non-Muslims.  The state openly discriminated against religious 
minorities through extra taxes, the abolishment of property rights, restrictions on 
education rights, language restrictions, religious restrictions, and so on. The Kemalist 
nationalism also permeated Turkish society through state apparatus and became national 
“habitus.” Therefore, Turkish nationalists sometimes mobilized ordinary man and 
women against religious minorities through nationalist acts of retaliation, humiliation, 
and hate campaigns. As a result, non-Muslim minorities as “unwanted citizens” or 
“local foreigners with Turkish citizenship” did not feel secure and at home. 
 Although the Kemalist elites aimed to weaken the role of Islam in the public 
space and to limit Islamic identity in the private space through strict secularization 
policies, Islamic identity moved from the private space to the public space and has 
become highly active in cultural, economic, political, and social fields for the past a few 
decades.  The increasing impact of the Islamic movements on Turkish society, politics, 
and the economy, particularly taking the control of state power by the Islamicly-
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oriented AK Party in 2002, changed power dynamics in Turkey, and led to the 
emergence of the post-Kemalist Turkey. 
 Islamic elites have constructed an alternative nationhood imagination based on 
the narratives of the glorified Ottoman past as a reaction to the Kemalist nationalism 
that denigrated the Ottoman past and its Islamic side since the early years of the new 
Republic. The Islamic nationhood imagination can be seen in almost every sphere of 
nation-oriented practices such as alternative commemorations based on the Ottomans, 
an alternative sense of a shared past that links the Ottomans to the present, and an 
alternative discourse on Turkishness embedded in the debates on Turkish national 
identity. However, the Islamic elites also had similar perceptions about religious 
minorities as the Kemalist elites had and accused religious minorities of collaborating 
with western powers and of being responsible for the collapse the Ottoman Empire. 
Therefore, the Islamic nationhood imagination was an exclusionary project toward 
religious minorities, and Islamic movements were not inclined to develop a better 
relationship with religious minorities until the integration of the Islamic movements into 
the globalized world.  
 Turkey’s integration into the globalization process, particularly the integration 
of conservative circles to the globalized world since the 1980s, had a transformative 
impact on the Islamic nationhood imagination and shifted it from an exclusionary 
project to an inclusive one consuming the narratives of Ottoman multiculturalism and 
tolerance. Islamic elites have reproduced, reinterpreted, and reconstructed the Ottoman 
past in the construction of the Islamic nationhood imagination and have begun to 
  203 
essentialize the Turkish nation with multiculturalism, tolerance, and dialogue in the 
form of nostalgia for the Ottomans in a defensive manner as a response to the global 
discourse that essentializes Islam with fanaticism and fundamentalism. Ottoman 
multiculturalism and tolerance thus have become a favorite narrative that Islamic elites 
have frequently utilized to prove that Muslims were/are open to multiculturalism and 
pluralism under the impact of the globalization process that poses serious legitimacy 
concerns about the place and role of Islamic movements. Islamic elites that perceive 
that modern ideals (e.g., multiculturalism, pluralism, human rights) are key sources to 
their legitimacy in the globalized world have embraced the secular discourse of 
multiculturalism and pluralism through the localization/legitimization of modern ideals 
with their own tradition in a defensive manner and produced an inclusive Islamic 
national identity/polity, that is the emergence of what I call “defensive inclusion.” 
 Although the state has favored Islam and Islamic movements in many fields, 
Turkey has experienced a radical shift in state policies toward religious minorities in the 
post-Kemalist period. The AKP government not only has developed a positive 
relationship with religious minorities since its foundation in 2002, but it has also 
ameliorated the social, cultural, religious, and economic rights of religious minorities 
although Turkey’s minority politics is still far from conforming to 
democratic/egalitarian norms. Religious minorities have enjoyed greater freedom and 
opportunities than they have ever experienced in Turkey. However, the Islamic 
nationhood imagination does not perceive non-Muslim minorities as part of the Turkish 
nation, but those who have lived with Turks for long centuries under the rule of Turkish 
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hospitality- with the exception of the Kemalist years. I conceptualize this situation as 
the emergence of neo-millet system. That is, the Islamic understanding of nationhood 
that imagines Turkey as a Muslim country tolerating (or permitting) non-Muslim 
minorities to live in Turkey in accordance with their own beliefs reproduces the second-
class status of non-Muslim minorities de facto even if the relationship between religious 
minorities and the state operates in the form of modern institutions de jure.  
 These empirical findings have theoretical contributions to relevant sociological 
inquiries. Primarily, this dissertation has challenged existing dominant theoretical 
approaches including the Civilizational Approach, Modernization Theory, Assertive vs. 
Passive Secularism, and Rational Choice Theory that try to explain the origin of 
religious freedom and revealed their weaknesses to explain the Turkish case. After 
examining dominant theories explaining the origin of religious freedom, I have reached 
the conclusion that the modernization process, the consciously chosen ideological 
positions of politicians on secularism, the existence of a pluralistic religious market, and 
the instrumental calculations of self-interested political elites are not able to explain the 
origin of religious freedom successfully.  
 Turkey is not only a challenging case to these theories, but also provides a 
useful insight to explain the origin of religious freedom. I have accounted for the origin 
of religious freedom by focusing on the practice of the nation, the competing 
nationhood imaginations, and the impact of nationhood imaginations on state policies 
toward the place and status of religious minorities. Although the empirical evidence of 
this project derives from the Turkish experience, I believe that this approach is 
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applicable to other cases (e.g., different approaches to Muslim minorities in France, the 
US, Britain, and Germany) and helps us understand the dynamics of inclusion/exclusion 
of religious minorities in modern nation-state polities. All in all, different approaches to 
religion and religious minorities in modern nation-state polities cannot be understood 
without taking into account the practical uses of the nation. 
 This dissertation has also made a contribution to the ongoing debate on the 
relationship between globalization and identity politics. The literature on the 
globalization process and identity politics focuses on two dominant approaches: the 
homogenizing impact of the globalization process and the resurgence of identity politics 
that triggers fanaticism and fundamentalism. While the former argues that a global 
order based on the universalization of western liberal democracy has been emerging as 
a result of the globalization process under the impact of the hegemony of the west, in 
particular the US, the latter argues that the globalization process revitalizes a major 
challenge to global modernity because it gives rise to the resurgence of identity politics 
leading ethnic and religious identities to rediscover their own roots as a reaction to 
encountering other identities. While the first approach has become weaker in academia, 
the second approach dominates the literature on globalization and identity politics. 
Particularly, the reinvention of the past and the resurgence of identity politics based on 
a constructed past amplify concerns about the future of the liberal tradition of tolerance 
and multiculturalism because of the global growth of religious fundamentalism and 
ethnic fanaticism in the globalized world.  
 The recent developments in Turkey, which I conceptualize as the emergence of 
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defensive inclusion, puts forward a third approach to the relationship between the 
globalization process and identity politics. While the Turkish case shares some aspects 
of the first approach because of its inclusion of modern norms (e.g., multiculturalism, 
tolerance, and dialogue), defensive inclusion diverges from the homogenization thesis 
because of the reinvention of the Islamic tradition to construct a legitimate and inclusive 
Islamic identity rather than westernization excluding Islamic tradition. On the other 
hand, defensive inclusion is different from the second approach because Turkish/Islamic 
circles rediscover their own roots under the impact of globalization, but this process 
does not trigger religious fundamentalism and fanaticism. In contrast, it leads to 
emergence of a more inclusive polity. Thus, defensive inclusion is neither a form of the 
homogenization thesis, nor the resurgence of exclusionary identity politics; yet, the 
reinvention of the past in a defensive way to prove that modern norms are already part 
of Turkish/Islamic tradition under the impact of globalization that poses serious 
legitimacy concerns to the Islamic movements. 
 This dissertation in the meantime helps us understand the moderation of Islamic 
movements by showing the transformative and progressive role of tradition.  Because of 
the dichotomy between tradition and modernity, it is a common approach to see the 
persistence of tradition or the reinvention of the past as merely a rejective reaction to 
the modernization process. Of course there are many examples verifying these kinds of 
arguments, but a static approach to tradition overlooks certain aspects of tradition, 
particularly its progressive role for religious movements. For Islamic circles in Turkey, 
tradition plays a crucial role in the legitimization of certain modern developments in the 
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globalized world. This dissertation has shown that the reinterpretation of tradition in 
line with global modernity allows Islamic movements to establish an Islamic discourse 
embracing modern norms such as multiculturalism, pluralism, and tolerance. 
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APPENDIX A 
LAUSANNE TREATY 
 
Section III 
Protection of Minorities 
 
 
Article 37 
Turkey undertakes that the stipulation's contained in Article 38 to 44 shall be 
recognised as fundamental laws, and that no law, no regulation, nor official action shall 
conflict or interfere with these stipulation's, nor shall any law, regulation, nor official 
action prevail over them. 
Article 38 
The Turkish Government undertakes to assure full and complete protection of life 
and liberty to all inhabitants of Turkey without distinction of birth, nationality, 
language, race or religion. 
All inhabitants of Turkey shall be entitled to free exercise whether in public or 
private, of any creed, religion or belief, the observance of which shall not be 
incompatible with public order and good morals. 
Non-Moslem minorities will enjoy full freedom of movement and of emigration, 
subject to the measures applied, on the whole or on part of the territory, to all Turkish 
nationals, and which may be taken by the Turkish Government for national defence, or 
for the maintenance of public order. 
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Article 39 
Turkish nationals belonging to non-Moslem minorities will enjoy the same civil and 
political rights as Moslems. 
All the inhabitants of Turkey, without distinction of religion, shall be equal before 
the law. 
Differences of religion, creed or confession shall not prejudice any Turkish national 
in matters relating to the enjoyment of civil or political rights, as, for instance, 
admission to public employment's, functions and honours, or the exarchate of 
professions and industries. 
No restrictions shall be imposed on the free use by any Turkish national of any 
language in private intercourse, in commerce, religion, in the press, or in publications of 
any kind or at public meetings. 
Notwithstanding the existence of the official language, adequate facilities shall be 
given to Turkish nationals of non-Turkish speech for the oral use of their own language 
before the Courts. 
Article 40 
Turkish nationals belonging to non-Moslem minorities shall enjoy the same 
treatment and security in law and in fact as other Turkish nationals. In particular, they 
shall have an equal right to establish, manage and control at their own expense, any 
charitable, religious and social institutions, any schools and other establishments for 
instruction and education, with the right to use their own language and to exercise their 
own religion freely therein. 
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Article 41 
As regards public instruction, the Turkish Government will grant in those towns and 
districts, where a considerable proportion of non-Moslem nationals are resident, 
adequate facilities for ensuring that in the primary schools the instruction shall be given 
to the children of such Turkish nationals through the medium of their own language. 
This provision will not prevent the Turkish Government from making the teaching of 
the Turkish language obligatory in the said schools. 
In towns and districts where there is a considerable proportion of Turkish nationals 
belonging to non-Moslem minorities, these minorities shall be assured an equitable 
share in the enjoyment and application of the sums which may provided out of public 
funds under the State, municipal or other budgets for educational, religious, or 
charitable purposes. 
The sums in question shall be paid to the qualified representatives of the 
establishments and institutions concerned. 
Article 42 
The Turkish Government undertakes to take, as regards non-Moslem minorities, in 
so far as concerns their family law or personal status, measures permitting the 
settlement of these questions in accordance with the customs of those minorities. 
These measures will be elaborated by special Commissions composed of 
representatives of the Turkish Government and of representatives of each of the 
minorities concerned in equal number. In case of divergence, the Turkish Government 
and the Council of the League of Nations will appoint in agreement an umpire chosen 
  231 
from amongst European lawyers. 
The Turkish Government undertakes to grant full protection to the churches, 
synagogues, cemeteries, and other religious establishments of the above-mentioned 
minorities. All facilities and authorisation will be granted to the pious foundations, and 
to the religious and charitable institutions of the said minorities at present existing in 
Turkey, and the Turkish Government will not refuse, for the formation of new religious 
and charitable institutions, any of the necessary facilities which are granted to other 
private institutions of that nature. 
Article 43 
Turkish nationals belonging to non-Moslem minorities shall not be compelled to 
perform any act which constitutes a violation of their faith or religions observances, and 
shall not be placed under any disability by reason of their refusal to attend Courts of 
Law or to perform any legal business on their weekly day of rest. 
This provision, however, shall not exempt such Turkish nationals from such 
obligations as shall be imposed upon all other Turkish nationals for the preservation of 
public order. 
Article 44 
Turkey agrees that, in so far as the preceding Articles of this Section affect non-
Moslem nationals of Turkey, these provisions constitute obligations of international 
concern and shall be placed under the guarantee of the League of Nations. They shall 
not be modified without the assent of the majority of the Council of the League of 
Nations. The British Empire, France, Italy and Japan hereby agree not to withhold their 
  232 
assent to any modification in these Articles which is in due form assented to by a 
majority of the Council of the League of Nations. 
Turkey agrees that any Member of the Council of the League of Nations shall have 
the right to bring to the attention of the Council any infraction or danger of infraction of 
any of these obligations, and that the Council may thereupon take such action and give 
such directions as it may deem proper and effective in the circumstances. 
Turkey further agrees that any difference of opinion as to questions of law or of fact 
arising out of these Articles between the Turkish Government and any one of the other 
Signatory Powers or any other Power, a member of the Council of the League of 
Nations, shall be held to be a dispute of an international character under Article 14 of 
the Covenant of the League of Nations. The Turkish Government hereby consents that 
any such dispute shall, if the other party thereto demands, he referred to the Permanent 
Court of International Justice. The decision of the Permanent Court shall be final and 
shall have the same force and effect as an award under Article 13 of the Covenant. 
Article 45 
The rights conferred by the provisions of the present Section on the non-Moslem 
minorities of Turkey will be similarly conferred by Greece on the Moslem minority in 
her territory. 
 
